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Abstract
Bilinear pairings have been recently used to construct cryptographic schemes with new and 
novel properties, the most celebrated example being the Identity Based Encryption scheme 
of Boneh and Franklin As pairing computation is generally the most computationally in­
tensive part o f any painng-based cryptosystem, it is essential to investigate new ways in 
which to compute pairings efficiently
The vast majority o f  the literature on pairing computation focuscs solely on using ellip­
tic curves In this thesis we investigate pairing computation on supersingular hyperelliptic 
curves of genus 2 Our aim is to provide a practical alternative to using elliptic curves for 
pairing based cryptography Specifically, we illustrate how to implement pairings efficiently 
using genus 2 curves, and how to attain performance comparable to using elliptic curves
We show that pairing computation on genus 2 curves over F 2m can outperform elliptic 
curves by using a new variant of the Tate pairing, called the r¡j pairing, to compute the 
fastest pairing implementation in the literature to date We also show for the first time how 
the final exponentiation required to compute the Tate pairing can be avoided for certain 
hyperelliptic curves
We investigate pairing computation using genus 2 curves over large prime fields, and 
detail various techniques that lead to an efficient implementation, thus showing that these 
curves are a viable candidate for practical use
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1.1 Public Key Cryptography
In 1976, a seminal paper by Diffie and Heilman [22] gave a solution to the key agreement 
problem, and introduced the revolutionary concept o f public key cryptography Symmetric 
key cryptography uses a single secret key for both encryption and decryption purposes In 
this context, the key agreement problem is to devise an efficient protocol to allow multiple 
parties to agree upon a secret key over an insecure channel, even if the participants in the 
protocol have not met before The security of Diffie and Heilman’s elegant solution to this 
problem is based on the intractability of the so-called Diffie-Hellman Problem in a cyclic 
Abelian group However, Diffie and Heilman restrict this definition to the multiplicative 
group of a finite field, denoted F*, in their paper
Aside from the problem of key agreement, symmetric key cryptography has inherent 
problems in distributing keys in a practical and secure manner, thus hampering its deploy­
ment in commercial or digital environments Public key cryptography consists o f two keys, 
one which is kept public and distributed freely, and the other which is private The two 
keys are linked by a one-way function, such that knowledge of the public key reveals no 
information about the private key However, a party that knows the private key can decrypt 
information that is encrypted with the public key The security o f  a public key scheme re-
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lies on a problem that is believed to be intractable if an adversary lacks certain information, 
such as the Discrete Logarithm Problem or the Diffie-Hellman Problem mentioned above 
In this section, let G \ be an additively written cyclic group of pnme-order n  with gen­
erator P , such that G[ = (P )n
Definition 1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in G \ is the following given (P, [x}P)
€ G \ find  the integer x  e  [0, n  — I], wheie [x\P denotes P  -f P  + Pv 1 ^
t tu n e s
Pohlig and Heilman [89] showed that an instance of the DLP in an arbitrary cyclic group 
can be reduced to an instance of the DLP in a prime-order subgroup Therefore, the order n  
o f G \ should be a large prime number, or at least divisible by a large prime that is approxi­
mately the size of n The Pollard-rho algorithm [90] is the best algorithm that is known for 
solving the DLP in a generic group (see also Pollard’s Kangaroo method [90]), and it has 
a fully exponential running time of group operations However, Nechaev [87] and
Shoup [108] showed that the best possible algorithm to solve the DLP in a generic group 
runs in time £l(y/n) This shows that Pollard-rho is essentially the best possible generic 
algorithm to attack the DLP As Pollard-rho has a fully exponential running time, the DLP 
is an intractable problem in the abstract setting
However, every cyclic group of order n  is isomorphic to the additive group o f integers 
(modulo n) with generator 1, and the DLP is trivial to solve in this group This implies that 
the difficulty of the DLP in a particular group depends on the representation of the group 
elements In other words, although the best possible generic algorithm to attack the DLP has 
an exponential running time, there may be efficient algorithms to attack the DLP m specific 
groups, that exploit the way that group elements are represented Therefore, it is crucial 
to consider attacks on specific groups when choosing a group to implement cryptographic 
schemes based upon the intractability o f the DLP
The Diffie-Hellman Problem is closely related to the DLP
Definition 2 The (computational) Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) in G \ is the following  
given (P, [a]P, [b]P) €  G f find  the element [ab]P 6 Gi
2
The DHP reduces to the DLP in polynomial time, meaning that if the DLP is tractable 
in a given group, then the DHP is also tractable To see why this is so, let (P  [a]P [&]P) be 
an instance of the DHP in G\ Then an adversary can compute the DHP by first finding the 
integer a  by computing the DLP instance (P, [a]P), and then computing [a] ([t>] P ) =  [ab\P 
There is some evidence that the DLP also reduces to the DHP in polynomial time e g , see 
den Boer [10], Maurer [76], and Maurer and Wolf [77] However, this remains unprovcn 
for the general case
To motivate the discussion on the DLP and DHP, we briefly describe the key agreement 
protocol due to Dtffie and Heilman in the case o f  three parties, which requires two rounds of 
communication The order n  and the generator P  o f the group are public parameters Each 
party ? 6 [0,1, 2] generates a secret integer x t 6 [0, n — 1), and computes the element [xl]P  
In the first round of communication, each participant sends their \x l]P  value to one o f the 
other participants, such that each party receives a value Each participant then computes 
the multiple of this element by their secret integer x u and sends this value again to another 
participant Each party then has the shared value K  = [2:0X1 x^]P  Any eavesdropper is left 
with the task o f computing K  given (P, [xo]P, [x\]P, [x2]P, [xqx\]P, [ z i t 2]P, [xqT2]P) 
which implies solving the DHP When all o f  the participants have a shared secret, some 
publicly agreed method is used to extract a key from it, which can then be used in a sym­
metric key cryptosystem
The first practical public key encryption and signature scheme was devised by Rivest, 
Shamir and Adleman (RSA) [93] in 1978 The security o f  RSA is based on the so-called 
RSA assumption, a problem believed to be equivalent to the integer factorisation problem 
In 1985, the ElGamal [26] cryptosystem was published, which was the first complete cryp­
tographic scheme for encryption/decryption that was based on the intractability of the DLP 
At this point, cryptographic schemes that used the DLP as a cryptographic primitive typi­
cally followed the original Diffie and Heilman paper, by using the multiplicative group of a 
suitable finite field ¥ q o f charactenstic p  Although the multiplicative group of a finite field 
is easy to describe and to implement, the DLP in this setting is vulnerable to sub-exponential
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time index calculus attacks This means that large cryptographic key sizes must be used in 
practice to maintain security levels
As the DLP is described in a generic setting, it is natural to examine groups other than 
F* The ideal candidate group would be impervious to all attacks that are faster than the 
generic Pollard-rho algorithm The other requirements are that the group elements can be 
represented in a compact manner, that the group operation can be computed efficiently and 
that the group order can be computed in polynomial time Schnorr [100] proposed using 
a subgroup o f prime order n  o f F*, where n can be substantially smaller than q In 1985, 
Miller [83] and Koblitz [63] independently suggested using the group of rational points on 
an elliptic curve over a finite field F ? No sub-exponential attacks are known to exist for this 
particular group, and thus key sizes can remain small The group elements are simply points 
on the curve, and the group operation corresponds to the inexpensive geometric chord-and- 
tangent operation The group order can also be computed efficiently and thus elliptic curves 
fulfil all o f the requirements for use in DLP based cryptosystems
In 1989, Koblitz [64] suggested using a more general class o f curves over ¥ qi namely 
hyperelhptic curves o f  arbitrary genus We note that it is not theoretically exact to equate 
elliptic curves with hyperelhptic curves of genus 1 However, for cryptographic purposes 
this equivalence holds true, as we concentrate on the arithmetical properties which are the 
same in both cases, and thus elliptic curves are also automatically considered
The set o f rational points on a hyperelhptic curve of genus g >  1 over F g, denoted 
C (¥ q), does not form a group Instead the divisor class group of degree zero is used, 
denoted P ic ^ (F 9) The group elements can be represented m a compact manner, and an 
efficient algorithm due to Cantor [14] exists to perform the group arithmetic It remains 
to examine the security o f P ic ^ (F g) The running time for the Pollard-rho algorithm in 
P ic ^ F q )  is 0 ( q 9/ 2) The best index calculus attack on the DLP in Pic£.(Fg) is due to 
Gaudry et al [40] The complexity of this attack is 0 ( q 2~2^9), and is therefore faster than 
Pollard-rho for genus g >  3, as long as q is sufficiently large However, hyperelhptic 
curves of genus 2 are invulnerable to these attacks, and along with elliptic curves are a
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good candidate for implementing DLP based cryptosystems
1.2 Bilinear Pairings
Bilinear pairings were first introduced to cryptology by Menezes et al [80] and Frey and 
Ruck [30], to attack instances o f the DLP on elliptic curves and hyperelhptic curves How­
ever, in 2000 Joux [52] and Sakai et al [99] showed how bilinear pairings could be used 
constructively, to build cryptographic protocols with unique properties The literature now 
contains a vast amount o f  pairing based protocols, many of which provide long-desired 
solutions to outstanding protocol questions In this section, bilinear pairings and their asso­
ciated hard problems are defined For a more detailed discussion on this topic, the reader is 
referred to Menezes [79], or Galbraith and Menezes [34]
Let G i =  (P )n be an additively written Abelian group of prime order n  and identity 
element oo, and let G2 be a multiplicatively wntten Abelian group of prime order n  with 
identity element 1 A restricted definition of a bilinear pairing is now provided that is 
suitable for most cryptographic applications This definition, which is commonly deployed 
both in theory and m practice, restricts both input elements to the pairing as belonging to 
the same additive group
Definition 3 A bilinear pairing on (G i, G2) is a map
e G 1 x Gi —> G 2
that satisfies the following requirements
1 (Bilinearity) For all R , S ,T  e  G \, e ( R + S ,T )  = e ( R ,T ) e ( S ,T )  an de(R , S + T )  = 
e{R , S )e{R , T )
2 (Non-degeneracy) e(P , P )  ^  1, where P  =£ 00
3 (Computability) e can be efficiently computed 1 e in polynomial time
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For all b , T  & G  j ,  a bilinear pairing has the properties
1 e(S, oc) =  e(oo, 5 )  =  1
2 (Bilineanty) e([a]S\ [6]T) =  e(5, T ) ab for all a, b €  Z
3 (Symmetry) e(S^T ) = e(T  6 )
It is the bilinearity property that allows the development o f new and exciting cryptographic 
protocols, as detailed later on in this chapter A large number of pairing based cryptosys­
tems rely on the property of symmetry associated with the restriction of both input elements 
to the same additive group The non-degeneracy requirement ensures that cryptographic 
applications are not trivial Finally, the stipulation that the pairing e can be efficiently com­
puted is fulfilled by computing either the Weil or Tate pairings using the degree zero divisor 
class group o f a hyperelliptic curve, as will be detailed in the following chapter
The bilinearity property implies that the DLP in G \ can be reduced efficiently to the 
DLP in G 2 Let (P, [x]P) be an instance of the DLP in G \ Then the bilinearity property 
gives the equality e(P , [ t]P )  =  e(P , P ) r 6 G 2 Therefore, solving the DLP instance 
(P, [r]P ) £ G \ is equivalent to solving the DLP instance [e(P  P ) , p(P, [rr]P)) 6 G \
Definition 4 Let e b e  a bilinear pairing on (G i , G 2) The (computational) Bilinear Diffie- 
Hellman Problem (BDHP) is the following given (P, [a]P [b]P, [c]P) € G \ compute 
e(P, P ) abc £ G 2
The BDHP is assumed to be just as hard as the DHP in G \ and G 2 It is known that 
if the DHP is tractable m either G \ or G2, then the BDHP is also tractable However, it
is not known if  the converse is true If the DHP in G \ is tractable, then the BDHP can be
computed as [ab]P and then e(\ab\P , [c)P) =  e (P  P )abc Alternatively, if the DHP in G 2 
is tractable, then the BDHP can be computed by letting q =  e(P, P ), and then computing 
(jab =  e([a]P, \b]P), gc =  e(P , [c]P) and gabc Therefore, the DHP (and hence the DLP) 
in both G 1 and G 2 needs to be intractable to guarantee the (assumed) security of a pairing 
based cryptosystem that uses the BDHP as a cryptographic primitive
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Interestingly, Joux and Nguyen [53] show that that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Prob­
lem is efficiently computable in G 1 using bilinear pairings, even if the DHP is intractable
Definition 5 The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP) is the following given 
(P , [a]P  [b\P, \c}P) e C \ decide whether [c]P =  [a6]P
The DDHP in G \ can be computed as follows Let 71 =  e(P, \c]P) =  e(P, P )c and 
72 =  e([or]/-’, [b]P) = e (P  P )ah Then [c]P =  [ab]P if and only if 71 =  72
1.3 Cryptographic Applications of Bilinear Pairings
As mentioned in the previous section, following the introduction of painngs in a construc­
tive manner, a large amount of attention has been devoted to using bilinear pairings to build 
cryptosystems with new and novel properties As motivation for the work in this thesis, brief 
descriptions o f  two important pairing based protocols are given, namely the key agreement 
protocol o f Joux and the identity based encryption schcme of Boneh and Franklin
13 1 A one-round, three-person key agreement protocol
As noted previously, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol can be used to agree keys 
between three participants in only two rounds However, in 2000 Joux [52] showed the 
surprising result that it is possible to achieve this in only one round using bilinear pairings, 
thus solvmg a long outstanding question as to whether this was possible at all Here this 
protocol is described as modified by Verheul [113] to reduce the bandwidth requirements 
Again, each party i €  [0,1,2] generates a secret integer e  [0, 7i -  1], but this time 
broadcasts the element [x J P  to both o f the other parties, and receives the elements [xz_i ]P 
and [a^+iJP (where the subscript o f x  is considered modulo 3) Note that the three messages 
are independent o f each other, and thus all communication between the participants can 
be said to occur in a single round Each party can then establish a shared secret key as 
K  =  e([3:l_ i ]P ) [xi+ i]P )x‘ =  e(P , p ^ i - i ^ t + i  a  (passive) eavesdropper must solve an 
instance o f  the BDHP to determine the shared key
Joux’s one-round key agreement protocol can be extended to n participants, by using an 
efficiently computable multilinear map G " -1 —> G 2 , for which a suitable extension of the 
BDHP is intractable However, the construction of multilinear maps that can be efficiently 
computed is an open problem In fact, Boneh and Silverberg [13] present evidence that 
it may not be possible to construct such multilinear maps using techniques from algebraic 
geometry In any case, Joux’s protocol is not feasible from a practical point o f  view, as 
it only resists passive attacks, and must have an extra round of communication to resist a 
man-in-the-middle attack by an active adversary However, it is useful as an example of 
how bilinear pairings can be used to provide an elegant solution to cryptographic protocols 
previously thought impossible
13 2 Identity based encryption
In 1984, Shamir [107] called for a public key, identity based encryption scheme in which 
the public key can be an arbitrary string Shamir’s original motivation for this scheme 
was to simplify the management o f certificates in email systems For example, if Alice 
wants to send an encrypted email to Bob, she encrypts the message using Bob’s public 
key string, which simply corresponds to his email address This differs considerably from 
traditional certificate-based schemes, where Alice needs to obtain the certificate containing 
Bob’s public key from some trusted source When Bob receives the encrypted message 
he contacts a third party, known as the Pnvate Key Generator (PKG) Bob authenticates 
himself to the PKG and obtains his private key O f course, this means that kcy-escrow 
is inherent in Identity Based Encryption (IBE), as the PKG knows Bob’s private key By 
appending a future date to Bob’s public key string, Alice can also ensure that a fresh key is 
used if she thinks that Bob’s pnvate key has been compromised
In 2000, Sakai et al [99] suggested that bilinear pairings could be used to achieve 
identity based cryptography In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [11] realised the first concrete 
implementation of IBE, which is based on bilinear pairings (and hence on the intractability 
o f  the BDHP) Here, the basic idea o f Boneh and Franklin’s IBE scheme is presented
Let e G \ x G \ —> G 2 be a bilinear pairing for which the BDHP is intractable, and let 
Hi {0,1}* —> O i\{oo }  and TT2 G 2 —> {0, l} i be cryptographic hash functions, where 
I is the bit length of the plaintext m  to be encrypted The PKG selects a private key ¿> at 
random from [1, a -  1], and computes its public key as Q =  [s]P It is assumed that all 
entities have an authentic copy of Q
Bob’s private key is d s  =  where Q b  =  H i ( ID b ), and I D b  is the public
key string associated with Bob’s identity Note that computing db  from (P, Q ,Q b )  is an 
instance of the DHP in G[, which only the PKG can compute as it has access to the secret 
value s  Alice encrypts a message m  € {0,1}*, by first randomly selecting an integer 
r 6  [1 , n — 1] and then computing the following values
Q b  =  H i(ID b ):  Ci = [i]P  C2 = m  © H 2 {e(Q si Q Y )
The ciphertext that Alice sends to Bob is then (C i, C2) Bob can recover the original 
message m  from the ciphertext (C i, C2) by using his private key d s  to compute
m  = C 2 © I l 2 { r (d s , C \))
To see how the bilinearity property of the pairing enables the decryption of the ciphertext, 
observe that
e(dB , C{) =  e{\s\Q B , [r]P) =  e(Q B , (s]P )r =  e(Q B , Q f
An adversary who attempts to recover m  from the ciphertext (C i,C 2) has to compute 
c(Q b > Q Y  from (P, Q b , Q, C i), which is an instance of the BDHP
1.4 Motivation for this Work
Bilinear pairings have been described thus far in a generic sense To implement pairing 
based cryptographic protocols, such as the two protocols described in the previous section,
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it must be shown how to construct pairings m a more concrete manner There are only two 
bilinear pairings that are of interest for cryptographic purposes, namely the Tate pairing 
and the Weil pairing In these eases, the group G\ is (loosely) the subgroup of order a o f 
the degree zero divisor class group of a hyperelliptic curve defined over a finite field F qk, 
where k  is known as the embedding degree of the curve, and the group G 2 is the group 
of the 71th roots o f unity in ¥ gk Ideally, the embedding degree should be large enough 
to protect against index calculus attacks in G 2, yet small enough to allow for the efficient 
implementation of ¥ qk In an unpublished manuscript in 1986 (later published in 2004), 
Miller [82, 84] described how to implement the Weil pairing efficiently using a double-and- 
add algorithm This algorithm, now known as M iller’s algorithm, can be easily adapted to 
compute the Tate pairing
Computing either the Weil or the Tate pairing in an efficient manner is essential, as 
pairing computation is generally the most intensive task in any painng based cryptosystem 
Therefore, it is important to investigate ways in which to speed up pairing computation, if 
cryptographic protocols that are based on pairings are to be adopted in practice In recent 
years, a large body of work has appeared in the literature to address this issue, and much 
progress has been made in implementing bilinear pairings in an efficient manner as a re­
sult Indeed, over the course of twenty years, the time to compute ciyptographically secure 
bilinear pairings has decreased dramatically, from several minutes to only a few millisec­
onds [5, 103] Although the performance o f pairing-based cryptosystems is approaching 
that o f cryptographic schemes such as RSA, there is still considerable motivation to im­
prove pairing computation, as it is an open question as to whether pairing based schemes 
might offer improved performance over traditional public key protocols
The vast majority o f  the literature on painng computation focuses solely on using ellip­
tic curves The reasons for using elliptic curves to compute pairings are largely the same 
reasons as to why elliptic curves are preferred for discrete-log based cryptosystems Firstly, 
the description o f the group elements as rational points on the curve is far simpler than the 
complicated divisor theory involved in using hyperelliptic curves of genus greater than one
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Secondly, the representation o f group elements in the elliptic curve case requires only 2 field 
elements, as opposed to 4 in the genus 2 case, 6 in the genus 3 case, etc Thirdly, the group 
law is vastly simplified m the elliptic case as it corresponds to the simple manipulation of 
geometric lines, as opposed to using Cantor’s algorithm for composition and reduction of 
divisors The group operation for elliptic curves costs less in general than the group law for 
hypcrelhptic curves of higher genus
However, despite the numerous apparent advantages of using elliptic curves, there are 
compelling reasons to investigate pairing computation on other hyperelhptic curves Firstly, 
no efficient pairing implementations on curves of genus g > 1 exist, meaning that protocol 
designers can only consider using elliptic curves It is o f considerable theoretical and prac­
tical importance to provide an alternative to using elliptic curves for pairing computation 
However, we focus solely on using hypcrelhptic curves of genus 2 The added complexity 
of the group law for hyperelhptic curves of genus g > 2 makes the group arithmetic dif­
ficult to implement in an efficient manner, and there are very few examples o f  such curves 
that are useful for pairing based cryptography
Secondly, considerable effort has gone into deriving explicit formulae for the group 
law for genus 2 curves e g ,  see Lange [70], which improve substantially on the generic 
algorithm due to Cantor [14] Avanzi [1] uses these formulae to show that a careful imple­
mentation of scalar multiplication on genus 2 curves over large prime fields is extremely 
competitive with elliptic curves It is natural to wonder then whether pairing computation 
on genus 2 curves is competitive also with the equivalent elliptic curve implementations 
Thirdly, curves o f genus 2 have a richer algebraic structure than those of genus 1 It is possi­
ble that this additional structure can be exploited in some way to speed up the computation 
Rubin and Silverberg [96] show that the maximum embedding degree L o f supersingular 
genus 2 curves is 12 over and 6 over ¥ p The interesting value for security purposes 
is k /g , where g is the genus o f  the curve The maximum security parameter for genus 2 
curves is attained in characteristic 2 (k /g  =  6), as opposed to characteristic 3 for elliptic 
curves (k /g  =  6) This is another reason to consider using genus 2 curves, as working in
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characteristic 2 is preferable to using fields of characteristic 3 Supersingular genus 2 curves 
over F2171 with a maximum embedding degree o f k — 12 are known to exist However, there 
are no known curves over Fp with an embedding degree of k =  6 Instead, a supersingular 
genus 2 curve defined over Fp with an embedding degree of k =  4 is known to exist 
The vast majority of efficient implementations of finite field arithmetic use cither binary 
extension fields or large prime fields F p Coincidentally, supersingular genus 2 curves 
only have interesting embedding degrees over these fields
In this thesis, pairing computation on supersingular hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 over 
both F2m and F p is investigated, using curves with the maximum embedding degree that 
is known in each case Specifically, it is illustrated how to implement pairings efficiently 
using these curves, and how to attain performance comparable to using elliptic curves The 
handful o f papers that exist on this topic in the literature yield inefficient implementations 
relative to elliptic curves In this thesis, the open question as to whether genus 2 curves 
provide a viable alternative to using elliptic curves for pairing computation is answered in 
the affirmative This thesis deals solely with improvements to the actual computation o f 
pairings, and does not focus at all on cryptographic protocols that are based on bilinear 
pairings
The structure o f this thesis is as follows Chapter 2 provides an overview of elliptic 
and hyperelliptic curve cryptography, the Weil and Tate pairings, and M iller’s algorithm 
Chapter 3 is a literature review of papers dealing with advances in the computation o f 
pairings The research contribution of this thesis is split into three chapters Chapter 4 
explores the computation o f  the Tate pairing on a supersingular genus 2 curve over ¥ 2^  
Chapter 5 uses a new variant o f the Tate pairing, called the 777 pairing, to compute the fastest 
pairing implementation in the literature Is is also shown for the first time how the final 
exponentiation required to compute the Tate pairing can avoided for certain supersingular 
curves Chapter 6 details the computation of pairings on a supersingular genus 2 curve 
over Fp, vastly improving on results available in the literature A new variant o f  M iller’s 





Cryptography that is based on the properties of algebraic curves is not an easy discipline as 
it involves deep mathematical concepts In this chapter, an overview of the mathematical 
techniques that are fundamental to the work in this thesis is provided This chapter states 
some of the results given in the previous chapter in a more concrete manner It is not our 
intention to be comprehensive, instead the interested reader can pursue any o f the numerous 
references that are cited throughout the chapter
Firstly, finite fields are examined Finite fields play an important role in modem cryp­
tography, and it is essential to represent finite field elements in such a way that allows for 
an efficient implementation Various bases for representing finite fields, as well as details 
about how to implement arithmetic, are investigated The relative cost o f  various funda­
mental finite field operations is also explored See Lidl and Niederreiter [75] for a more 
comprehensive treatment on this topic
Secondly, hyperelliptic curves and their applications in cryptography are examined 
Some divisor theory is given, and a group is constructed with a compact representation 
o f the group elements An algonthm is given to perform the group operation It is then 
detailed how this group is suitable for cryptography, and the DLP is defined in this context
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Menezcs et al [81] provide a good “elementary” overview of using hyperelliptic curves 
in cryptography Another thorough review is found in Jacobson ct al [56], Galbraith and 
Menezcs [34], and in various chapters of Cohen ct al [19] A compact treatment of this 
topic is given in Hietalahti [49]
Thirdly, two concrete implementations of hyperelliptic curves are examined, namely 
hyperelliptic curves of genus 1 (elliptic curves), and hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 The 
vast majority o f implementations in the literature use one o f these types o f  curves Fourthly, 
we make concrete the abstract notion of a bilinear pairing, by introducing the Tate pairing 
and the Weil pairing These pairings are given in the more general setting of hyperelliptic 
curves, rather than using elliptic curves, as is common in the literature An algorithm is 
given to compute pairings, and finally the chapter is concluded Good references on this 
topic are chapter 9 of Blake et al [9], as well as chapters 6 and 16 of Cohen et al [19]
2.2 Finite Fields
A field is a commutative ring for which every non-zero element has a multiplicative inverse 
Let A and L  be fields such that A C L  An element a  6 L  is said to be algebraic over A if 
there is a polynomial j ( x )  in one variable with coefficients m K , such that f ( a )  =  0 The 
field L is an algebraic extension of A if every element of L is algebraic over K
Definition 6 An algebraic closure oj a fie ld  K , is a fie ld  K  containing K , such that K  is 
algebraic over K  and every nonconstant polynomial with coefficients in K  has a root m 
K  i e K  is algebraically closed
The field K  has prime characteristic p , if  there is a prime p  such that 1 H-1 -f- + 1  =  0
(p  times), where 1 is the multiplicative identity, and 0 is the additive identity o f  the field 
Otherwise, K  is said to have characteristic 0 If  a field K  has prime characteristic, then K  
contains the finite field of integers modulo p, l e { 0 ,1 , ,p  -  1}, denoted F p For any 
prime p, and any positive integer m , there exists a finite field with q = pm elements This 





The multiplicative group o f nonzero elements of F (/, denoted F*, forms a cyclic Abelian 
group of order q -  1 For any element o- e  F*, then <V/_1 =  1 due to the theorem of La­
grange, and therefore a (} = a  This map can be generalised, as in the following definition
Definition 7 The q-th power Frobemus automorphism <j>(} o f  ¥ q is defined as
fo r  all x  £ Fq We will sometimes refer to the p-th power Frobemus automorphism (pp o f  a 
finite fie ld  F 9 o f  characteristic p which is defined as
fo r  all x  e ¥ q
Let ¥ q and ¥ qk be finite fields, such that F qfe is a finite extension of ¥ q Then Fg* 
can be regarded as a vector space of dimension k  over ¥ q This means that there is a 
basis (A)>/?ij 1)» where {3t e  ¥ qk9 such that every element a  6 F g* has a unique
representation of the form
k—1
« = 5 2  «.a ,
1=0
where al e  ¥ q The element a  e  ¥ qk is denoted by the F q-vector (ao, a i , , a^_ 1) The 
addition of two finite field elements is performed on the ax components of the two elements 
However, the multiplication of two elements requires knowledge about the dependencies 
between the elements of the basis There are many different bases o f F ^  over F 9, however
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two bases are mainly used in practicc
The most commonly implemented basis is the polynomial basis Let F g[x] be the ring 
of polynomials in x A polynomial /  € ¥ q[x] is said to be irreducible if j  has positive 
degree, and the equation j  =  be implies that either b 6 F 9[j,] or c G F 9[a] is a constant 
polynomial If j  €  F jx ]  is an irreducible polynomial over ¥ q o f degree k, then a finite 
field with qk elements is constructed by adjoining a root of j  to F^ For every finite field 
Fq, and every positive integer k , there exists an irreducible polynomial m F^fjc] o f  degree 
k I f  f3 e  Wqk is a root o f } ,  then (1 ,P k~l ) is called the polynomial basis o f
F ^  over F g Addition, subtraction and multiplication are performed modulo /  Inversion 
can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm in ¥ q[x] Irreducible binomials, 
trinomials and pentanomials are commonly used to define extensions of a finite field, as 
they allow for a fast reduction
A less commonly used basis is known as the normal basis The element ¡3 e  ¥ gk is 
said to be normal over F^ if the elements (/?, ¡3g (3q2, j/?9* 1) are linearly independent
over Fq Then the basis (/? Pqi f iq21 ^¡3qk *) is called a normal basis o f F ^  over ¥ q
For every finite field ¥ q and positive integer k, there exists a normal basis of F ^  over ¥ q 
Using a normal basis, exponentiating an element a  6 ¥ qk to the power of q can be achieved 
with a simple shift of the vector representation This is particularly useful for finite fields 
o f characteristic two, as squarings become trivial as a result However, squaring can also 
be speedily implemented in characteristic 2 using a polynomial basis, by inserting the 0 
bit between every other bit o f the binary representation of the element, and then reducing 
modulo the irreducible polynomial A further advantage o f using a polynomial basis is 
that the multiplication of two elements in the normal basis is complicated and requires the 
precomputation of a table Therefore, in this thesis only polynomial bases are considered 
Two particular types of finite fields are commonly used in cryptography, namely binary 
fields F 2m, where rn is prime to avoid Weil descent attacks (see Gaudry et al [39]), and 
large prime fields Fp Addition in F 2m reduces to a bitwise XOR operation, and hence this 
field is commonly deployed in hardware implementations F 2™ also has the advantage that
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Tabic 2 1 The ratios S /M  and I / M  in MIRACL
Finite Field S /M I / M
FJTp
F 2™
0 8 —> 1 0 
0 1 0 25
10 -> 40 
9 - »  13
squaring in this field is substantially faster than multiplication Note that no irreducible 
binomials exist over F2, and therefore either a trinomial or pentanomial should be used 
as the irreducible polynomial Large prime fields F p have the advantage o f being simple 
to implement, as no field extensions are involved However, the ratio between squarings 
and multiplications is far larger than for F2™ Optimal extension fields Fpd, where the 
irreducible polynomial defining the extension allows for a fast reduction, are sometimes also 
used (particularly in embedded applications) These fields are deployed if it is necessary to 
avoid the specific disadvantages o fF 2^  o rF p
Computing the ratios S /M  and I ¡ M  in F p and F 2™ is o f considerable interest when 
implementing finite field arithmetic, where 5, M , I  denote a squaring, multiplication and 
inversion respectively However, the ratios depend on a wide range of parameters, such as 
the representation used, whether the implementation is m software or hardware, how much 
optimisation is used, etc This implies that different implementations yield widely differing 
estimates Nonetheless, it is useful to provide these ratios to assess the cost o f inversion 
in particular The MIRACL [102] library provides a suite of test programs for calculating 
the ratios S /M  and I / M  m both F 2™ and F p The implementation o f both F 2m and Fp 
includes numerous platform-specific enhancements and is highly optimised The testing 
includes different parameters for m  and p, that range from 103 to 2048 bits The results are 
included in Table 2 1, on our platform o f a Pentium IV, 2 8 GHz Note that the ratio I / M  
can be far more expensive for F p than it is for F 2m We emphasise that I / M  is expensive 
in F p due mainly to the highly efficient way multiplication is implemented in MIRACL 
If f  £  F9[x] is an irreducible polynomial o f degree k , then j  has a root a  in F qk All 
o f the roots of /  are given by the k  distinct elements (a , a q, , a qk~l ) £ F qk, which are
called the conjugates of a  with respect to ¥ q
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t = l
and the norm o f  a  is given by
k
NF4t/F ,(«)= n ® ’
1=1
2.3 Hyperelliptic Curves
Definition 9 An (imaginary quadratic) hyperelliptic curve C  o f  genus g >  1 over the fie ld  
K  is defined by an equation o f  the form
C  y 1 + h (x )y  =  f ( x ) ,
where h(x)  6 K [x\ is o f  degree at most g and j ( x )  €  K[x] is momc o f  degree 2 g +  1
C  must be non-singular, meaning that there are no pairs (x  y) G K  x K  which satisfy 
both the equation of the curve C, and the partial denvative equations
2y  +  h (x)  =  0, h f(x )y  -  f ( x )  =  0
When the characteristic of K  is not equal to 2, then the equation C  can be transformed into 
y 2 — f ( x ) ,  where j  (a:) has degree 2g +  1, by the change of variables
x  ^  x  y ( y ~ h ( x ) / 2)
In this case, the condition on the partial derivatives is met if and only if f ( x )  has no repeated 
roots in K
Definition 10 Let L  be a fie ld  containing K  Then the set o f  L-rational points on the curve 
C, denoted L (C ) is defined to be the set offin ite points { (x ,y )  e  L  x  L } that satisfy the
Definition 8 Let a  £  F qk Then the trace o f  a  is given by
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equation o f  the curve C  along with the point at infinity oo The set o f  K-rational points 
C (K )  is denoted C  fo r  short
The opposite o f a point P  = (x ,ij) £ C , denoted —P , is the unique other point on the 
curve with the same a>coordinate, and is computed as - P  =  (x, —y — h (x )) If P  =  oo, 
then - P  =  oo If  a finite point is equal to its opposite it is called special, otherwise it is 
said to be ordinary
Definition 11 A divisor D  is a finite form al sum ofpoints on C  such that
D  =  5 2  m t (P t )
where m l E Z, and m v =  0 fo r  all but finitely many Px 6 C
The degree o f a divisor is the integer Y l rni The support of a divisor is the finite set 
{P% E C  | 7?7t ^  0} The set o f divisors forms a free Abelian group, denoted D ive, under 
the addition law
52  n^ p ' ) + 5 2  = 52  + rn>)(p.)
The (sub)group of divisors o f  degree 0 is denoted D iv£ The greatest common divisor of 
two divisors D i =  £ n t(P t) e  D iv^ and D 2 =  ^ m ^ P , )  € D iv^ is also an element of 
D iv^, and is computed as
gcd(£>i,£>2) =  m in im *,n t)(P t) -  ( ^ m i n ( m 1, n l))(oo)
Given a point P  e  C , and a function /  considered on C, if  /  (P ) =  0 then /  is said to 
have a zero at P  If /  is not defined at P , then /  is said to have a pole at P , in which case 
/ ( P )  =  oo The order of a function at a point, or the number of zeros or poles at a point, 
can be computed in the following way
Definition 12 L e tG (x y y) be a polynomial with coefficients in K  considered as a function
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on C  As y 2 can be repeatedly replaced with f ( x )  — h(x)y , an equivalent polynomial 
C7(x, y) can be obtained such that G (x^y) = a(x) -  b (x)y Then the order o f  G (x , y) at a 
point P  6 C denoted o rdp  G is computed as follows
1 P  =  (x p :y p ) is a finite point Let G be m the form  (t, — ¿ p ) 7(ao(x) — bf^(x)y), 
where (x — x p )  does not divide both ao(a:) and bo(x) I f  ao (xp) — bo(xp)yp  ^  0 
then let s — 0  otherwise let $ be the exponent o f  the highest power o f(x  — j. p) which 
divides «o(x ) +  h(x)ao(x)bQ(x) — f(x)bQ (x) I f P  is an ordinaly point then define 
o idp  G ~  ! +  6 otherwise define o rdp G  = 2 r +  6
2 P  =  oo Then ordooG =  — m ax(2 deg(o), 2r; +  1 +  2deg(b))
To any G (x ,y )  such that G  ^  0, the divisor (G) =  ^ (o rd p , G )(P t ) is associated A 
rational function R  on C  is defined as a ratio R  = G (x , y ) /H ( x ,  y), with H  ^  0 To such 
a rational function the divisor (G / H ) = (G) -  (H ) € D iv^  is associated The order o f  R  
at a point P  € C  is defined to be o id p R  =  o idp  G  — o id p  H , if  H (P )  ^  0 Note that 
ordp  R  does not depend on the choice of G and H  Evaluating a divisor D  =  m , (Pt) at 
a rational function R  is computed as
assuming that (R )  and D  have disjoint support If R  and D  are both defined over K , then 
R (D ) € K  The divisor of a rational function is called a principal divisor, and such divisors 
form a subgroup of D iv^  A principal divisor also has the property that £  rnxPl =  oo
Definition 13 The (degree zero) divisor class group P ic%{K) o f  C  over K  is the quotient 
group o f  the degree zero divisors defined over K  modulo the principal divisors defined over 
K  It is also known as the Picard group o f  C
Two divisors D \ and D 2 are equivalent (when considered as elements o f P icq {K )), 
denoted D \ ~  D 2, if their difference D \ -  D 2 is a pnncipal divisor, i e D \ =  D 2 -+ (R ), 
for some rational function R
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Definition 14 A semi-reduced divisor D is o f  the form  D = nh{Pi) ~  (53 Wt)(oo) such 
that
1 All m l >  0 and the P t are finite points
2 I f  P% ^  — P% then only one o f  them occurs in the sum with m t ^  0
3 I f p l — —pl then m t <  1
Any D  G D iv^ can be modified by a pnncipal divisor to obtain an equivalent D \ ~  D  
such that D \ is a semi-reduced divisor This implies that every coset o f P icq (K )  can be 
represented by a semi-reduced divisor
The field K  is defined from now on to be F f/, the finite field of q elements A divisor D  
is said to be defined over if D a =  m t ( P f )  = D , for all automorphisms o  o f F (/ over 
F (/, where P a =  (cr(x), cr(y)) if  P  =  (x, y) and oo^ =  oo The theorem of Riemann-Roch 
implies that every element o f P ic ^ (F f/) can be represented uniquely by a semi-reduced 
divisor D  = m , (Pi) — m i)(°°X  wlt^ additional property that m , <  g, where
q is the genus of the curve Semi-reduced divisors with this property are known as reduced
divisors
The degree zero divisor class group P icq(K )  is isomorphic to the Jacobian o f the curve 
C  defined over K , denoted Jc{K )  The Jacobian is an Abelian variety of dimension q 
P ic ^ (X )  is also isomorphic to the ideal class group of the function field K ( C ), which is 
the field of rational functions on C  Mumford [86] introduced a way of representing a semi­
reduced divisor as the greatest common divisor o f  two prmcipal divisors o f functions of the 
form u(x) and t;(x) -  y This uses the ideal class group representation, and is extremely 
useful for implementation
Definition 15 A (non-tnvial) semi-reduced divisor D  ~  — ( ^ m i)(oo) €
D iv q (K )  can be represented by two polynomials [u,v] with coefficients in F g such that 
u (x) =  ~  x t)mt and v ( x l) — y % with the following properties
1 u  is momc
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2  deg v <  deg u <  g
3 it | v 2 +  vh  — f
The identity element o f  P ic^(iT ) is represented in Mumford notation as [1, 0] A divisor 
in Mumford representation [w, v] is reduced if and only if deg(w) <  g I f  D  is defined over 
F^, then u and v are also defined over ¥ q However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
points in the support of the divisor are defined over ¥ q
Cantor [14] showed how to perform group arithmetic in P ic ^ ( /f )  using Mumford rep­
resentation, assuming that h(x) =  0 and p  ^  2 This algorithm was later generalised by 
Koblitz [64] to remove these conditions The group operation is split into two steps The 
first step, called composition, takes as input two semi-reduced divisors D \ and D 2, and 
outputs a semi-reduced divisor D f ~  D \  +  D 2 This is given in Algorithm 1 The second 
step o f the group operation is called reduction, and reduces the semi-reduced divisor D ' to 
an equivalent reduced divisor This is given in Algorithm 2
Algorithm  1 Divisor Composition 
I n p u t  = [uh v1]iD2 = [u2,v2]
O u tp u t  D f ~  D \ +  D% D f =  [u -u]
1 Compute d\ =  gcd (u i, ¿¿2) =  e \u \ +  e2u2
2 Compute d =  gcd(di V1 + V2 + h) = c \d i 4- c2 (v\ + v 2 +  h)
3 s i < -  c ie i, 52 c \e2, 63 c2
4 u (u iu 2 ) /{ d 2)
5 v (si«iV 2 4- 52^ 2^ 1 +  53(^ 1 v2 + f ) ) / d  m od u6 Return [u v]
A lgorithm  2 Divisor Reduction
Input D  =  [u, u] semi-rcduced
O u tp u t D* = \v\ v!] reduced with D f ~  D
1 v! ( /  — vh — v2)/u, vr <— (—h — v) mod v f
2 if deg uf > g then
3 u <—  uf, v vf
4 >  Go to step 1
5 end if
6 > Make uf momc
7 R etu rn  [u\ vf]
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Pic® (Fg) is a finite Abelian group which fulfills all the criteria given in Chapter 1 for 
implementing a DLP-based cryptosystem The group elements can be represented in a 
compact and simple manner due to the representation of Mumford The group operation 
can be performed efficiently due to the algorithm of Cantor The DLP is defined in the 
hyperelliptic context as follows
Definition 16 The Hyperelliptic Discrete Logarithm Problem (HCDLP) in P ic ^ F ^ )  is the
follow ing given (£>, \x]D) G FiCQ(¥q)2, find  an integer x  6 [0, # P ic ^ ( F v) — 1] where
\x]D denotes D  -f D  +  D  1 J ' v "i times
Computing [x\D  efficiently is essential for cryptosystems based on the intractability of 
the DLP It is inefficient to repeatedly add D  to itself when x  is a large integer Instead, it is 
far more efficient to use the double-and-add algorithm (also known as square-and-multiply 
when using multiplicative notation) The double-and-add algorithm takes 2[log2(^)J oper­
ations in the worst case, and 3[log2(x )J /2  operations on average, assuming that a doubling 
is computationally equivalent to an addition On average, x  will have a Hamming weight 
of log2(x )/2 , which necessitates log2(t-)/2  additions It is possible to improve the per­
formance of the double-and-add algorithm by using a windowing algorithm to reduce the 
number of additions If  x  is written in non-adjacent form (NAF), it is possible to reduce 
the number of additions to log2(z ) /3  This method is effective if x  does not have a low 
Hamming weight
The best attack on the HCDLP is due to Gaudry et al [40], which has complexity 
0 ( q 2~2tQ) This is faster than the generic Pollard-rho attack for genus g > 3 There­
fore, hyperelliptic curves o f genus 1 or 2 are typically used when implementing DLP-based 
cryptography It remains to examine how to determme the cardinality o f  the group
Definition 17 The Hasse-Weil bound gives a bound on the group order that depends only 
on the underlying finite fie ld  ¥ q and the genus q o f  the curve,
(Vq — l)2s -  #PiCc(F«j) < (\/9 + l)2s
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Therefore, the group order for an arbitrary hyperelliptic curve of genus g over F g is 
roughly given as # P iC q (F q) «  q9
Definition 18 The q-th power Frobemus endomorphism <j>q on a hyperelliptic curve C  
defined over F (/ is given by
where P ^ q =  ( r q, y <!) and
P < (F ,)  Pic“ (F,)
OO q = CO
When a divisor is written in Mumford representation [1/ v], then the ç-th power Frobe- 
nius endomorphism of Pic® (Fg) operates on the coefficients o f  u  and v as the q-th power 
field automorphism Therefore, applying the ç-th power Frobemus endomorphism to a di­
visor in Mumford representation requires at most 2g operations in F (/ For a hyperelliptic 
curve C  o f  genus g defined over F,,, the Frobemus endomorphism <j>q satisfies a character­
istic polynomial o f degree 2 g o f the form
XC(T) = T 2" + a jT 2''- 1 + + a gT>+ + a lq“- iT  + q\
where a t 6 Z The characteristic polynomial o f  the Frobemus endomorphism factors as 
\ c ( T )  =  where the are complex numbers of absolute value x[q Once the
values are known, then both the number of the points on the curve C  and the cardinality 
o fP icg .(F ,r), for some integer r  >  1 , can be computed efficiently
Lem m a 1 Let C  be a hyperelliptic curve o f  genus g over F 9 and let \ c  (T) =  ü f = i  (T  — 
a t) be the characteristic polynomial o f  the Frobemus endomorphism Then fo r  any integer
r > 1





= n a  -  o
1 = 1
Therefore, it is possible to compute #Pic® (Fyr) by first deriving the aL coefficients of 
X c{T ), and then factoring x c { T )  to obtain the a t Each at coefficient can be obtained by 
computing # C (F qi) For a curve of genus g , this involves computing the number of points 
on the curve C (¥ qi) for 1 < i < g This technique is useful for Koblitz curves, which 
are curves defined over a small field, and then considered over a large extension field For 
example, all o f the genus 2 curves in characteristic 2 that are examined in this thesis are 
defined over F 2, but considered over ¥ 2^  However, this method is not generally useful for 
determining the cardinality of P ic ^ (F p) for large p, as computing # C ( F pt) is a non-tnvial 
task In this case, an algorithm can be used to compute ~xc directly (1 e without computing 
the number of points on the curve) Once \ c  is known, the group order can be computed 
as # P ic ^ ( F p) =  x c ( l )  Chapter 17 of Cohen et al [19] provides an overview of such 
algorithms
Menezes et al [80] show how to reduce the (HC)DLP in Pic£.(Fg) to the DLP in F** in 
probabilistic polynomial time using the Weil pairing (actually their paper gives this result 
for elliptic curves) Frey and Ruck [30] use the Tate pairing to achieve the same effect for 
curves of arbitrary genus, and hence the attack is frequently referred to by the initials of 
the authors as MOV/FR As index calculus attacks exist with sub-exponential complexity 
in F*fc, then the reduction implies that the DLP in P ic ^ (F g) can be compromised if k is 
small k  is a positive integer that is defined in the following way
Definition 19 Let C  be a hyperelhptic curve o f  genus g over F«j and let D  E P ic^(Fg) be 
a divisor o f  pnme-order n, which is co-prime to q Then the embedding degree k o f  (D )n 
is the smallest positive integer such that n  \ qk — 1 In other words F g/t is the smallest fie ld  
that contains the group o f  the nth roots o f  unity
When selecting a curve to implement a DLP-based cryptosystem, it is desirable to have
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an embedding degree k that is as large as possible to avoid the attack of MOV/FR For the 
majority o f  hyperelliptic curves this is automatically satisfied, and when considering the 
same curve over different fields, k varies over the whole range 1 , q9 However, for a
certain class of curves that are called supersingular, the embedding degree k is relatively 
small, which makes supersingular curves unsuited to implementing DLP-based cryptogra­
phy Yet it is precisely this property that makes supersingular curves excellent candidates 
for pairing based cryptography An Abelian variety over ¥ q is supersingular if it is lsoge- 
nous (over F g) to a product o f supersingular elliptic curves A hyperelliptic curve C  over 
Wq is called supersingular if the Jacobian, J c ( F g), is supersingular
As hyperelliptic curves o f  genus g over ¥ q have a group size o f  approximately q9 ele­
ments, they can be defined over the field ¥ qt, where qf ~  to attain the same group size 
as an elliptic curve defined over F g However, this also implies that the genus of a curve 
should be taken into account when assessmg the security afforded by an embedding degree 
k  This is due to the MOV/FR attack, which uses the Tate pairing or the Weil pairing to 
transfer the DLP to the group F*k/g The so-called security parameter is then defined as the 
embedding degree divided by the genus o f the curve
Galbraith [32] gives a bound k(g) on the embedding degree of supersingular Abelian 
varieties of dimension g over ¥ q This bound depends solely on the genus, and not on 
the Abelian variety itself For example, for supersingular Abelian varieties o f dimension
2 the bound is A, (2) =  12, and for supersingular Abelian varieties o f  dimension 3, the 
bound is k(3) =  30 As the embedding degree must be divided by the genus to give a more 
accurate estimation o f the security, low genus supersingular hyperelliptic curves cannot give 
much more security from the MOV/FR attack than supersingular elliptic curves However, 
Rubm and Silverberg [96] show that Galbraith’s bounds are not achieved by simple Abelian 
varieties o f  dimension g > 3 An Abelian variety is simple if it does not decompose as a 
product o f lower dimension Abelian varieties As it is essential to work in large primc-order 
subgroups in cryptography, splitting Abelian varieties are not interesting For the dimension
3 example, the actual bound that can be attained is k (3) =  18 (i e again k /g  =  6)
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Table 2 2 The maximum embedding degrees of supersingular hypcrelhptic curves over 
F ,  [96] ____________________________________________
genus(g) 1 2 3
q arbitrary (Galbraith’s bounds) 6 12 30
q square 3 6 9
q nonsquare, p — 2 4 12 *
q nonsquare, p — 3 6 4 18
q nonsquare, p >  3 2 6 14
It is important to note that supersingular hypcrelhptic curves of genus g may not be 
known with the maximum embedding degree as given by Rubin and Silverberg For exam­
ple, there is no known example o f a supersingular hyperelliptic curve of genus 2 over Fp 
with an embedding degree o f k =  6, only an embedding degree of k =  4 The maximum 
embedding degrees for supersingular hyperelliptic curves of small genus are summarised 
m Table 2 2 Supersingular hyperelliptic curves of genus 3 with embedding degree 14 only 
exist in characteristic p — 7, not for large p, and so this case is not interesting for cryp­
tography As can be seen in Table 2 2, supersingular hyperelliptic curves only attain large 
embedding degrees in small characteristic However, due to Coppersmith [21] a subexpo- 
nential attack exists on the DLP in the finite field F*mfc which is faster than in F*fc This is 
an argument against using supersingular curves for pairing based cryptography, as opposed 
to ordinary curves over Fp, as larger finite field parameters must be used
2.4 Implementing Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography
As explained in the previous chapter, only hyperelliptic curves o f  genus 1 (elliptic curves) 
and hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 are interesting for implementing cryptosystems that are 
based on the intractability o f  the DLP In this section, more details are given on how these 
curves are used in cryptography
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A non-singular elliptic curve E  defined over a field K  is given by an equation of the form
E  y 2 -f a \xy -\-  a$y = x 3 +  ci2X2 +  a^x  +  ag,
where a \ , a2, a-$, 0,4, clq €  A As detailed in the previous section, the elements of the group 
P ic ^ (F 9) of a hyperelliptic curve C  o f genus g can be represented by a semi-reduced divisor 
D  =  rnt (Px) -  (J2 m t )(oo), with the property that 52 <  5 F°r an elliptic curve, this
means that D  has only a single finite point Pq €  E (¥ q) in its support with ??io =  1, such 
that D  is of the form D  =  (Pq) — (oo) Therefore, there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between elements o f P ic ^ F ^ )  and the points in E (¥ q), where [1 , 0] is equivalent to the 
point at infinity oo In other words, £ ( F g) is isomorphic to P ic ^ (F 9) Therefore, it is 
possible to work solely with E ( ¥ g), the F g-rational points on the curvc, rather than use 
Mumford representation as for elements o f  P ic^(Fg) Note that for a hyperelliptic curve o f 
genus g >  1, the points on the curve do not form a group
The point at infinity oo can be thought of as a point on the y-axis, which lies so far away 
from the rc-axis, that any vertical line (i e x  =  c, where c is a constant) passes through it 
Cantor’s algorithm for performing group arithmetic in P ic ^ (F q) corresponds exactly to the 
geometric chord and tangent operation on E (¥ q)y which is desenbed as follows
Definition 20 Let P>Q 6  E (F q), 1 be the line connecting P  and Q (or tangent line to E  
i f  P  =  Q) and i? be the third point o f  intersection o f] with E  Let v be the vertical line 
connecting R  and oo Then P  + Q is the point such that v intersects E  at R, oo and P  + Q
This definition easily yields explicit formulae for the group law that depend on the 
coordinates o f  the input points These formulae are far simpler and faster to implement than 
the generic algorithm due to Cantor for arithmetic in Pic® (¥ q) Many different coordinate 
systems are available with which to perform group arithmetic The advantage o f using 
alternatives to the standard affine coordinates is to eliminate expensive field inversions, 
or to reduce the cost o f  doubling a point, which is the most prevalent operation in scalar
2 4 1 Elliptic curves
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Table 2 3 Cost o f group arithmetic for elliptic curves in ¥ p




Chudnovsky Jacobian Coordinates 
Modified Jacobian Coordinates 
Montgomery Scalar Multiplication
/ ,  2M, 5  
12M, 25  
12 M , 4 5  
11M, 35  
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9M , 25
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4M , 45  
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/ ,  2M , 5  
16M, 25 
16M, 35  
13M, 4 5  
4M , 15
I , 2M , 5 
8 M , 4 5  
5M , 55 
5M , 45 
2M , 35
multiplication The cost o f the group operation using different coordinates in ¥ p is given in 
Table 2 3, and in F2™ in Table 2 4 Note that 7, M , 5  denote a field inversion, multiplication 
and squaring, respectively A clear conclusion to be drawn from Table 2 3 is that affine 
coordinates in F p should be avoided, as the ratio J /M  is large The situation is not so clear 
in F 2"i as field inversion is not as expensive as in ¥ p
The set o f points on an elliptic curve forms a finite Abelian group which meets all of 
the requirements for implementing a DLP-based cryptosystem It has the added advantage 
o f having an extremely simple representation and algorithm to compute the group law The 
group E ( ¥ q) has thus far resisted any successful attempt to apply the mdex-calculus As a 
result, it is possible to use smaller field sizes for elliptic curve cryptography than for finite 
field cryptography It remains to determine the cardinality o f the group The Hasse-Weil 
bound on the cardinality o f P ic ^ (F g) for a general hypcrelliptic curve C  over ¥ q is
(v/9 - l ) 2s< # P i4 ( F , ) < ( v^ + l ) 2i'
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Tn the elliptic curve case this simplifies to
(<? ~ 2\/<? + 1) < #E (¥q) < {q + 2 \ / i  + 1 ),
from which the identity # j£ (F 9) =  <7 +  1 — / is obtained, where |/| <  2^/q The value 
t is called the trace of the Frobenius endomorphism The characteristic polynomial of the 
Frobenius endomorphism for an elliptic curve E  over ¥ (] is x e { T )  =  T 2 +  a jT  +  q The 
cardinality of E ( ¥ (]) can be evaluated with y c (1 ) — 1 +  oi +  where ai =  —t Once 
# E ( F (J) is known, it is trivial to find # E ( ¥ (Jr) for some integer r  >  1 Let x e ( T )  =  
(T  -  ao){T  -  oei), then
# E ( ¥ qr) = qT +  1 -  a rQ ~  o^,
where ao and a \  are conjugates Several algorithms exist to compute the group order o f  an 
elliptic curve E  defined over a large prime field F ;J in polynomial time, the first o f which 
was given by Schoof [101]
In the previous section, an Abelian variety was defined as supersingular if it is isogenous 
to a product o f supersingular elliptic curves (over F 7) Clearly, this definition is incomplete 
without defining supersmgulanty in the context o f elliptic curves
Definition 21 An elliptic curve E  over Fg =  F pm is supersingular i f  and only i f  t = 0 
m od p where t is the trace o f  the Frobenius Otherwise the curve is ordinary
In other words, for a curve to be supersingular the characteristic p  must divide the trace 
of the Frobenius t This can only happen if # E ( ¥ q) =  1 m od p I f  p > 5, then E  
is supersingular over F p only if  the trace o f the Frobenius t equals zero, in which case 
# E ( ¥ P) = p +  1 This yields an extremely fast method to evaluate a scalar multiple of 
a point P  =  (x  y) As the trace is zero, the characteristic polynomial o f the Frobenius is 
Xb(<t>p) =  </>p+P =  0 Therefore \p]{x,y) = -<fi2 (x ,y )  = (xp2, - y p2), which is extremely 
efficient to compute, as raising an element in Fp to the power of p 2 is a linear operation
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This technique can be used in scalar multiplication by writing the scalar to the base p and 
using multi-exponentiation
The set o f torsion points are the points whose order is finite, which is the case for all 
points on E  over ¥ q The set o f /i-torsion points is defined as follows
E[n} = { P \ P e E ( W q),{n}P  = ( ^ ) }
There are exactly r?2 ^-torsion points When p  is the characteristic of then a curve is 
ordinary if E\p] ~  Z y„ and supersingular if  E\p] ~  0 In other words, supersingular curves 
have no finite points o f order p with coordinates in ¥ q
2 4 2 Genus 2 curves
A non-singular (imaginary quadratic) hyperelliptic curve C  o f genus 2 over a field I< is 
given by the equation
C  y 2 +  h (x )y  =  f ( r ) ,
where h(x)  is a polynomial in K  o f  degree at most 2, and f ( x )  is a momc polynomial 
in K  o f degree 5 All genus 2 curves are hyperelliptic, which is not the case for curves 
of genus ry >  2 There is no isomorphism between P ic ^ (F r/) and C (¥ q), unlike in the 
elliptic case, and therefore C (F f/) does not form a group The elements of P ic^ (F r/) arc 
represented by a reduced divisor D  =  5 2 m ,(P j) ~  CH'm i)(00)> where 52 m , < 2 It is 
possible to enumerate all the different types o f  reduced divisors that arise for genus 2 curves, 
D  — (0), D  =  (Po) -  (oo), D  =  2(Pq) -  2(oo) and D  — (Pq) +  (P i) -  2(oo) Divisors 
with a single finite point in the support are called degenerate divisors, and will prove to be 
extremely useful in pairing computation later in this thesis Elements o f P ic ^ (F g) for genus 
2 curves are represented as [x2 + u \x  +  uq, v \ x  +  i>o], using the notation of Mumford 
It is relatively inefficient to use Cantor’s algorithm to compute the group law lor genus 
2 curves, as it is a genenc algorithm designed to cater for all possible curvc equations and
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Table 2 5 Cost o f group arithmetic for genus 2 curves in F p




/ ,  22 M , 35  
47 M , 4 5  
47M , 75
I  22Af, 55 
38M , 65  
34M , 75
genera A large amount o f  work has been done on deriving explicit formulae from Cantor’s 
algorithm for genus 2 curves It is only necessary to derive formulae for the most common 
case, which is when the divisors have maximal degree 2 and the finite points in the support 
all have different x-coordinates Cantor’s algorithm can then be used to handle the other 
rarely-occurring cases This work culminated in Lange’s formulae [70] for the affine case 
Miyamoto et al [85] introduced projective coordinates, which Lange [68] improved and 
extended to even characteristic Lange [69] also introduced “new” coordinates as a general- 
isation of elliptic Jacobian, Chudnovsky Jacobian and modified Jacobian coordinates from 
elliptic curves to hyperelliptic curves of genus 2
The cost o f doubling and addition using the explicit formulae and various coordinate 
systems is given in Table 2 5 m Fp and Table 2 6 in Genus 2 curves over F 2^  can be 
classified depending on the h(x)  polynomial The cost in Table 2 6 assumes that k (x )  — 
I12X2 4- h ix  4- Hq, where the leading coefficient h2 ^  0 Large speedups can be obtained 
when some of the coefficients o f h (x)  are equal to 0 For example, curves of genus 2 where 
h(x)  is constant are supersingular, and extremely efficient explicit formulae can be derived 
for the group operation Examining the tables, it is clear that inversion must be costly to 
justify using the alternative coordinate systems over affine coordinates Using the ratios of 
I / M  and S /M  over Fp and F2™ m Table 2 1, affine coordinates are more efficient for F 2m 
as well as in all but the most inefficient parameters for Fp Recently, Gaudry [38] and others 
have extended Montgomery scalar multiplication to the genus 2 case, which promises to be 
much more efficient than the coordinate systems given in Tables 2 5 and 2 6
Therefore, genus 2 curves are a good alternative to using elliptic curves for DLP-based 
cryptography Group elements can be represented in a reasonably compact manner as 4
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Tab e 2 6 Cost o f  group arithmetic for genus 2 curves in F 2
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elements o f  F 9, and the explicit formulae for performing the group law are far more ef­
ficient than using Cantor’s algorithm As with elliptic curvts, no algorithm exists to date 
for attacking the DLP in P ic ^ (F g) with complexity lower than the generic Pollard-rho al­
gorithm The Hasse-Weil bound on the order o f Pic® (Fg) for genus 2 curves implies that 
# P ic ^ ( F q) «  q2 However, the size of the group for elliptic curves over ¥ q is only around 
q This means that a genus 2 curve can be defined over a finite field of y/q elements to 
maintain the same security as an elliptic curve defined over a finite field o f q elements 
Smaller field sizes lead to more efficient implementations, particularly if a field element 
can fit inside a hardware register However, this must be balanced against the more difficult 
arithmetic required in the genus 2 case
As with elliptic curves, the Frobenius endomorphism can be used to speed up scalar 
multiplication for genus 2 Koblitz curves over F2m, e g see Gunther et al [44] The 
characteristic polynomial o f  the Frobenius endomorphism for a genus 2 curve C  over ¥ q is 
given as
4
X c (T )  =  T 4 +  a iT 3 + a2T 2 + a ig T  +  q2 =  J ] ( r  “  « .)
1 = 1
where a i a2 6 Z, and the are complex numbers o f absolute value y/q The group order 
over ¥ qr, for some integer r > 1, can be computed as
4
# p .c^ ) = r i ( w )t—1
The group order over F g can be computed by determining the coefficients a\ and <72 of 
X c (T ) , and then evaluating x c ( l )  These coefficients are given as a\ =  # C ( ¥ q) -  q -  1
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and a2 =  ( # C ( F ff2) -  q2 -  1 -F a2) / 2 Using this method to compute the group order 
over an extension of ¥ q involves determining the tv, by factoring x c {T )  However, this 
technique is only practical for curves defined over small fields Numerous algorithms exist 
to compute # P ic ^ ( F 9) for genus 2 curves in a more general way, see chapter 17 of Cohen 
et al [19] for more details
The set o f /¿-torsion divisors, P ic^[/t], is given as
P k & M  = { D \ D e  P i c ^ , [a]D =  (0)}
Pic^[n] has group structure (Z /r?Z)4 in the genus 2 case As with elliptic curves, supersin- 
gular genus 2 curves have no divisor D  o f order p  in ¥ q See Galbraith [32] for more details 
on supersingular (genus 2) curves in cryptography
2.5 The Tate Pairing
The Tate pairing (also called the Tate-Lichtenbaum pairing) was introduced to cryptogra­
phy by Frey and Ruck [30], as an alternative bilinear pairing to the Weil pairing In the 
context o f pairing based cryptography, the Tate pairing is a pairing of Jacobian varieties 
defined over a finite field Let C  be a hyperelliptic curve defined over a finite field ¥ q, 
and let ri be a (large) prime such that n |#P ic<?(F9) n  is also required to be co-prime 
to q to avoid the attack o f Ruck [98] Let k be the embedding degree as defined previ­
ously, and let D \ €  P ic ^ (F 9*)[u], such that [n\Di =  ( / ) ,  for some function /  Let 
D2 6 P ic ^ (F gfc)/aP ic^(F gjt) To ensure a non-tnvial pairing value, D \ and D 2 must have 
disjoint support
Definition 22 The Tate pairing o f  level n  is a map
{, )„ Pk&(F,*)M  X P i c ^ V n P i c ^ F ,* )  -> F;t /(F(>)"
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and is defined as
( D u D 2)n = } ( D 2)
The Tate pairing satisfies the follow ing properties
1 (Bilinearity) ([a]D\ , [b]D2)n =  { ^ 1, D 2) ^ f o f  all a ,b  G Z (modulo nth powers)
2 (Non-degeneracy) For each divisor D \ G P i c ^ F ^ f n ]  D \ ^  (0) thete is some 
divisor D 2 G PiCQ(Ff/fc)/nPic® (F(/t)  such that ( D i ,D 2) ^  (F*k)n
3 (Computability) {D \ , £>2)n be efficiently computed
The subscript n  in ( , )n can be dropped if it is obvious from the context The first input 
to the Tate pairing is an element of P i c ^ F ^ ^ n ] ,  the group of n-torsion divisors in F (/fc 
However, the second input is an element of P i c ^ F ^ / n P i c ^ F ^ ) ,  where n P ic ^ F  *) =  
{[n\D  \ D  € P ic ^ (F 7a:)} is a subgroup of P i c ^ F ^ )  The quotient group Pic® (F ^ )  /  
7 iP ic^(Ff/A:) is the set o f  equivalence classes of elements in P ic ^ (F f/fc) under the equiva­
lence relation D \ ~  D 2 such that (D \ -  D 2) G t i P i c ^ F ^ )
Let r? be a pnm e as defined, and let P ic ^ (F y) have no elements o f  order 772 In other 
words, n 2 should not divide # P ic ^ ( F f/) Then the group P\Cc(Fqk)/nP iC c(F qk) is iso­
morphic to P ic ^ (F f/fc)[7?] Therefore, the second input to the Tate pairing can be taken to 
be an element of the n -torsion group However, it is unnecessary to restrict D 2 to this 
group, as the output o f  the Tate pairing is not affected by the choice o f D 2 E P ic ^ (F f/fc) as 
representative of the class Therefore, the Tate pairing is defined as the simplified map
Pic£(F,t)[n] x P.c^F,,*) -  F^/(FJ*)"
The output o f the Tate pairing is an element o f the quotient group F*fc /(F * fc )n Let p n =  
{w G F*k | u n =  1} be the group of the nth roots of unity, and define (F*fc)n =  {u n \ u  G 
F*fc}, which is a subgroup of F*fc The quotient group FJfc/(F * fc)n is isomorphic to p n 
Two elements a,b  e  F*^ are equivalent (when considered as elements o f F*k/ (F*k)n)
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if  a /b  € (F*fc)" In other words, a =  be" for some c (E F**. As the output of the 
Tate pairing is defined up to a multiple by the 71th power of c e  F*^, it is necessary to 
modify the output to obtain a unique value suitable for cryptography An obvious way to 
remove the nth powers is to exponentiate the pairing value to the power of (qk -  1 ) /n ,  as 
(cn)(<^-i)/n _  c{qk- i)  — j hls exponentiation is known as the “final exponentiation”, 
and the resulting pairing is known as the reduced Tate pairing
Definition 23 The reduced Tate pan ing is defined as
The non-degeneracy property of the (reduced) Tate pairing states that for a given divi­
sor D \ e  Pic® (Fqk)[n], apart from D \ — (0), there is a divisor D 2 e  Pic® (¥qk) such 
that ( D \ ,D 2) ^  1 However, a method is needed to construct D 2 such that the pair­
ing is non-degenerate As will be detailed in the following chapter, instead of defining 
D \ € P ic£ (F  * )M , it is common in practice to define D \ over F g, l e D \ 6 Pic® (Fg^n] 
If  D 2 is also defined over F g and k  >  1 then the pairing value is degenerate, as it will be 
eliminated by the final exponentiation Two techniques are known to construct D 2 to guar­
antee non-degeneracy in the case that D \ G Pic® (Fg) The first technique uses distortion 
maps on supersingular curves, and the second uses trace maps on ordinary curves
Verheul [113] introduces distortion maps and shows how to apply them to pairing com­
putation Let D  e  P ic ^ F y )  be a non-tnvial divisor with prime order n, such that n 2 does 
not divide # P ic ^ ( F (/), and let the embedding degree k >  1 A distortion map ip is then 
a non-rational endomorphism which maps D  € P ic ^ (F r/) to D' E P ic ^ (F <./fc)\P ic^(F i/) 
Distortion maps are used to guarantee non-degeneracy, as the so-called modified pairing of 
random elements D ' in a specific subgroup o f order n  in Pic® (F^t)
Definition 24 Let D \ ,D 2 e  P ic ^ (F g)[n] Then the modified pairing is defined as
I
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1 he modified pairing is guaranteed to be non-degenerate as the distorted divisor D f2 =  
0 (D 2) is linearly independent from D i Another advantage to using distortion maps is that 
they facilitate the generation of random elements D' €  P ic ^ (F gfc), which can be done by 
simply generating a random D  £ P ic ^ F ^ )  and then using ip to map D  into the larger 
field As distortion maps always exist for supersmgular curves, the modified Tate pairing is 
commonly used in practice
Distortion maps do not exist on ordinary curves, and hence a different technique must 
be used in this case to guarantee non-degeneracy Let D \ €  P ic^  (Fqk ) The trace map on 
D \ is defined as
k
t> (A ) = £ M ° i) € P icc (f ,).
where (j)qx is the qlth power Frobemus endomorphism The trace map can be used to 
guarantee a non-degenerate pairing m the following way Let D \ ,D 2 £ P i c ^ F ^ ) ^ ] ,  
D u D 2 t  P i 4 ( F , )  and T r ( A )  +  (0) Then
(Tr(Di),D2)^k- ^ n ^  1
Another bilinear pairing is the Weil pairing An additional constraint on the prime 
subgroup order n |#Pic®  (F^), n  co-prime to q, is that n  must also be co-pnme to q — 
1 This condition ensures that the Weil pairing is efficiently computable Let D \ ,D 2 E 
Pic^OfyOfa], where D \ and D 2 are in distinct cyclic subgroups of order n  Let /  be a 
function such that ( / )  =  [n]£>i, and g be a function such that (g) =  [n]£>2 Again, to 
ensure a non-tnvial pairing value, D \ and D 2 must have disjoint support
Definition 25 The Weil pairing is a map
e „ ( , ) P ic ^ (F 9t)[/i] x Picg;(F,k)[n] — ftn ,
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( r\ n \ f ( Dz)
en {D u D 2 ) =  ^ m
The Wed pait ing has the following properties
1 (Bilinearity) en ([a \D i, [b]D2) =  en (D \: D 2 )ab fo t all a, b € Z
2 (Non-degeneracy) Foi each divisor D\ E P ic ^ (F gfc)[n] D i ^  (0) there is some
divisor D 2 E P ic ^ (F qk)[n] such that en ( D i ,D 2) ^  1
3 (Computability) er, (D i , £>2) can be efficiently computed
4 (Alternating) For all D \ D 2 € P i c ^ F ^ n ]  then en ( D i ,D 2) = en (D 2, Z)i)_1
5 (Compatibility) I fD 1 € Pic® (F9t)[nm ) and D 2 6 P ic£ (F 9fc)[n] then enm(D i, D 2 ) =
en ([m \D u D 2)
6  lf(j) E  —> E f is an isogeny with dual 4> then en((p(P), Q) = cn(P : 4>(Q))
The Weil pairing can be computed using two applications of the Tate pairing such that
{D \, D 2 )n
and is defined as
en(Di, D2) = CP2.A)«’
where the equivalence is up to nth powers Note that this implies that en (D \, D \)  =  1, 
which is not necessarily the case for the Tate pairing When assessing which is the more 
efficient pairing, the comparison is between the final exponentiation to (qk — 1) j n  required 
for the (reduced) Tate pairing, and the computation of (D 2 ,D \ ) n required for the Weil 
painng This question will be explored further in the following chapter, however it suffices 
to say for the moment that the Tate pairing can be computed more efficiently Therefore, 
the Tate pairing is the most interesting pairing for cryptographic applications
A bilinear pairing is said to be symmetric if swapping the arguments yields the same 
pairing output As the Weil pairing can be calculated with two applications of the Tate
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pairing, it follows that the Tate pairing is not symmetric, as this would violate the non­
degeneracy property of the Weil pairing However, both the reduced Tate pairing and the 
Weil pairing are symmetric when a distortion map is applied to the second argument, or the 
trace map is applied to the first argument, as both are then restricted to a cyclic subgroup 
For example, let D2 =  [tu\Di  and let ip be a distortion map Then
cn {Du  ip(D2)) =  cn (D i, [m]ip{Di)) = cn ([m]Du  0(£>i)) =  cn (D2, 0(£>i))
Therefore, as supersmgular hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 are considered in this thesis, 
the property of symmetry, as required in the definition of a bilinear pairing in Chapter 1, is 
provided by restricting both input elements to the pairing to the same group P ic ^ (F Q)[/t] 
and using a distortion map
The computability property of the Tate pairing simply states that the Tate pairing can 
be computed efficiently The mam task involved in computing the Tate pairing (D\ D 2)n, 
is to construct the function j  such that ( / )  =  [ri]Di In an unpublished manuscript in 1986 
by Miller [82] (and later published in 2004 as Miller [84]), it was shown how to efficiently 
construct this function in stages by using a double-and-add algorithm This algorithm, 
known universally as M iller’s algorithm, was originally used to compute the Weil pairing 
in polynomial time However, it can be easily adapted to compute the Tate pairing
Let D 2 e  P ic ^ (F gfc), and let D 3 £ P ic ^ (F Qfe) be the divisor that is formed from 
the Cantor composition and reduction of D\  and D 2 Then
D 1 + D 2 - D i = (J)  = {c/d)J
where f  =  c /d  is a function on C  which is independent o f the choice o f  the representatives 
for D\,  D 2 and D 3 The goal is to construct a function /„ ,  such that ( /„ )  — [n\D\ Let 
f i  =  1, and let J l be the function appearing in
( l )  = ( i)D -  [i]D,
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where ( i )D  stands for the (symbolic) addition of the divisor ¿ times to itself, while [¿]£> 
stands for the reduced result Then j l+J is defined as
U 1+3 ) -  0 + j ) D  ~  [* + j ] D
=  (%)D -  [i]D +  ( j ) D  - \ j ] D - [ i  + j ] D  4- [i]D +  \ j \D
If i =  j ,  then the addition is replaced by a doubling, and appears in the function There­
fore, the function f n can be constructed in stages by using a double-and-add algorithm 
The actual value for the function j n is not o f interest, rather it is the value of j n at a divi­
sor D  that is required Each iteration of the algorithm, the rational functions c and d are 
evaluated at the image divisor D 2 €  P ic^F^fc) This is possible due to the fact that only 
multiplication, and not addition, is required to compute / l+J This result is then multiplied 
with an accumulating variable f  e ¥ qk,  which must also be squared each time the iterating 
divisor is doubled The resulting algorithm is known as Miller’s algorithm, and is given in 
Algorithm 3
If any of the intermediate functions in Miller’s algorithm has a zero at the evaluating 
divisor D 2, the algorithm will fail There are a number of techniques to ensure that this 
does not happen One strategy is to evaluate at the divisor D 2 =  (D2 -f D') -  ( /) ') , rather 
than evaluate at D2, where D* is a randomly chosen element of P i c ^ F ^ )  This technique 
involves evaluating the rational functions c and d at the divisors (£>2 +  D f) and D* at each 
iteration, and multiplying the the accumulating function by the result However, this is quite 
inefficient and techniques will be described in the following chapter to avoid this penalty
It remains to examine how to derive the necessary intermediate functions c and d for the 
two cases of interest for cryptography, namely elliptic and genus 2 curves The intermediate 
functions are calculated implicitly as part o f the composition and reduction process on the 
iterating divisor In the case of elliptic curves, the functions are simply the straight lines 
used in the addition process So when adding two points P , Q €  E ( ¥ qk ), the function c is
40
Algorithm  3 Miller’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing
IN PU T Di  e  P i c ^ ( F 7fc) [ ? i ] , D 2 6  Pic® (F^fc)
O u t p u t  {Di , D 2)7I
1 i < - l2 T ^ D
3 D '2 <- (D2 +  Df) -  (D’)
4 for % [log2(n)J -  1 downto 0 do
5 > Compute T ' , c }d such that T ’ — (2) T  — (c/d)f r r 2 ci^2)
I T + -T '
8 if n % =  1 then
9 o Compute T \ c , d  such that T f =  T  -f D -  (c/d)
in  f  <— f c^ 2)
II T  < - T
12 end if
13 end for
14 R eturn  /
the straight line through P  and Q,  and the function d is the vertical line through the point 
P  +  Q In this thesis, we follow the convention of calling the function c the “line function”, 
and d the “vertical line function” However, it must be emphasised that this is not strictly 
accurate for higher genus curves
For genus 2 curves it is not quite so straightforward Let D \ , D 2 € P ic ^ (F i;k) be 
the two divisors that are being added, given in Mumford representation as D\  =  [“// i , ?^ i] 
and D 2 =  [a2, u2\ In the composition stage of Cantor’s algorithm, the polynomial 6 =  
gcd(fii U2, ui +  v2 +  h) is computed Now let D 3 =  [¿¿3, y3] be the output of the Cantor 
composition algorithm on D\  and D2, and let D '3 =  [u '3, u's] be the reduced divisor equiv­
alent to D% If the divisor D$ is already reduced following the composition stage, then 
the function / ( x ,  y) =  c(x, y) /d (x ,  y) =  ¿(x) If this is not the case, then the function 
j ( x , y )  ~  t ( x ,  y ) /d (x ,  y) — 6 (x) (y  -  v s ( x ) ) / u fs (x) In the overwhelmingly common case 
<5 =  1 and thus c(x, y) =  y -  U3(x) and d(x, y) =  af3 (x)
As M iller’s algorithm has [log2 iterations, there will be [log2(n)J doublings Also 
if n  has a random Hamming weight, there will be [log2(n )/2 J additions to be performed in 
the loop In Algorithm 3 the iterating divisor T  is an F^-rational divisor Therefore, per-
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forming doubling or addition on this divisor is computationally expensive, even assuming 
the use of explicit formulae The rational functions that are extracted from the addition pro­
cess for both doubling and addition are then evaluated at the image divisor D 2 € P i c ^ F ^ ) 
After this, the accumulating variable /  e  F qk (also known as the Miller variable) must be 
updated by the result o f  evaluating c and d at D 2 However, this operation is extremely 
expensive, as with a naive implementation an inversion is required over F qk Finally, the 
accumulating vanable is squared whenever a doubling takes places, which again is not a 
cheap operation
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been described how finite field arithmetic can be implemented in an 
efficient manner using a polynomial basis Hyperelhptic curves have been introduced, and 
their application to cryptography has been detailed In particular, hyperelhptic curves o f 
genus 1 and 2 have been shown to be suitable for implementation due to their compact 
representation, efficient explicit formulae for the group law, and lack of effective index 
calculus attacks
The Tate pairing and Weil pairing have been defined in the context o f hyperelhptic 
curves It has been shown how to construct pairings to avoid trivial values, and an efficient 
algorithm due to Miller to compute pairings has been described Both the Weil pairing and 
the Tate pairing are suited to implementing cryptographic protocols that are based on the 
intractability o f the BDHP m PicJl(Fgfc)
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Chapter 3
Optimisations to Miller’s Algorithm
3.1 Introduction
In 1993, Menezes [78] reported an implementation o f the Weil pairing that ran in “just a few 
minutes” on a SUN-2 SPARC-station using an elliptic curve over F 2™, where m  «  200 
This was when pairings were used to reduce the HCDLP on supersingular curves to the DLP 
in ¥*k, and hence the speed of pairing computation was not particularly important How­
ever, with the emergence of cryptographic protocols that are based on computing either the 
Weil or Tate pairings, it quickly became obvious that it was of paramount importance to im­
prove the relatively slow computational speed o f M iller’s algorithm as originally described 
In this chapter, an overview o f various methods to improve the performance of M iller’s 
algorithm is provided To the best o f our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive review 
on this matter in the literature The emphasis is mainly on elliptic curves, as nearly all 
o f  the improvements were denved in this context However, a substantial number of the 
techniques can be generalised to the hyperelhptic case Firstly, the early optimisations to 
M iller’s algorithm are examined These include defining the iterating point over a subfield, 
as well as modifying the image point in such a way that the calculation of vertical line 
functions can be omitted from the algorithm entirely
Secondly, the concept o f squared pairmgs is examined Initially it appeared that these
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pairings could be computed more efficiently than plain pairings However, it was later 
shown that plain pairings always yield a more efficient implementation Thirdly, the gener­
alisation of pairing calculation to hyperelhptic curves of genus greater than one is detailed 
Certain curvcs are shown to be extremely suited to pairing implementation, as the Tate pair­
ing can be computed with a shortened loop size and a trivial final exponentiation These 
curves also support a simple choice of function in the loop which eliminates the need for 
explicitly computing multiples o f the iterating point
Fourthly, the concept o f pairing compression is detailed Pairing compression involves 
modifying the output o f M iller’s algorithm to take up less bandwidth Both the tracc-based 
approach as well as the alternative method of using algebraic ton are examined It is then 
shown how to compute the Weil pairing efficiently, using many o f the optimisations defined 
earlier in the chapter A metric for implementing finite field arithmetic in an efficient man­
ner is also exammed This metric can be used to analyse the cost of pairing computation in 
a theoretical manner Finally, a small number of recent optimisations are examined and the 
chapter is concluded
3.2 Early Optimisations
Here the Tate pairing is considered in the elliptic case E , rather than in the more general 
hyperelhptic setting Let D\ ~  (P ) -  (oo) 6 P i c ^ F ^ n ] ,  such that [n]Di = n ( P )  -  
71( 0 0 ) =  ( / ) ,  and let D 2 =  (Q) -  (o o ) 6 P i c ^ F ^ )  Rather than compute the Tate pairing 
using D\  and D 2, it is more convenient to exploit the isomorphism between P ic ^ (F 9*) and 
E ( ¥ qk), and compute the pairing on P  and Q To ensure that none of the intermediate 
functions in M iller’s algorithm have a zero at Q, the second argument to the Tate pairing is 
defined as Q' = (Q 4- R)  -  (7?), where R  e  E ( ¥ qk) is a random point on the curve such 
that R  ^  {oo, - P }  Therefore, the Tate pairing is computed as
{P,Q')(/~l)/n = f(Q'){qk~l)/n
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Galbraith et al [31] introduce three improvements to M iller’s algorithm for computing 
the Tate pairing Ihe mam observation is that the first input point P  in {P , Q f)n should 
be defined over F 9 rather than over ¥ qk This observation was previously made by Boneh 
and Franklin [11] in the case of the Weil pairing Galbraith et al suggest representing the 
field F qfc as a degree k extension of the base field F g =  F pm, rather than working with 
extensions of F pt o f degree m,  as suggested by Boneh et al [12] However, arithmetic in 
F ?fc is still far more expensive than in F^ If  P  is defined over ¥ q} then the coefficients of 
the straight lines used m the addition process will also be defined over F g This leaves only 
the evaluation of the line functions, and the subsequent multiplication by the accumulating 
Miller variable (which is also squared), to be performed in F qk This idea substantially 
reduces the computational cost o f M iller’s algorithm Galbraith et al also show that the 
random point R  in M iller’s algorithm can be defined overF^ instead o fF g*
The second observation of Galbraith et al relates to removing inversions from the al­
gorithm The line functions must be divided by the vertical line functions at each iteration 
of the loop However, inversion in the field F ^  is extremely expensive The idea o f Gal­
braith ct al is to use two accumulating variables m M iller’s algorithm, and to perform a 
single inversion after the loop One variable keeps track o f the numerator, or line functions, 
and the other keeps track of the denominator, or vertical line functions Each variable must 
be squared whenever a point doubling is performed This technique effectively trades an 
inversion for a squaring at each iteration of M iller’s algorithm, which results in a dramatic 
improvement, as squaring is a relatively cheap operation in ¥ qk compared to inversion 
The third observation is that windowing methods can be used to compute M iller’s al­
gorithm This observation was also made by Boneh et al [12] Windowing methods are 
routinely used for scalar multiplication on elliptic curves Given a point P  e  E ( ¥ q), the 
basic idea is to precompute the values [z]P for all values % in a window of size 3 or 4 bits 
Windowing methods reduce the number of additions that must be performed, but do not 
affect the number of doubling operations However, in chapter 9 o f  Blake et al [9], Gal­
braith shows that using windowing methods to compute the Tate pairing is not efficient, as
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there is an increase in the number of field multiplications in the addition stage oi M iller’s 
algorithm
Galbraith et al also discuss how to select the order n used to compute the Tate pairing 
Let H(n)  be the Hamming weight o f n Then the number of additions to be performed in 
Miller’s algorithm corresponds to H ( a )  -  1 Galbraith et al discuss how a can be chosen 
so that it has as low a Hamming weight as possible It is also shown how the actual group 
order can be used, rather than a subgroup order This is useful for certain supersingular 
curves in small characteristic, which have a group order o f  low Hamming weight, but do 
not have a large prime factor o f low Hamming weight In this case, the Tate pairing can 
be computed using the group order TV, and the final exponentiation becomes (qk — 1)//V, 
which also has a low Hamming weight Note that while the result is still a unique nth root 
o f unity, it may not be the same value as when the Tate pairing is computed with respect to 
the large prime n
Some supersingular curves in low characteristic p have extremely efficient formulae to 
compute [p*]P, where i >  0 is an integer and P  is a point on the curve Galbraith et al 
show how this property can be exploited in painng computation An example is given of two 
supersingular curves in characteristic 3 with an embedding degree of k =  6 These curves 
have a formula for computing [3\P  which does not involve inversion As this formula is 
very efficient, it is natural to consider using it to compute the Tate painng for these curves 
This can be done by using a ternary basis in M iller’s algorithm, instead of a binary basis 
as is standard The accumulating vanable must then be cubed each time a point tnpling is 
performed, which can be computed efficiently in characteristic 3
Barreto et al [5] also present an improved variant o f  M iller’s algonthm to compute 
the Tate pairing The most important contribution o f this paper is a deterministic variant 
o f Miller’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing, which is far less expensive to compute 
that the conventional algonthm This algorithm depends on the first point P  in (P: Q' )n 
being defined over ¥ q rather than over the larger field F qk As discussed, Galbraith et 
al [31] independently discovered the benefits o f defining P  over ¥ q However, Barreto et
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Tabic 3 1 Some supersingular elliptic curves with low k
Curve equation Finite field Curve order k
y 2 ~  x à -f x  — dx  +  d, d 6 {0 1} F p, p > 3 p +  1 2
#2 d y 2 +  y  =  r 3 +  x  +  rf, d 6 {0, 1} F 2 m 2m ±  2(m+1)/2 +  1 4
y 2 = x ò — x  +  dj d €  { — 1 , 1} Fgra 3m  g ( m + l )/2 j 6
al achieve further computational savings by introducing two new optimisations Barreto 
et al first of all show that (q — 1) is a factor o f (qk -  1 ) / n  for the curves in Tabic 3 1, all 
o f which have an even embedding degree k  If the random point R  is also defined over 
rather than F ^ ,  then by Fermat’s little theorem / ( P )9_1 =  1, and hence f ( R ) ^ qk~l^ n =  1 
Therefore, the evaluation at R  can be omitted altogether from Miller’s algorithm, resulting 
in a deterministic algorithm that is computed as (P, Q)n ~l ^ n =
Barreto et a l ’s second contribution is the idea o f ‘denominator elimination1 Recall that 
two functions are extracted from the addition process in Miller’s algorithm In the elliptic 
case, the line function corresponds to the tangent at the iterating point (if doubling), or 
the line between two points (if adding) The vertical line function consists o f the equation 
of the vertical line through the resulting point The line function must be divided by the 
vertical line function each time a doubling or addition takes place Galbraith et al [31] 
avoid this by using two accumulating variables and performing a single inversion after the 
loop However, Barreto et al show how to completely avoid computing the vertical line 
functions, which improves the speed of Galbraith et a l ’s algonthm by nearly 50%
As detailed m Chapter 2, the modified Tate pairing is typically used when implementing 
pairings using supersingular curves In the elliptic case, this involves generating a point 
Q e E( ¥q) and using a distortion map to obtain a point i)(Q)  €  E ( ¥ qk), which can 
then be used as the image point in M iller’s algorithm Table 3 2 gives a suitable distortion 
map for some of the curves defined previously in Table 3 1 Barreto et al show that the 
vertical line functions can be discarded when computing the modified Tate pairing using 
any of these distortion maps The key reason for this is that the distortion maps given in 
Table 3 2 map the ^-coordinate of the point Q to a subfield o fF gfc, whereas the ¿/-coordinate
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Table 3 2 Distortion maps for (most of) the curves given in Table 3 1
Curve Finite field Distortion map Conditions
Ei  o ”01 {x ,y )  =  { - x }iy) p  =  3 mod 4, 
i € F p2, 
z2 =  - 1
#2,0, E 2 1 ¥ 2m y )  =  {x +  s2, y  +  sx  + t ) S, t  E F 2^rn 5 
s4 +  s =  0, 
t 2  + t  +  s 6 +  s 2 =  0
£3  — 1, E 3  1 F 3™ ^ 3(2 y )  =  ( - z  +  f d  w ) Td €  F33m j I E  F 32m ,
»¡I -  U  -  <> -  0,
z2 =  - l
is mapped to the full field F gk
The vertical line functions are defined by an equation x  — x ^ p  =  0, where x ^ P is the 
x-coordinate of some multiple % of P , and x  is a variable which will be later evaluated at 
X^(Q) (the value of which remains constant throughout the algorithm) As P  is defined over 
the base field F g, the ^-coordinate o f a multiple o f P,  will also be defined over ¥ q 
In addition, the distortion map tp leaves the ^-coordinate of ip{Q) defined over a subfield 
of F qk Therefore, the vertical line functions in M iller’s algorithm will not be defined over 
¥ qk , but over some subfield It can be shown that when i divides the embedding degree k , 
then (ql -  1) divides (qL — 1) This exponentiation eliminates all terms defined over ¥ qi, 
and thus there is no need to include the vertical line functions in M iller’s algorithm
The denominator elimination technique o f Barreto et al is approximately 50% faster 
than the algorithm o f Galbraith et al This is because the denominator elimination technique 
removes the need for the second variable, and hence saves a squaring and a multiplication 
in ¥ qk each time a doubling is performed in the loop Barreto et al also examine the use of 
prime order subgroups o f low Hamming weight They propose using a Solinas [109] prime 
as the subgroup order, which is a pnm e number of the form p = 2a ±  2^ ±  1 As a result, 
only two additions must be performed in M iller’s algorithm, which can then be unrolled to 
remove conditional logic
Barreto et al give a technique to speed up the final exponentiation required for the
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Tate pairing One way to evaluate this function is to precompute (qk -  1 ) / n  and to use a 
square-and-multiply algorithm with windowing techniques to compute the exponentiation 
However, Barreto et al observe that for an even embedding degree k, the factor (qk/2 — 1) 
can be extracted from the final exponentiation This exponentiation can be evaluated with 
a single field inversion and multiplication in F qk, as raising to the power of qk^2 is trivially 
computed as a conjugation with respect to ¥ ^ / 2 The remaining exponentiation to (qk¡ 2 +  
1)/ n  can sometimes be factored further, but remains an expensive operation to compute
Izu and Takagi [51] investigate the computation of the Tate pairing using elliptic curves 
over large prime fields Their mam contribution is to evaluate the use of alternative co­
ordinate systems in M iller’s algorithm As with scalar multiplication, the best coordinate 
system to use depends on the finite field They also show how to optimise the generation 
of the coefficients o f the line functions when random points are included in the algorithm 
However, this optimisation is not useful in practice due to the deterministic algorithm to 
compute the Tate pairing given by Barreto et al [5] Izu and Takagi also investigate using 
an explicit formula to compute [2l]P, instead of using the double-and-add approach
Chatterjee et al [15] also examine the implementation of the Tate pairing using elliptic 
curves over large prime fields The main contribution of this paper is a method to encapsu­
late the computation o f the line function with the doubling process on the iterating point P  
Jacobian coordinates are used to represent P , and it is shown how some of the operations 
in the encapsulated method do not need to be calculated, as they are eliminated by the final 
exponentiation This technique is also shown to apply in the addition stage of Miller’s al­
gorithm when mixed addition is used Chatterjee et al examine the memory requirements 
of M iller’s algorithm, as well as showing how certain operations can be parallelised for 
implementation in hardware It is also shown how to exploit the NAF to compute the Tate 
pairing
The denominator elimination technique was previously defined for certain supersingular 
curves with distortion maps of a special form Barreto et al [6, 7] generalise this technique 
to ordinary elliptic curves, by removing the need for a distortion map It is shown that when
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k is even and d\k, then qd — 1 is a factor of qk -  1 This implies that the accumulating 
function can be multiplied by any nonzero element i e  F gd without changing the pairing 
output Therefore, the denominator elimination technique can be generalised for the case 
that the x-coordinate o f the image point Q is defined over some subfield ¥ qd o f ¥ qk, where 
d\k Note that the ^/-coordinate o f  Q must be defined over ¥ qk or else the entire pairing 
value will be defined over F^d and will be eliminated by the final exponentiation
Barreto et al then give two techniques to show how denominator elimination can work 
in the absence of supersmgular curves and suitable distortion maps Let d = k / 2  (and hence 
the embedding degree k is even) The first technique uses twists Let E  y 2 = x 3 +  ax  -I- b 
be an elliptic curve over the finite field ¥ q> o f characteristic p >  3 Then the quadratic twist 
of E  over F qd is E'  y 2 = x 3 +  v2ax  +  v 3b, for some quadratic non-residue v 6  ¥ qd 
Let v be a quadratic residue in F ^ ,  then the map ^ ( x ^ y )  i—> (u- 1x, (v s / v )~ l y)  is an 
isomorphism that maps the group of points o f ^ '( F ^ )  to a subgroup o f E ( ¥ qk)
Now let Q' be a point on the twisted curve E '( ¥ qd) The mapping given above can 
be used to map Qf to the pomt Q  on the curve E  defined over F ^ ,  and Q can then be 
used as the image pomt m M iller’s algorithm Note that the ^-coordinate o f Q  is defined 
over F^d, and thus the denominator elimination technique applies Barreto et al [6, 7] also 
note that cryptographic operations which do not involve pairing computation, such as scalar 
multiplication, can be performed solely using arithmetic in F gd The points o f  ^ '( F ^ )  can 
then be mapped back to E ( ¥ qk ) when needed for pairing computation Scott [103] uses the 
twist idea to implement the Tate pairing efficiently using ordinary elliptic curves over F p 
with embedding degree k =  2
The second technique given by Barreto et al exploits the fact that the group ip(E/ (¥qd)) 
is a subgroup o f the trace zero subgroup of ^(F^fc) Therefore, an alternative to using 
twists is to simply choose a random R  €  E ( ¥ qk ), and then set Q — R  -  R qd Q  is then a 
trace-zero point with the property that its rc-coordinate is defined over F^d This method is 
especially useful for hyperelhptic curves of genus g > 1 However, the disadvantages are 
that generating random points over F ^  is slower than doing so over F gd, and the ability to
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speed up non-pairing based operations does not apply
3.3 Squared Pairings
Eisenträger et at [25] present algorithms to compute the squared Weil and Tate pairings 
on elliptic curves, and the squared Tate pairing on hyperelliptic curves The squared Weil 
and Tate pairings are deterministic, unlike the plain Weil and Tate pairings (as originally 
defined) Furthermore, the authors claim a speedup of approximately 20% by computing 
the squared Tate pairing using their method over the plain Tate pairing, and by extension, 
the same speedup for computing the squared Weil pairing over the plain Weil pairing The 
authors also present a method to compute the squared Tate pairing on hyperelliptic curves, 
and claim a speedup of approximately 30% on the standard algorithm This algorithm is 
notable for being the first detailed implementation of a bilinear pairing on a hyperelliptic 
curve o f genus 2
However, there is no real advantage to computing the squared Weil or Tate pairings 
using the methods given by Eisenträger et a l , as they have been surpassed by superior 
methods to compute the plain Weil or Tate pairings, as detailed in the previous section 
Barreto et al show that there is no need to include random points in Miller’s algorithm, 
as they can be defined over a subfield and are eliminated by the final exponentiation as 
a result Therefore, there is no real advantage to the deterministic algorithms to compute 
the squared Weil and Tate pairings The authors use Cantor’s algorithm in the genus 2 
case to double and add divisors and to extract the necessary functions required by Miller’s 
algorithm However, in practice Lange’s explicit formulae (e g see [70]) for the group law 
would be used
The relationship between the squared Weil/Tate pairings and the plain Weil/Tate pair­
ings is investigated further by Kang and Park [58] The authors show that a squared pairing 
can be transformed into a plain pairing when the image point is a trace zero point As 
seen previously, for a random point R  e  E ( F qk), a trace zero point Q  can be generated
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kj 2as Q = R  — R q Let en be either the reduced Tate pairing or the Weil pairing, and let 
P  £ E ( ¥ q) Then Kang and Park show that
en (P, R ) 1- " ^ 2 =  en (P, R ) 2 = en (P , Q),
as 1 -  q^ / 2 =  2 m od n  This result shows that evaluating at a random point R  £ E ( F qk) 
when computing a squared pairing is equivalent to evaluating at the trace zero point Q =
k/ 2R  -  R q when computing the corresponding plain pairing As the ^-coordinate of a 
trace zero point is defined over a subfield, the denominator elimination technique applies 
Therefore, it may be concluded that there is no real advantage in computing squared pairings 
using the methods o f Eisentrager et al [25], as it will always be more efficient to use a plain 
pairing with a trace zero point
In a separate paper, Eisentrager et al [24] present formulae which eliminate a field 
multiplication from the standard way of computing [2}P +  Q , where P  and Q  are points on 
an elliptic curve This idea can be used to speed up both scalar multiplication and pairing 
computation Instead o f constructing a function /12&+C by first computing h2b and then /126+c 
in an independent manner, the idea is to compute &26+c directly using the faster formulae 
However, this idea is not useful when the order has a low Hamming weight, as is normally 
the case It also does not take the standard denominator elimination idea into account 
Freeman [28] adapts this method to hyperelhptic curves of genus 2
3.4 Pairings on Hyperelhptic Curves
Duursma and Lee [23] were the first to examine pairing implementation on hyperelhptic 
curves in a constructive manner In particular, they mtroduce several optimisations to the 
computation of the Tate pairing on hyperelhptic curves of the form C  y 2 — r v — x + d  over 
Fpm, where d =  ±1 , p =  3 m od 4 and gcd(m , 2p) =  1 These curves have embedding 
degree k — 2p Firstly, Duursma and Lee propose using a multiple of the group order o f the 
form ppm +  1 which has Hamming weight 2 in base p  It is shown how the final addition
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does not need to be evaluated, as the line function that is calculated is a vertical line function 
and is eliminated by the final exponentiation Therefore, using the order +  1 results in 
a loop of p m  iterations (to the base p) with no logical decisions, which helps to simplify the 
implementation An additional advantage is that the final exponentiation can be computed 
as
(p2pm _ + j) = (ppm _ 1}
As described previously, an exponentiation of this form can be trivially computed with a 
multiplication, inversion and some Frobenius actions in Fp2Pm
Duursma and Lee also propose computing pairings on hyperelliptic curves using points 
in the support as image elements rather than divisors A reduced divisor on a genus g curve 
typically has g finite points in the support, 1 e D  = (P\)  +  +  (Pg) ~  g(oo) However,
Duursma and Lee propose using degenerate divisors instead, which are divisors with sup­
port consisting o f a single affine point, 1 e D  =  (P)  -  (oo) Rather than represent these 
divisors using Mumford notation, it is easier to simply work with the point P  Duursma and 
Lee also give an explicit formula to compute the line functions that are required in Miller’s 
algorithm, rather than extract them from the addition process
Lem m a 2 Let C  y 2 = x p ~  x  + d be a hyperelliptic curve over F pm d = ±  1 and p =  3
mod 4 and let P  =  (xp ,  yp)  G C (F pm) Then the function
hp  =  y vPy  ~  (xp  -  x  4- d)(p+1)/2 
has divisor (lip) — p(P)  +  (—[p](P — oo)) — p ( oo) where
~ [p ](P  -  o o )  =  (x7p  +  dP +  d , y fp )  -  ( o o )
Combining this function with a loop size of pm  iterations results in the following closed
53
formula to compute the Tate painng
p m
(P, i/>(Q)) = )p(<b{Q)) = A[p.- i]p(0W))p,’m '
i=i
Using the double-and-add approach of M iller’s algorithm, the accumulating variable j  e  
¥ p2mp is exponentiated to p  each iteration of the loop Although this exponentiation is effi­
cient, it must be performed pm  times in total, meaning that it has a non-tnvial cumulative 
cost However, Duursma and Lee show how it is possible to absorb the pvm~ ‘ exponen­
tiation into the formulae, thus eliminating the exponentiation to p  from M iller’s algorithm 
altogether In addition, Duursma and Lee show how the loop size of p m  iterations can be 
replaced with a loop of rn iterations Rather than loop to p m , the key idea is to loop to m  
and to absorb the power to p  inside the explicit formulae
Among the relevant hyperelhptic curves are two curves extremely suited to painng im­
plementation These are the elliptic curves E  y 2 =  x 3 -  x 4- d over ¥ 3™, where d ~  ±1,  
as defined previously in Table 3 1 Note that the group order for these curves divides 
+  X =  33m +  1 These curves have embedding degree k — 6, which is the maximum 
embedding degree for supersingular elliptic curves Let p € F33 be a root of p3 -  p -  d =  0, 
and let a € F 32 be a root of a 2 -f X =  0 Then the distortion map 0 (x , y) = (p -  x, cry) 
supports the denominator elimination technique of Barreto et al [5] Scalar multiplication 
by 3 is extremely efficient on these curves, as exploited by Galbraith et al [31] Therefore, 
it is convenient to use a ternary basis in M iller’s algonthm The Duursma-Lee algorithm 
for computing the Tate pairing on these curves is given in Algonthm 4
Kwon [66] adapts the techniques o f  Duursma and Lee to elliptic curves in characteris­
tic 2 There are exactly three isomorphism classes of supersingular elliptic curves over F 2m, 
where rn is odd, and Kwon’s method applies to all such curves Two curves in particular 
are suitable for pairing based cryptography, as they have the maximum embedding degree 
of k =  4 for supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic 2 These curves are defined as 
Ed y 2  +  y  =  z 3 +  x  +  d, where d e  {0,1}, as given previously in Table 3 1 These curves
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Algorithm  4 The Duursma-Lee algorithm for the curve E  y 2 =  r 3 -  x  4- d over F 3m,
d =  =bl__________________________________________________________________________
I n p u t  P  =  ( x P , y P) ,Q  =  ( z Q, y Q) €  E { F 3m)
O u t p u t  (P ,^ (Q ))
1 / - I
2 for ? <— 1 to m  do
3 ?p x3p , yp  <— yp
4 f  <- f  ( -vypyQ -  {xp + xq -  p + d)2)
1/3 1/3
5 x q  f -  yQ < -  (Jq
6 end for
7 R e tu r n /
support a doubling formula, such that for the point P  £ E ( F2™), where P  =  (x ,y ), [2]P  
is given as
[2]P =  (x4 +  1 , t 4 +2/4)
A distortion map for these curves is given in Table 3 2 Instead of using the group order to 
compute the Tate pairing, it is possible to use the multiple 22m +  1 instead, as
22m h- 1 =  (2m +  2(m+1)/2 +  l ) ( 2m -  2(m+1)/2 4- 1)
As the final addition can be omitted, this results in a closed formula to compute the Tate 
pairing on these curves, with a loop size o f  2m  iterations Following Duursma and Lee, 
Kwon shows how the loop to 2m  can be reduced to m  iterations, by absorbing the exponen­
tiation to 2 into the formulae Kwon shows that 7 multiplications in F 2™ are required per 
iteration of the loop This compares favourably with the characteristic 3 case as modified 
by Granger et al [43], which costs 14 multiplications in F 3m per iteration Kwon’s algo­
rithm is given in Algonthm 5 Note that the extension field F 24m is represented using the 
polynomial basis {1 , x, x 2, a:3}, where x 4 +  x  4* 1 =  0
Kwon also gives a variant o f the algonthm which requires no square rooting Kwon’s 
stated motivation is that square rooting in a finite field is an expensive operation, roughly 
equivalent to that of a multiplication with a precomputation However, square rooting can
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Algorithm  5 Kwon’s algorithm for the curves E  y2+ y  =  a;3+ x + ( /o v e rF 2m, d — {0,1} 
In p u t  P  =  ( x P , y p ), Q =  [xQ, y Q) £ E ( F 2m)
O u tpu t  < P ,^ (Q ))
1 / - I
2 for } <— 1 to m  do
3 xp  <- x 2P , y P <-
4 2 £p  +  <- z  +  x p X Q  4- yp  +  yQ -f d
5 /  <- 1 {w +  z x  +  (z  -f- 1 ) j 2)
1/2  1/26 <- x j  yQ t/q
7 end for
8 R etu rn  }
be as fast as squanng in characteristic 2 [27] In characteristic 3, cube-rooting can also be 
performed efficiently (e g see Barreto [3]), although it is not as efficient as cubing In this 
case, it is better to precompute all o f the m  cubes of a value x q  £ in a table, and to 
access the table in reverse order in the algorithm to obtain the cube-roots
Choie and Lee [17] detail the efficient computation of the Tate pairing on hyperelhptic 
curves o f genus 2 in a more general way than that o f Duursma and Lee Instead o f using 
Cantor’s algorithm to derive the functions that are required in M iller’s algorithm, Choie 
and Lee use Lange’s explicit formulae [70] for the group law on genus 2 curves These 
formulae are modified slightly to obtain the required functions, as the formulae are designed 
for scalar multiplication and hence do not calculate the line function that is required in an 
explicit manner The formulae given by Choie and Lee are actually identical to formulae 
given in an earlier (Japanese only) paper by Takahashi [111] Choie and Lee then present 
the first computational results for the Tate painng on a hyperelhptic curve o f genus g > 1 
The maximum embedding degree of a supersingular genus 2 curve over a large prime 
field F p is k =  6 However, no example of such curves is known Instead, Choie and Lee 
implement the Tate pairing on the curve y 2 = x 5 +  a, a £  F*, where p = 2 ,3  m od 5 This 
is a supersmgular genus 2 curve with embedding degree k =  4 This curve has a distortion 
map ip(x, y)  (Csx, y)  where (5 is a primitive 5-th root o f  unity in Fp4 Note that this 
distortion map does not support the denominator elimination technique The group order 
of this curve is # P ic ^ (F p )  =  p2 +  1 Choie and Lee choose log2(p) «  256 and choose
56
a prime factor n  o f # P ic ^ ( F p) such that log2(/i) ~  160 On a 2 GHz Pentium IV their 
timings to compute the Tate pairing vary between 515 and 594 ms, depending on the form 
of the divisors and whether precomputation is used or not
Harasawa et al [45] construct a distortion map for the genus 2 curvc C  y 2 — x 5 -  cvx 
over Fgm, where a  = ± 2  Secondly, they show how to compute the modified Tate pairing 
on this curve The authors take advantage o f a simple quintuple operation for computing 
[5\P  for a point P  e  C(Fsm), by rewriting Miller’s algorithm to the base 5 The authors 
compare the efficiency of their algorithm to that o f the prime field curve utilised by Choie 
and Lee [17], as both curves have embedding degree k =  4 Harasawa et al give a 
theoretical metric to show that their method is about twice as efficient as the metric given 
by Choie and Lee However, this claim docs not take into account the fact that it is easier to 
optimise arithmetic in F p than in F 5m
3.5 Compressed Pairings
Scott and Barreto [106] show how to compress pairing values and how to speed up the 
subsequent exponentiation of these elements The first contribution of this paper uses Lucas 
sequences to speed up the final exponentiation required to compute the Tate pairing Lucas 
sequences provide an efficient means ol implementing exponentiation in a subgroup of 
¥*k whose order divides qL¡ 2 -H i An efficient laddering algorithm has been developed 
(e g see Joye and Quisquater [54]) to compute Lucas sequences The laddering algorithm 
requires very little memory, facilitates parallel computing, and has a natural resistance to 
side-channel attacks [55]
Lucas sequences consist o f  a pair o f functions Un (a,b) and Vn (a,b),  evaluating as 
elements o f  ¥  k/2 Let b =  1, in which case the arguments to Un and Vn can be omitted 
The sequences are given as
Uq =  0, Ui =  1 Un+1 =  aUn -  Un~ i,
Vo =  2, V\ =  a , Vn+i = aVn -  Vn- i
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The laddering algorithm to compute Vn is given in Algorithm 6 It is only necessary to 
compute Vn> as Un can be computed from Vn with the formula
r _  aVn - 2 V 1l- 1 
a2 - 4
Algorithm 6 Computing Lucas sequence elements
I n p u t  a, nt = (nt- i  1 1 0 )2 , with nt-i = 1
O u t p u t  Vn =  K ( a , l )
1 v0 ^  2
2 v\ <— a
3 for 1 t -  2 downto 0 do
4 if n, = 1 then
5 vo <-- vqv\ — a
6 vi <-- v \  — 2
7 else





The final exponentiation required to compute the Tate pairing is (qk -  l ) / n  Assum­
ing that the embedding degree k  is even, an element r  e  F  * can be represented using 
a polynomial basis as x  =  (a +  hy/P), where a, b G ¥ qk/2 and r 2 — ¡3 — 0 is an irre­
ducible polynomial over ¥ qk/2 The conjugate of r  with respect to Wqk/2 can be computed 
as r  =  (a -  byffi) As the embedding degree k  is even, (qk ¡ 2 — 1) can be factored out of 
the final exponentiation, and can be trivially evaluated Sometimes, other easily computed 
factors may also be extracted, but an expensive exponentiation to <pk {(]) I n  remains, where 
(j>k is the k -th cyclotomic polynomial
After exponentiating to (qk/2 -  1), the element r  e  F^ fc will have norm 1 In other 
words, the product o f  x  by its conjugate with respect to ¥ qk/2 will be equal to 1,1 e
r r  =  (0 +  byfp) (a  -  byffi)  = a2 -  b2(3 =  1
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Note that an element o f norm 1 can be determined up to the sign o f  b from a alone There­
fore, the output of the Tate pairing can be represented as one element in ¥  k/2 and a single 
bit to determine the sign of b, rather than the full value in Fqk, thus giving a compression 
factor of (almost) 2 An element of norm 1 also has the property that an otherwise expensive 
field inversion can be computed with a simple conjugation This follows from x x  =  1 and 
therefore 1 / x  = x
Scott and Barreto show how to efficiently raise an element x  € F qk of norm 1 to the 
power m  by means of Lucas sequences with the formula
x "1 =  (a + b y / p ) m =  ^ 2 ^  +  Um (2a)bs /p
As stated previously, only Vm (2a) /2  needs to be explicitly calculated Scott and Barreto 
propose using this formula to compute the expensive exponentiation to rn =  4h(<l)/n re­
quired for the Tate pairing, where k is even The cost to compute x 1,1 using the laddering 
algorithm given in Algorithm 6 is M  +  5 per iteration, where M  and 6 are a multiplica­
tion and a squaring respectively in F  k/2 The conventional binary algorithm takes around 
5  +  M / 2  per iteration assuming a random exponent, where 5  and M  are a squaring and a 
multiplication respectively in F^jt This is roughly equivalent to 3S  -t- 3 M /2 , assuming the 
ratios 3M  ~  M  and 3 5  ~  5  Therefore, the Lucas sequence approach gives a speedup of 
about 60% over the basic binary square-and-multiply algorithm
The second contribution o f Scott and Barreto is to show how to compress pairing values 
to half length assuming an even embedding degree For an element x € ¥ qk, the trace with 
respect to Fqk/ 2 is equal to T rF^ / F fc/2 (x) =  x  + x qk/2 Let x  = (a +  by/fi) e  ¥ qk be the 
output o f the Tate pairing after the final exponentiation Then
( • ' - ) - x + j ' q k / 2 =  ( “ + b V P ) + ( “  -  w n  = 2 a
As the second component of x  has been discarded, the pairing has been compressed to 
half length This idea can be effectively combined with that of using Lucas sequences to
59
compute the final exponentiation Scott and Barreto also show how to comprtss pairings to 
a third o f  their length when the curve has an embedding degree that is a multiple of 6 This 
involves using the trace with respect to F n/j Note that any subsequent exponentiation of 
compressed pairing values must take into account the fact that they are traces of full pairings 
values, they cannot be handled as general finite field elements
Granger et al [43] adopt techniques from torus-based cryptography to achieve pairing 
compression First of all, Granger et al give an alternative to computing the final expo­
nentiation required to compute the reduced Tate pairing for the supersingular elliptic curves 
in characteristic 3 as studied by Duursma and Lee [23] These curves have an embedding 
degree of k =  6 Duursma and Lee propose computing the Tate pairing on these curves 
using the order qz +  1 =  33m +  1 The output o f  M iller’s algorithm prior to the final 
exponentiation is then an element of the quotient group
g  =  f *6/ ( f ;6)«j+1
Exponentiating an element in ¥ qG to q3 +  1 gives an element in F*3, as this exponentiation 
is the norm map with respect to ¥ qj Therefore G simplifies to F*6/ F *3 Two elements 
a, b 6 F *6 are equivalent (when considered as elements o f  G) if  a =  be, where c € FJ3 
Let a E F*6/ F *3 be the output o f the Tate pairing prior to the final exponentiation Then 
exponentiating to the power o f  (q3 — 1) yields a unique value suitable for cryptographic 
purposes, as a ^ 3_1) =  (òc)^3_1) =
Let elements o f the field ¥ qe be represented using a polynomial basis as a — (ao +  
O’lV P )  £ Fge, where a o ,a i € F g3, and ¡3 is a suitable quadratic non-residue Then the 
output o f  Miller’s algorithm a £  F*6/ F *3 is written as
a — be =  (eòo +  ibi y fp )
Note that dividing by eòi gives the value a! =  ò' =  bo/bi +  yffi As the value c has been 
eliminated, a! can be used as a unique representative of the coset o f G  to which a belongs
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Therefore, the final exponentiation is just a multiplication and inversion in ¥ qs This is in 
contrast to the standard exponentiation to q6 — 1, which requires a multiplication and an 
inversion in ¥ q b However, the alternative means of securing a unique value is essentially 
no more efficient than the standard approach, as both inversion and multiplication in F go 
can be efficiently reduced to their counterparts in ¥ qs
The approach o f Granger et al has two interesting implications The first is that it 
results in a two-fold compression of the pairing value The output of the pairing a' = 
a o /a i 4- can be represented by the element ao/fli €  ¥ qs, which results in a two­
fold compression It is important to note that this value cannot be treated simply as a 
general element of F gj The second advantage is that any subsequent exponentiation of 
the pairing value is faster than a general exponentiation in ¥ q b Each time a multiplication 
must be performed in the square-and-multiply algorithm to compute the exponentiation, the 
accumulating value is multiplied by the value (ao /a i 4- y/ft) Writing x  = a o /a i, observe 
that
(x + \fp)(bo + bj yfp) = (xbo -  bi) + (xbi + b0) \ f j i
The multiplication of two generic elements in F^e costs 3 multiplications in ¥ q3 using the 
Karatsuba approach However, this method costs only 2 multiplications in ¥ qi
Granger et al then remark that the output o f  the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over ¥ q 
may be viewed as an element of an algebraic torus Rubin and Silverberg [97] introduce the 
concept o f torus-based cryptography as an alternative to using traces to obtain compression 
Granger et al give an alternative representation for the quotient group G as G ~  T2(Fgj) 
This enables compression by a factor o f 2 Additionally, Granger et al show how the torus 
Te(Fg) gives a compression ratio o f 3 for these curves
Granger et al also show how to use loop-unrolling to speed up the algorithm given 
by Duursma and Lee [23] to compute the Tate pairing for certain supersingular elliptic 
curves of characteristic 3 Some o f the terms in the representation of the line function
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that is calculated at each iteration of the loop are equal to zero This can be exploited by 
unrolling the loop times two, and by writing a special multiplication routine to multiply the 
two sparse functions together, before multiplying the result with the accumulating variable 
This approach costs only 14 multiplications in Fyn per iteration of the loop This compares 
favourably the original Duursma-Lee algorithm (20 multiplications) and the trace-based 
variant by Scott and Barreto [106] (17 multiplications)
3.6 The Weil Pairing
Koblitz and Menezes [65] examine the task of computing the Weil pairing on elliptic curves 
in detail In order to compare the performance o f the Tate pairing and the Weil pairing in a 
fair manner, Koblitz and Menezes give a metric for estimating the running time o f pairings 
Firstly, the cost o f arithmetic in the finite field F qk is analysed, by introducing so-called 
pairing-friendly fields For the rest of this section, let k > 2 be even and q = p Let s  and m  
be a squaring and a multiplication respectively in F^  Similarly, let S and M  be a squaring 
and a multiplication respectively in F^, and S and M  be a squaring and multiplication in 
F fe/2 Assume that S  «  M, s as m and S & M  Also note that multiplying an element in 
F qk by an element in Fq takes time k m
Let k =  2l3:/ and q ~  1 m od 12, and let ¡3 € Fq be neither a square nor a cube 
in Fq Then the binomial x k -  ¡3 is irreducible over Fq and hence defines the extension 
field Fqk Therefore, F ^  can be constructed from F^ as a tower of quadratic and cubic 
extensions, by adjoining the squareroot or cuberoot of ¡3, then the squareroot or cuberoot 
o f that, etc Using the Karatsuba [59] technique, a multiplication in a quadratic extension 
takes 3 multiplications in the subfield This technique will be detailed later in this thesis 
Similarly a multiplication in a cubic extension takes 5 multiplications in the subfield, using 
the Toom-Cook [112, 20] method However, this analysis omits the large amount of addi­
tions and divisions by constants that must be performed with this method Using these two 
multiplication methods, Koblitz and Menezes estimate the cost o f a multiplication in F qk as
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M  «  375 'm
As discussed before, it is common that the subgroup order n is defined to have a low 
Hamming weight In this case, the number of additions in Miller’s algorithm is negligible 
compared to the number of doublings Therefore, Kobhtz and Menezes analyse the cost of 
computing a pairing by focusing solely on the computation that takes place when a point 
doubling is performed To compute the Weil pairing en (P,Q) ,  the functions l \ /u \  and 
I2 /V2 are extracted from the addition process for each bit o f  n  These functions can be 
accumulated by using the two variable algorithm of Galbraith et al [31] in the following 
way
h  t i  i * ( Q ) h ( Q )  
h  t i H Q W , Q )
This function, along with the associated point doubling, is termed a Miller operation 
Koblitz and Menezes point out that the denominator elimination technique also applies 
to the Weil pairing assuming that the output o f the pairing is exponentiated to (qk/2 -  1) 
(alternatively to (1 — g*/2)), which can be trivially realised as a conjugation with respect 
to F jt/2, and a multiplication and an inversion in F  t In this case, the function evaluation 
simplifies to
h  f f h i Q )  
h  i i  h(Q)
Note that for the Tate pairing this simplifies to /]  =  f 2/] (Q )
As the Weil pairing consists o f two loops, the first is termed Miller hte (due to Soli- 
nas [110]), as the iterating point is defined over ¥ (/ The second loop is called the full Miller 
loop, as the iterating point is defined over ¥ (fk The full Miller loop is much more compu­
tationally expensive than the Miller hte loop, as the arithmetic is in ¥ qk However, Koblitz 
and Menezes follow the idea of Barreto et al [6, 7], in defining the image point Q  as a point 
on a quadratic twist o f the curve defined over the quadratic subfield ¥ qk/2 This leads to a 
gam both in evaluating at Q  in the Miller hte loop, and in performing arithmetic on Q  in
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Tabic 3 3 Minimum bitlengths of n  and qk
Security level (in bits) 80 128 192 256
bqk













Table 3 4 Operation counts for each 13it o f a
k Final exponentiation Miller lite Full Miller
* =  2 
k > 4
(7/2 -  l ) ( s  +  m )
(U7 -  1 )(s + M)
4s  4- 8 m  4- 5  4- M  
4s +  (k 4- 7)m  +  5  +  M
4s 4- 8m  4* 5  4- M  
k m  4“ 45  4~ 6A/ 4~ 5  4~ M
the full Miller loop To compare the Tate pairing with the Weil pairing, the cost of the full 
Miller loop must be compared with the final exponentiation to (qk / 2 4-1) / n  required by the 
Tate pairing (as both pairings have the (qk/2 — 1) exponentiation in common)
Kobhtz and Menezes estimate the cost o f the Miller operation for the Miller lite loop as 
4s 4- 8m  4 - S  + M  for k =  2, and 4s +  (k 4- 7)m  +  5  4- M  for k >  4 assuming the use of 
Jacobian coordinates The cost o f the full Miller loop is the same as Miller lite for k =  2, 
and is given as k m  +  4 5  4- 6M  +  5  4- M  for k >  4 Kobhtz and Menezes use the security 
parameters defined by Lenstra [73], that are reproduced in Table 3 3 Let bn be the number 
of bits of the prime subgroup order n , bqk be the number of bits o f qk and let 7 =  bqk/bn 
Let Tk =  1/2 if k  =  2 \  i >  1, else let t* =  1/3 (if k =  2 > 1) Then, using 
the Lucas sequence approach of Scott and Barreto [106], Kobhtz and Menezes estimate the 
cost o f the exponentiation to (qh! 2 4-1 ) / n  as (7^7 -  1 )(5  4- M )  for each bit o f n  These 
results are summarised in Table 3 4
For the embedding degree k =  2, Kobhtz and Menezes estimate that the Tate pairing 
will be faster when 7 <  20 However, they estimate that the Wei I pairing will become more 
efficient to compute for higher values of 7 , starting at the 192-bit security level When 
k >  4, the Weil pairing becomes more efficient to compute when 7 =  28 8 for k ~  6, 
7  =  28 2 for k =  12 and 7 =  27 8 for k — 24 Therefore, when k  >  4 the Weil pairing 
becomes more efficient than the Tate pairing at the 256-bit security level
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Granger et al [42] examine pairing implementation using ordinary elliptic curves and 
vanous practical levels of security Firstly, they analyse the cost o f computing the final 
exponentiation required for the Tate pairing Recall, that for an even embedding degree, the 
factor (r/^ /2 — 1) can be extracted from the final exponentiation and easily evaluated The 
remaining exponentiation that must be performed can sometimes be simplified further as 
(qkf 2 +  l)/0 jt( i/)  and <j)k{(i)/n However, the exponentiation to <j>i(q)fn is an expensive 
operation Rather than use the Lucas sequence approach of Scott and Barreto, Hu et al [50] 
introduce the idea o f exploiting the q-th power Frobemus endomorphism to compute this 
exponentiation This can be done by simply writing (¡>i{q)/n to the base q Granger et 
al suggest using multi-exponentiation (e g see Avanzi [2]) to compute all o f the resulting 
exponentiations using a smgle square-and-multiply algorithm
Granger et al examine the theoretical costs of using this method to compute the final 
exponentiation They conclude that the Lucas sequence approach is more efficient for em­
bedding degree k <  6 However, for k > 6 the multi-exponentiation idea is more efficient 
As discussed previously, Koblitz and Menezes conclude that the Weil pairing is more effi­
cient than the Tate pairing at high levels of security However, this analysis does not take 
into account the technique of multi-exponentiation Granger et al conclude that the Tate 
painng is always faster than the Weil pairing for all o f the interesting security sizes used in 
practice
Scott [105] also examines the relative efficiency of the Tate pairing and the Weil painng 
In public key schemes that are based on the DLP in ¥*k, security is traditionally increased 
by increasing the size of q, for example from 1024 bits to 2048 bits However, this leads 
to a substantial increase in the cost of arithmetic in F*fe, which can be problematic in con­
strained environments Scott points out that pairing based cryptography has another option, 
to keep the size of the underlying field constant and to double the embedding degree k This 
has the added advantage of requiring only minimal changes to the underlying software or 
hardware implementation Scott advocates fixing the base field size at 512 bits, and using 
elliptic curves with embedding degrees 2,4  and 8, depending on the level o f  security that is
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required
Scott also addresses the practical considerations of computing the expensive 
exponentiation required for the Tate pairing Using the techniques of Granger et al [42], 
Scott points out that it is easiest to precompute (</)/// and store it as a number to the 
base q, and then to exploit the q-th power Frobenius action to allow a multi-exponentiation 
Scott also shows how the entire final exponentiation to (qk — 1 ) / n  can be included in the 
multi-exponentiation This approach does not require an inversion, which may be useful 
in restricted environments where inversion is particularly expensive Scott provides ex­
perimental evidence that the exponentiation to <^(<j)/n is faster using the Lucas sequence 
approach when k < 4
Scott then gives an algorithm to compute the Weil pairing for an even embedding de­
gree, which is more efficient than that given by Koblitz and Menezes The algorithm given 
by Koblitz and Menezes includes an exponentiation to (qk — 1) after the loop, to avoid 
computing the vertical line functions However, raising the output o f M iller’s algorithm 
to this power also means that inversion can be replaced inside the loop with a simple con­
jugation with respect to F qk/2 Thus Scott shows that only one accumulating variable is 
needed to compute the Weil pairing, rather than the two variable approach previously used 
in analysing the cost of computing the Weil pairing
It is possible to precompute the required multiples o f the first input point to the Tate 
pairing and to store them for use in M iller’s algorithm This technique is useful if a pairing is 
computed multiple times using the same iterating point, and if storage space is not an issue 
Scott shows that this technique is applicable to the second input point when computing the 
Weil pairing This greatly reduces the computational complexity of the Weil pairing, as it 
is no longer required to double and add the point defined over the extension field inside the 
algorithm Scott concludes by giving experimental results that validate the assertion that the 
Tate pairing is faster than the Weil pairing for all interesting security levels, except when it 
is possible to precompute points
The results mentioned in this section so far are applicable to all curves, as no special
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properties are exploited However, Park et al [88] describe a technique to implement the 
Weil pairing efficiently on supersmgular curves, when the modified pairing is used In 
particular, they show how the full Miller loop can be effectively replaced with a Miller lite 
loop First o f all, the distortion map that is used must be separable
Definition 26 An endomorphism (j> is inseparable i f  and only i f
<t>(x,y) = (h(t !‘, yp), v (x1>, y1'))
f o r  some rational functions u, v where p  is the chat actenstic o f ¥ q
Most distortion maps used in practice are of degree one and are therefore separable 
Park et al then show how the Weil pairing can be computed as
.  ip  M ) )  = M m  + R) h i - ^ j R ) )  
n{ , m ) )  f p ( R )  J q W - H P  -  B ) )
In fact, the random point R  can be omitted as explained earlier Clearly, this definition 
replaces the full Miller loop on the point ip(Q) with a Miller lite loop on Q  Also, the 
function evaluation is at i/>-1 (P)  rather than at P,  where is the inverse of the distortion 
map Park et al then show that a self-pairing can be computed as
e (P  tb(P)) — cn^ fp ty-HP)) '
where c j  is a constant that depends on the distortion map Self-pairings are required for a 
certain number of cryptographic applications Park et a l ’s self-pairing formula can be com­
puted with a single Miller loop, and it has no final exponentiation However, the complexity 
o f the algorithm is not the same as that o f the Tate pairing without the final powering, con­
trary to the claim o f Park et al This is due to the fact that it is necessary to evaluate the line 
functions at tp(P) and ij)~l (P)  each iteration of the loop, whereas only one evaluation is 
required using the standard denominator elimination technique with the Tate pairing
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J3.7 More Recent Optimisations
Hu ct al [50] implement the Tate pairing using a supersingular elliptic curve over Fp2 with 
an embedding degree of k — 3 This is the first i eported implementation in the literature of a 
pairing on a curve with an odd embedding degree As detailed earlier, this paper also shows 
how the Frobemus endomorphism can be exploited to speed up the final exponentiation 
required for the Tate pairing The disadvantage to using an odd embedding degree is that 
the denominator elimination technique of Barreto et al [5] does not apply Therefore, Hu 
ct al [50] use the algorithm of Galbraith et al [31] Another argument against using this 
curve is that the iterating point is defined over Fp2, instead of F p as is more common
Blake et al [8] give some refinements to M iller’s algorithm for general elliptic curves 
Their improvements reduce the total number of line functions in M iller’s algorithm How­
ever, as these techniques do not incorporate denominator elimination, they are not partic­
ularly useful in practice Let h(Q)  be a linear function in two variables that is evaluated 
at the point Q =  (x , y ) Then the conjugate o f  h ( Q ), which is denoted h(Q),  is equal to 
h ( - Q ) ,  where - Q  is the opposite o f  Q Let lp(Q)  be the evaluation of the point Q  at the 
line function when doubling P , and let V[2]p(Q)  be the vertical line through [2]P Then
~ l p { Q ) l p { - Q )  -  ~ lp{Q)lp{Q )  ~  y 2p(Q)v[2\p(Q)
The minus sign can be omitted in Miller’s algorithm, as the pairing value is not affected 
by non-zero constants This technique is used later in this thesis to prove a result about the 
Tate pairing
Scott [104] shows how to efficiently implement the Tate pairing on certain ordinary 
elliptic curves These curves arc closely related to the supersmgular elliptic curves used by 
Boneh and Franklin [11] However, Scott shows that a speedup o f up to 20% is possible 
when computing the Tate pairing in the ordinary elliptic curve case Alternatively, only half 
the amount o f storage is required if it is possible to precompute the lines that are required 
in M iller’s algorithm The ordinary curves in question have the same equations as the two
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Boneh and Franklin supersingular elliptic curves, but with different congruence conditions 
attaching to the large pnme p So the curves are no longer supersingular and have no 
distortion maps as a result
However, the same maps are still endomorphisms of the curve and are useful in the 
context of scalar multiplication, as examined by Gallant e ta l [37] Gallant eta l give endo­
morphisms for these curves such that given a point P , a fixed multiple of the point can be 
determined with a single field multiplication Scott transfers this idea to the area of pairing 
computation, by observing that the line functions in the first half of M iller’s algorithm are 
related by the endomorphism to the line functions in the second half Therefore, the line 
functions from the first half o f the algorithm can be stored, before they are multiplied by the 
accumulating variable In the second half o f the loop, the group arithmetic can be avoided 
by reusing the stored functions
3.8 Conclusion
Various methods in the literature to compute pairings efficiently have been described in this 
chapter A number of conclusions arise naturally from the optimisations that have been 
detailed Firstly, a number of generic techniques exist that improve the running time o f 
M iller’s algorithm as originally defined The first input divisor should be defined over the 
field Fq, rather than In this way, the group arithmetic takes place over the smaller 
field, which is a large saving An even embedding degree should be used with a distortion 
map for supersingular curves, in order to use the denominator elimination technique Any 
random divisor used to guarantee the non-degeneracy of the Tate pairing can be omitted as 
it can be defined over a subfield, and hence eliminated by the final exponentiation
Secondly, the Tate pairing should be used, rather than the Weil painng, as it is always 
more efficient to compute The final exponentiation can be evaluated reasonably efficiently 
using either Lucas sequences or multi-exponentiation, depending on the embedding degree 
o f the curve in question Thirdly, numerous optimisations exist when computing the Tate
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pairing using certain supersingular curves over low characteristic These optimisations in­
clude a shortened loop size, a trivial final exponentiation, and no conditional statements in 
the loop
There is no inherent obstacle to using any of these optimisations to compute pairings 
efficiently on genus 2 curves However, the papers that have been described in this chapter 
are largely unclear on this issue Duursma and Lee [23] provide a family of hyperelliptic 
curves suitable for fast pairing implementation However, this family of curves contains 
no hypcrelhptic curves of genus 2 over finite fields o f a suitable characteristic Any im­
plementation of genus 2 pairings that exists in the literature lies far behind the equivalent 
implementation on elliptic curves This deficit is addressed in the remainder of this thesis
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Chapter 4
Pairings on Supersingular Genus 2 
Curves over F2 m
4 1 Introduction
In this chapter, the first efficient implementation o f  the Tate pairing on a supersingular genus 
2 curve over F 2m is described Firstly, various supersingular curvcs over F 2m arc examined, 
and two curves arc selected that have the maximum embedding degree o f k =  12 for genus 
2 curves in characteristic 2 It is shown how to compute the group order for these curves, 
and how to select the field F 2m such that the group order has a large prime factor Explicit 
formulae are given for doubling divisors m P ic ^ (F 2^ )  for the curves in question
Various aspects of the arithmetic of the selected curves are then explored It is shown 
how to construct the extension fields that are required, and how to perform arithmetic in 
these fields in an efficient manner An octuphng automorphism is given on the curves, 
which can be exploited in M iller’s algorithm by using an octic basis Degenerate divisors 
and their application to pairing computation are exammed Explicit formulae are derived 
for the intermediate functions that are required in M iller’s algorithm, and it is shown how 
the final exponentiation can be computed efficiently
The implementation of the Tate pairing is then considered in detail using an octic ba­
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sis and explicit formulae As degenerate divisors are used, the input elements to M iller’s 
algorithm are points on the curve However, using a standard “double-and-add” algorithm 
destroys the special form of the iterating divisor, due to the additions in the group order It 
is shown how this can be avoided by splitting the function that is required into several other 
functions which are computed separately It is also shown how a large amount o f  computa­
tion in Miller’s algorithm can be avoided by precomputing certain powers o f  the first input 
point
Whenever a doubling is performed in M iller’s algorithm, the accumulating variable 
must be squared As an octic basts is used in this chapter, this operation must be performed 3 
times per iteration o f the loop However, it is shown how this can be avoided by building the 
exponentiation into the explicit formulae inside the loop, at the cost o f  some extra operations 
in the extension field This optimisation requires the precomputation of certain powers of 
the second input point Finally, some experimental results are given and the chapter is 
concluded
This chapter contains joint work with Paulo S L M Barreto, Steven D Galbraith and 
Michael Scott, which has been accepted for publication in Designs, Codes and Cryptogra­
phy A preprint is available at the ePnnt archive as Barreto et al [4]
4.2 The Curve
The first task is to select a suitable genus 2 curve over F ^  with a low embedding degree 
As no ordinary genus 2 curves are known that have a low embedding degree, the search 
must be restricted to supersingular curves In the context o f finite fields of characteristic 
2, Koblitz curves are curves that are defined over the binary field F 2, and the degree zero 
divisor class group of the curve is considered over F?™, for some pnm e m  As detailed in 
Chapter 2, it is a simple matter to compute the group order #Pic2>(F2m) for Koblitz curves 
Also, as the coefficients of the equation of the curve are either 0 or 1, it is possible to reduce 
the computational complexity of the group law Therefore, Koblitz curves are attractive for
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pairing implementation For information on how to speed up scalar multiplication on genus 
2 Koblitz curves see Gunther et al [44] and Lange [67]
Recall that a genus 2 curve is given by the equation C  y 2 +  h(x )y  = } (x), where j  ( j ) 
is momc of degree 5, and h(x)  is o f degree < 2 Choie and Yun [18] classify genus 2 curves 
over F2™ into three types, which depend on the degree and form of the h(x)  polynomial 
Curves with a constant h(x)  are defined as Type-TTI curves The following lemma due to 
Galbraith [32] shows that all Type-Ill curves are supersingular Note that no genus 2 curve 
defined over F 2 with a non-constant h(x)  polynomial is supersmgular
Lem m a 3 Let C  be a genus 2 curve over F 2m o f  the form y 2 +  cy — f ( x )  where / ( r )  is 
momc o f  degree 5 and c € F 2m Then C  is supersingular
When considering the equation of Type-III curves over the field F 2, the left-hand side 
of the equation is fixed as y 2 -1- y  The right-hand side o f the equation is / ( x )  =  x 5 4- / 4X4 4- 
h x * +  h ? 2 +  J +  /o, where all € {0,1} This implies that there are a maximum of 
25 different curve equations for Type-III curves over F 2 However, by a linear change of 
variables, Choic and Yun show that all Type-III curves arc of the form
c  y 1 + y  =  x 6 +  f 3X3 +  h x  +  f 0
This equation implies a maximum of 23 possible curve equations In fact, there are 6 differ­
ent curves up to isomorphism, as the curve y 2 4 - y — x 5 +  1 is isomorphic to ij2 4 - y = x 5 , 
and the curve y 2 -{- y  =  x 5 4- x 3 +  x  +  1 is isomorphic to the curve y 2 +  y  =  x 5 +  x 3 4- x  
Therefore, there arc essentially 6 different supersingular Koblitz curves of genus 2 over 
that must be investigated for pairing computation
Table 4 1 gives a representative o f  each of the 6 different isomorphism classes of Type-
/III curves defined over F2, along with the embedding degree of each curve For all o f  these 
curves, Koblitz [64] gives an automorphism to compute a fixed scalar multiple [2l\P  o f a 
point P  e  C (F 2m), by applying the 2nd power Frobemus endomorphism to the coordinates 
o f P  The Frobemus endomorphism <p2 is trivially computed in characteristic 2 as it equates
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Table 4 1 Supersingular genus 2 curves over F 2
Curve Automorphism Embedding degree
y 1 +  y = x b +  x* ■+- x [8]P =  026(P) 3
ij2 +  y  =  re5 [ 4 ] P = - M P ) 4
y 2 +  y =  +  x [16]P =  02s(P ) 4
y 2 -\- y — X +  1 [1 G]P = f o ( P ) 4
y 2 Jr y — x5 +  x s [64] P  =  - 0 2i2 (P) 12
y 2 +  y — æ5 +  x 3 +  1 [ 6 4 ] P = - f c i 2(P ) 12
Table 4 2 Supersingular genus 2 curves over F 2 with k =  12
Isomorphism class 1 Isomorphism class 2
y 2 +  y = x b +  x d 
y 2 -f y  =  x 5 -f x 3 +  x 2 -h x  
y 2 -f- y  =  C3 -f- x 4 +  x 3 +  l 
y 2 -f y  = x 5 +  x A -f a:3 +  x 2
y 2 +  y = x b +  x 3 +  1 
y 2 -f y — x 5 +  x 3 4- x 2 +  x  +  1 
y 2 +  y — x°  H~ x 4 4- x 3 +  x  -f- 1 
y 2 +  y =  a;5 +  x 4 +  x 3 +  x 2 +  1
to a squaring As a result, the automorphisms that are given enable an extremely efficient 
method to perform the group operation This is not useful for systems based on the DLP, 
as these curves are all supersingular and hence are vulnerable to the attack of MOV/FR 
However, this property is exploited later in this chapter to compute the Tate pairing
As can be seen in Table 4 1, two curves have the maximum embedding degree of k  =  12 
given by Rubm and Silverberg for genus 2 curves over F 2™ These curves are
Cd y 2 +  y =  x b +  x 3 +  d, d e  {0 ,1 }
Table 4 2 gives the other curve equations over F 2 that are isomorphic to the curves Cd 
However, as the curve equations Cd have the smallest number of coefficients o f all o f these 
curves, the other curves are not considered for pairing implementation in this chapter 
The next step is to determine the group order # P ic ^  (F2m ) for the curves Cd Again, we 
largely follow Koblitz [64] in this treatment The characteristic polynomial o f the Frobenius
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XC(T) =  T 4 +  0l T 3 +  a2T 2 +  2a , T  +  4 =  J ] ( T  -  a ,) ,
? = 1
where a 1 , 0 2  € Z, and the a,  are complex numbers of absolute value \/2  As detailed 
in Chapter 2, once the coefficients a\ and ¿¿2 are known, the group order over F2 can be 
evaluated as x c ( 1) =  # P ic ^ ( F 2) lo determine the group order over some extension field 
F 2m, it is necessary to find the factors ctt o f  Xc{T ) ,  and then to compute
4
# P l C °  ( F j m )  =  J J ( 1  -
1= 1
To determine a\ and a 2 for the curves Cd, it is necessary to first count the points on the 
curves over F 2 and F 22 The results are # C o (F 2) =  5 and # C 0(F22) =  5, and # C \  (F2) =
1 and # C i ( F 22) =  5 The coefficients a\ and a2 o f \ c ( T )  are then computed as a\ =  
# C ( F 2) -  3 and a2 = (# C ( F 22) -  5 + a2) ¡2 For Co these values are a\ = a2 = 2, and 
for C\  these values are a\  =  - 2 ,  n2 =  2 The characteristic polynomial o f  the Frobenius 
endomorphism for these curves is then
XCd(T)  =  T 4 +  ( ~ l ) d2T 3 4- 2T 2 +  ( - 1  )d4 T  +  4
It is now necessary to derive the a x First o f all, the quadratic equation x 2 + a i x + ( a 2 - 4 )  =  
0 must be solved to obtain the two roots 71 and 72 For Co these roots are — 1 ±  y/3 and for 
Ci the roots are 1 ±  \/3  The a , are then found by solving the quadratic equation x 2 -  7, +
2 =  0, and the group order over F 2™ is computed as #Pi c% (¥ 2m) =  n £ = i( l  “  a D  ^ s  
m  must be prime to avoid the Weil descent attack, the group order over F 2m can be written 
for Co as
#P iC c0(F2m) =  22"' +  ( - I ) [ ( m+ 1)/4l2(3m+1)/2 +  2m +  ( - l ) [ ( ”,+1)/4l2('"+1)/2 +  1,
endomorphism for a genus 2 curve C  over F 2 is given as
4
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and for C\  as
# P lC ^ ( F 2m) =  22m -  (_ l)[(^ + l) /4 ]2(3m+l)/2 _|_ 2m -  (_ l)[(^ + l)/4 ]2(^+ l)/2 +  1
where [] denotes the greatest integer function When describing details o f the pairing im­
plementation later m this chapter, the group order for both curves is written for convenience 
as
# P ic £ (F 2m) =  22m ±  2(3to+1>/2 +  2m ±  2(”,+1)/2 +  1
There are two criteria on the selection of the prime m  First of all, it should be large 
enough so that the group Pic° (F2™) is invulnerable to the Pollard-rho attack, and ¥^ km is 
resistant to index calculus attacks Secondly, the group order # P ic ^  (F2™) must be divisible 
by a large prime number to avoid the attack of Pohlig and Heilman In other words, only a 
small co-factor should divide the group order As m  is prime, only the group order over the 
base field, # P iC c (F 2), divides the group order over the full field, # P iC £ (F 2m) Therefore, 
to give the maximum resistance to the attack of Pohlig and Heilman, # P ic ^ ( F 2m) should 
be divisible by as small a multiple of # P ic ° ( F 2) as possible
Computing the group order over F 2 for both curves can be done by simply evalu­
ating the characteristic polynomial o f the Frobenius endomorphism at 1, which yields 
XCoW =  # P lcc 0(F2) =  13 and x c i ( l )  =  # P iC c 1(F2) =  1 Therefore, for the curve 
Co it is desirable to find a prime m , such that as small a multiple o f 13 as possible divides 
# P ic ^ 0(F2m), leaving a prime number In fact, an exhaustive search yields some examples 
where the co-factor is the lowest possible value of 13 For Cj,  as # P ic ^ i (F2) =  1, it is 
theoretically possible to find instances of m  where the group order itself is prime How­
ever, in the range o f m  which is large enough for security, yet small enough for practical 
implementation, only one such example was found Table 4 3 gives a number of examples 
for both curves
Lange [70] gives explicit formulae for performing the group arithmetic on genus 2
76
Table 4 3 F 2„., where # P ic ^ ( F 2 ) is equal to a small cofactor times a prime
Finite Field Curve Co-factor
F 2 103 y 2 -1- y  =  x b +  x 6 13 1237
F 2 181 y 2 +  y — x 5 +  x^ 13
F2211 y 2 +  y =  3 5 +  x s 13
F 2 79 y 2 +  y  — +  x 6 + 1 151681
F 2 127 y 2 +  y =  +  x 3 +  1 198168459411337
F 2 199 y 2 + y  = x 5 + x 3 +  1 2389 121789
F 2 239 y 2 +  y  =  x 5 -I- x 3 +  1 1
curves over finite fields o f arbitrary characteristic These formulae are more efficient than 
the generic algorithm due to Cantor As mentioned earlier, the group arithmetic for curves 
defined over F2 can be more efficient than for curves defined over F 2™, especially if  the 
equation of the curve is sparse In Algorithm 7, explicit formulae are given for doubling a 
divisor on the curves Cd As this is the most common operation in scalar multiplication, the 
other cases can be handled by Cantor’s algorithm We note that formulae by Stevens given 
later in chapter 14 of Cohen et al [19] slightly improve on the efficiency of some of these 
formulae
4.3 Curve Arithmetic
In this section, all of the background information that is needed to implement painngs on 
the selected curves is described
4 3 1 Finite field arithmetic
As the embedding degree o f the curves Cd is k =  12, it is necessaiy to show how to 
construct the extension field F 2i2m A polynomial basis representation will be used rather 
than a normal basis representation, for reasons outlined m chapter 2 There are a number 
of different ways to construct the field F 2i2m As the curve is initially considered over the 
field F 2m, it makes sense to choose this field as the base field Rather than construct F 2i2m 
as a degree 12 extension o f F 2m, it is more convenient to first construct the field F 26m, using
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Algorithm 7 Doubling of a divisor [u, u] on the curves C¿
I n p u t  [v , v]
O u t p u t  [ u \  v '\ =  2[u, v\
1 if deg(w) = 0 then
2 \u f Vf] 4 -  [1 0]
3 else if deg(u) = 1 then
4 Uq < - U q , v[  Uq2 +  Uq, Vq <- u l  +  d
5 [u\ v'] <— [x2 +  Uq, v[x +  tig] > (3S)
6 else
7 if t£]_ = 0  then
8 Sq <- v\, l;0 <-
9 u '0 « -  s'o2
10 W \  < Sg 4" 1, Wq <— Wl H- Uq +  Uo, W i  UqU>i - f  ¿Q,
11 7^  W0 + Vl, 0^ <— Wl +^0 + 1
12 [v!, v f] <— [x2 +  x  +  íí¿, i>J:r -I- Vg] > (2S, 2M)
13 else if ui = 1 then
14 Aq u \ ,  Uq <— 6^2
15 Vq <— SÓ(U¡) 4“ Uq +  Uq) +  u!qVi +  ^0 +  1
16 \u', v r] <— \x  +  Uq, v¿] > (3S, 2M)
17 else
18 s': 1 +  u \ ,  ¡2 <— v j
19 Zj < U q , I q  <— V q  d
20 101 <—  l / s j ,  U »0 ¿2 ^ 1  +  u i
21 Uq <— W q , u [  <— w f
22 W2 <— W \  +  1'2 , U)3 <— U q W 2
23 v[ <r- ( u i  +  Uq)( 2^ +  s i )  4- m  +  W i  +  I'l
24 IÍQ <---  W3 4- /q +  1




an irreducible trinomial or pentanomial o f degree 6 defined over F 2™ Then the field F 2i2m 
can be constructed by using an irreducible trinomial of degree 2 defined over F 26m
The curves Cd have been studied m coding theory (e g see [41]), and a distortion map 
such that C ( F 2™) i-> C (F 2i2m) is known Normally, the random irreducible polynomials 
that define the fields F 2&m and F 2i2m are chosen so that they are defined over the subfield 
F 2 However, it is better to carefully choose the irreducible polynomials so that applying 
the distortion map to a point P  e  C (F 2™) simply involves manipulating the basis repre­
sentation The base field F 2m is constructed in the standard manner by using an irreducible 
polynomial o f degree m  over F 2 F 2fom is constructed by using an irreducible pentanomial 
of degree 6 that is defined over F 2, given as
x  ^+ xd -f- x3 -f- x2 + 1 = 0
Let w  £ F 2b be a root o f this polynomial Then a polynomial basis for the finite field F 26m 
is
{1 , w ) w 2, 7/j3, w 4, w 5}
Note that w 7 =  tu5 +  w 4 +  w 1 +  w  +  1 and w8 =  w  +  1 To define the quadratic extension 
of F 26m, the irreducible trinomial o f degree 2 over F 2Gm that is used is
x 2 +  x  +  (w5 +  w 3) =  0
Let so 6 F 2i2 be a root of this polynomial Then a polynomial basis for the finite field 
F 2i2m is given by adjoining so to the field F 26m, to yield the 12-tuple
{1 , w, w 2, w 3, w 4, w 5, s0, tuso, w 2s0: v)3sq: w 4s q, w 5so}
Now define s \ — w 2 +  w 4 and s 2 — w 4 +  1 The distortion map which maps elements
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of C (F 2m) to C (F 2i2m) is given as
ip{z, y) =  (x +  w  y-\- S 2 Z 2  +  +  s q )
To see why the basis for F2i2™ was chosen, note that applying the distortion map to a point 
p  =  ( r , y) e  C(Fam) can be computed using a single squaring in F 2m as
Note that the distortion map maps the x-coordinate of P  to F 2&m, and the y-coordinate of 
P  to F 2i2m Therefore, this distortion map supports the denominator elimination technique 
of Barreto et al [5]
It remains to consider the cost o f arithmetic in F 26m and F 2i2m As addition is extremely 
cheap in characteristic 2, this operation is ignored in the analysis A squanng in F 26m can 
be achieved extremely efficiently as
This takes only 6 squarings in F 2™ Multiplication is far more costly, and takes 18 mul­
tiplications in F 2™ using the Karatsuba technique A multiplication in F 2i2m is computed 
as
(a -f bs o)(c +  dbo) = (ac +  bd(w5 +  ws ) +  so((a +  b)(c +  d) -f at))
{a;, 1 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
{y -j-x 2, 0, x ,0 x  +  x 2, 0, 1 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
This costs 3 multiplications in F 26m, as the multiplication by (w 5 +  w 3) can be handled by 
a series of additions A squarmg in F 2i2m is computed as
(a -f 6s0)2 =  {a2 +  b2 {w5 +  ™3) +  s0(62))
80
This costs only 2 squarings in F 2bm Therefore, a squaring in F 2i2m takes 12 squarings m 
F2m, and a multiplication in F 2i2m takes 54 multiplications in F 2™ As multiplication in the 
extension fields is costly, it is imperative to try to avoid it whenever possible
4 3 2 Octupling
Recall that Koblitz [64] gives a map for the curves Cd, such that for an element P  e 
C (F 2m), an explicit formula to compute a fixed scalar multiple of P  is [64]P =  — 0212 (p )  
Let D  e  P ic ^ (F 2m) be a divisor with a single point P  = ( x i , y i )  in the support, 1 e 
in Mumford representation D = \x +  x \ , y i )  Then [64]D can be computed simply as 
[64] D =  [x +  x f 2 , ^ 12 +  1] This explicit formula provides an extremely cheap means 
of performing scalar multiplication on D,  as it requires only 24 field squarings in F 2m It 
would seem a good idea to use this explicit formula to compute the Tate pairing using the 
curves Cd, rather than use the formulae given in Algorithm 7 to repeatedly double D
However, the curves Cd also have an octupling formula to compute [8]£), for any D e  
P ic ^ (F 2m) If  D  =  (P ) -  (00), this formula has the property that [8\D = (P') -  (00) 
P f can be computed as P'  — cr^2&(P), where (¡>2 is the 2nd power Frobemus map, and a  is 
given as
° { x i , y \ )  =  ( x i  +  1 , 2/1 +  x \  +  1 )
Note that applying the o  map twice in succession yields a 2 = ( x \ , y\ +  1) As ( ¿ i , y\  -I-1) 
is equal to the formula for —P , the opposite of P , then a 2 =  — 1 Although not strictly 
accurate, the result o f the octupling map on P  is denoted as P f =  [8]P  =  (P ) , and
thus [8]D =  ([8]P ) -  (00) Therefore, for a divisor D  =  [ x + x i ,  yi], [8\D  can be computed 
as
[8]Z) =  [x +  (xi +  l ) 64, (7/1 +  x 2 +  l ) 64], 
which takes 12 squarings in F 2m It is worth examining how the octupling map [8]P  relates
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to the map [64] P  =  given by Koblitz As a 2 =  — 1, then using the octupling
map twice in succession gives [8]([8]P ) =  o 2<j)2i2 (p ) =  - h  12 (P ), which is exactly the 
map given by Koblitz
The octupling formula as defined applies only to a divisor with a single finite point 
in the support However, it can be easily extended to general divisors Let D =  (P i) +  
(P 2) — 2(oo) be a general divisor, where Pi  =  (2,1, y\)  and P2 =  (x2, t/2) Using Mumford
representation, D  is represented as two polynomials u(x) =  x 2 +  u i x  +  uq and u(x) =
v \ x  -f vo, such that
U = X2 +  (x i +  X2) l  +  (X1X2)
V = (y2 + y i ) l  (x2 + Xi)x  + (y ix2 + x i y 2) / ( x 2 + xi))
The goal is to compute [8]Z> in such a way as to use the octupling formula that is given on 
each of the points P i and P2 By linearity
D'  =  [8}D =  [8]((P i) -  ((X))) +  [8]((P2) -  (00)) =  (P i) +  ( J $  -  2(oo), 
where
P[ =  (xf4 +  1 ,1/f4 +  x j28 +  1), P2 =  (x24 +  1, J/f4 +  x228 +  1)
The Mumford representation for D ' =  [v! ,v'\ is given as n '(x ) =  x 2 +  +  tig and
i/(a;) =  'uja: +  v'Q u f (x)  is computed as
u\  = x[  +  x 2 = (xi  +  x 2)64
-  7/64
Uq =  x ix 2 =  (ref4 +  l ) (x |4 +  1) =  (x ix 2)64 +  (xi  +  x 2)64 +  1
=  (uo +  Ui +  1)64,
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and t/(x ) is computed as
ui -  (^i + ^2)/(^i + ^2) — (^i4 + xi28 + i/24 + -^ 228)/(xi4 + ^24)
=  ( ( y i  +  V2)/{xi  +  x2))64 +  {xi +  x2)64
— ( 1^ + ^ i)64,
vo = i v i x 2 +  y*2x  +  4 )
= ((2/f4 + xi™ + 1)(44 + 1) + (?/264 + x^ 28 + l X x f 4 + l))/(x?4 + x264)
= ((yiX2 + P2Xi)/ (x1 +x2))64 + ({y\ + y 2)/{xi + x2))64 + (xix2)64 +
(xi + x2)C4 -f 1
= ( v 0 + V I + U q + U i + l)64
Algorithm 8 summarises this information, by giving complete formulae for octupling a 
divisor of any form in Mumford representation This algorithm can be used for straightfor­
ward scalar multiplication o f divisors on the curves Cj,  as it is extremely efficient, taking 
at worst 24 field squarings to compute [8]D
A lgorithm  8 Octupling of a divisor [u, w] on the curves Cd 
In p u t  divisor [u, t?]
O u t p u t  =  8[u , u]1 if  deg('u) =  2 then
2 [1/ ,  v]  <— [x2 +  4- (uj +  wo +  I)64 (vi 4- 'Ui)64x 4- (« 1  +  Uq +  v\ 4- vo 4 -1)64]
3 else if  d eg (u ) =  1 then
4 [?/, i / ]  [x 4- (uo +  I ) 64, (vo +  Uq 4- l ) 64]
5 else
6 [u', t/'j <- [1,0]
7 end if
4 3 3 Using degenerate divisors
For genus 2 curves, a general (reduced) divisor D  € P ic ^ (F q) is o f the form D = (Pi) +  
(P2) -  2(oo), where Pi, P2 are elements o f C (F 9) or C(Wq2 ) However, certain divisors 
D'  € P ic ^ F ^ )  have only a single finite point in the support, 1 e D'  ~  (P) -  (00) 
These divisors are called degenerate divisors In general, multiplying a degenerate divisor
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D  =  (P ) -  (oo) by a scalar n does not result in a divisor [ri]D =  (Q) -  (oo), but instead 
in a general divisor In fact, simply doubling D  = (P) -  (oo) gives the divisor [2\D = 
(P)  +  (P ) — 2(oo) which is a general divisor However, as shown in the previous section, 
multiplying a degenerate divisor on the curves C¿ by 8 gives a degenerate divisor again
The group arithmetic on degenerate divisors is much more efficient than for general 
divisors For example, adding two general divisors takes I  3 5 ,22 M  m F 2™, using the 
formulae of Lange [70] for the genus 2 group law in characteristic 2 However, adding a 
degenerate divisor to a general divisor takes only /, 5 ,1 0 M  in F 2m Katagi et al [60, 61] 
exploit degenerate divisors in the context o f  scalar multiplication, by using a degenerate 
divisor as the “base-divisor” This does not reduce the computational cost o f the doubling 
operations in the double-and-add algorithm to compute the scalar multiple However, each 
time an addition is performed, a general divisor is added to the initial degenerate divisor, 
which is cheaper than a general addition, as detailed above Katagi et al [61] also show that 
solving the DLP using a degenerate divisor as the base-divisor is as intractable as using a 
general divisor
Duursma and Lee [23] use degenerate divisors in the context of pairings on hyperelliptic 
curves In this way, rather than use a divisor D =  (P ) -  (00) as one of the inputs to 
M iller’s algorithm, it is possible to simply use the finite point P , in a similar manner to 
pairing computation on elliptic curves Pairing computation using degenerate divisors can 
be more efficient than using general divisors In particular, if a degenerate divisor is used 
as the second argument to the Tate pairing, then it is possible to evaluate the functions in 
Miller’s algorithm at a single point, rather than at two points in the general case, which can 
be a significant saving
In general, there is little advantage in defining the first argument to be a point as well, as 
a general divisor will be obtained with the first doubling in M iller’s algorithm The benefit 
o f having a reduced cost for addition also tends to be negligible compared to the cost of 
arithmetic in the extension field However, it has been shown that an octupling operation 
exists on the curves C¿ such that for a divisor D  =  (P ) -  (00), then [8\D — (P ')  -  (00),
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where P ' =  o4>2s(P)  As this octupling operation is extremely efficient, it makes sense to 
consider pairings on degenerate divisors Therefore, in this chapter the pairing of degenerate 
divisors D\ =  (P ) -  (oo) and D 2 =  (Q) — (oo) is examined Computing a pairing using 
points, rather than divisors in Mumford representation, also allows for a simpler description 
which is used to optimise the pairing computation later
Pairing based protocols that use degenerate divisors to speed up pairing computation 
typically require computing a pairing of general divisors as well There are a number of 
different ways to compute pairings on two general divisors D\ — (P i) +  (P2) ~  2 (oo) and 
D 2 = (Q i)  +  (Q2) -  2(oo) First o f all, a pairing can be computed on D\  and D 2 using 
their Mumford representation However, as explicit and fast algorithms will be derived later 
in this chapter for pairings using degenerate divisors, it is more convenient to exploit the 
bilinearity property of the Tate pairing by computing
( D i , D 2)n — (Pi Ql)n(Pl>Q2 )n(P2 i Q l )n (P 2 Q 2)n
Therefore, computing a general divisor using this method is at worst 4 times the cost of 
computing a pairing using degenerate divisors However, a number of techniques are avail­
able to improve this bound, that are largely the same as the techniques that are known to 
optimise the computation o f multiple pairing values in the case of elliptic curves A sin­
gle accumulating variable can be shared for all the pairings, rather than have four separate 
variables, and thus only a single squaring over F 2i2m must be computed at each iteration 
Any precomputation that is done need only take place once The final exponentiation can 
also be shared, rather than computed after each separate pairing However despite these 
optimisations, this approach is still substantially slower than the degenerate pairing
The previous paragraphs detail how degenerate divisors can be used in pairing compu­
tation However, there has been no discussion of when it is permissible to use degenerate 
divisors Frey and Lange [29] examine these issues in detail In particular, they state that 
if the group order of a supersingular curve has a sufficiently large co-factor, then it is not
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possible to find a divisor D  £ P ic ^ (F g) of prime order, such that D  is degenerate How­
ever, Table 4 3 gives several examples where the group order # P ic ^ ( F 2^ )  for the curves 
Cd has a small co-factor Frey and Lange motivate the discussion on degenerate divisors 
by showing how they can be used m both Identity Based Encryption and Short Signature 
schemes
It is essential to test any implementation of the Tate pairing thoroughly, to ensure that 
it meets the required properties o f  a bilinear pairing The computability property is ad­
dressed by simply implementing the algorithm efficiently, and the non-degeneracy property 
is met in this case by using a modified pairing The implementation can be tested for the 
remaining property, that o f bilinearity, by comparing the output o f certain pairing computa­
tions, as will be explained later We emphasise that this is only necessary to ensure that the 
implementation is correct - mathematics guarantees the bilinearity of the Tate pairing
To generate random divisors in P ic ^ (F 9), it is first necessary to generate random points 
on the curve C, over F 2m or F 22m The following solution is due to Koblitz [64] Let 
q =  2m or q ~  22m To generate a random point P  =  {x ,y)  E C'(Fg), first generate a 
random x  e ¥ q Then the equation o f  the curve Cd y 1 ~h y =  x 5 -j- x 3 +  d has a solution 
y e  ¥ q if  and only if the trace of the right-hand side of the equation is equal to zero, 1 e
+  t 3  +  d )  =  0
If the trace is not equal to 0, random values for x should be repeatedly generated until 
this condition is met As rn is defined to be a prime (and hence odd), the y coordinate is 
computed using the half-trace as follows
(m—1)/2
y  =  ^ 2  (x5 +  +  d)22j
3 =0
Once a solution y has been found, then the other root is given by y  +  1
As degenerate divisors are associated with points on the curve, it suffices to generate 
random points to construct a range o f  degenerate divisors for testing purposes Two random
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points Pi =  (¿ 1, 1/1) and P 2 =  (x2, ^2) are used to construct a general divisor D  as D = 
(Pi)  +  (P2) — 2(oo) However, it is often useful to use Mumford’s representation, rather
than keep the finite points P i and P 2 in the support of D separate This can be done by
representing D  as D  = [u, u] such that
u, =  x 2 +  ( x  1 -f- x 2 ) x  +  ( ¿ i x 2 )
v =  (y2 +  Vl)/{X2 +  Xi)x +  (2/1 +  Xi(y2 +  V l)/(x 2 +  Xi))
This conversion requires just 3 multiplications and 1 inversion
To test that an implementation o f  the Tate pairing is bilinear, two random divisors 
D \ , D 2 e  P ic ^ (F 2m) are generated The divisor D '2 6 P ic ^ (F 2 12m) is then obtained 
by applying the distortion map to D 2 Let M  be the final exponentiation required to com­
pute the Tate pairing Then the Tate pairing is computed using D i and D '2 as {D\, D ’2)M 
Scalar multiplication is then performed on D \  using a random scalar Z, to obtain the divisor 
[l]Di The Tate pairing is computed again as D 2)M The output o f the first pairing
is then exponentiated to the power of Z, and compared to the output of the second pairing 
If the two values are equal this implies that the pairing is bilinear, as
{Dh D’2)m  = ([l}Du D,2)M
For a more “thorough” test o f the bilinearity property, it is also possible to perform scalar 
multiplication on the second divisor D f2 using a random value r, and then to compute the 
second pairing as {[¿]£>i, H ^ 2)Ai ^ i s  can be equated with the first pairing value, raised 
to the power of lr
If degenerate divisors are used, then D \  and D 2 are associated with the finite points 
P i and P 2, which are used as the input to M iller’s algorithm The bilinearity test involves 
multiplying the divisor D \  by the scalar Z However, assuming I is a random scalar, this 
approach will normally yield a general divisor, rather than another degenerate divisor In 
this case, the pairing can be computed using Mumford representation, or by splitting the
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divisor to obtain the two finite points in the support This can be done using the following 
method Let [l]D\ =  [«, a], where a — x 2 +  u,\x -f and o =  v\jl -f uq Once the j -  
coordinates x \  and x 2 have been found, then g\ and y 2 are trivially recovered by substituting 
x \  and x 2 into the equation of u Finding x \  and x 2 requires solving the quadratic equation 
a (as u =  ( i  +  x i ) ( x  +  x 2)) This can be done by first rewriting a in the form
Z2 +  Z =  ( u o ) / ( u i ) 2 ,
where 2 =  r / v i This equation can be solved by using the method given previously for 
generating random points on the curve Once this is done, x \  and x 2 can be recovered by 
multiplying the two roots by ¿¿2
4 3 4 Octupling functions for the Tate pairing
As an efficient octupling operation has been derived ior the curves Cj,  it makes sense to 
use this operation to compute the Tate pairing As degenerate divisors are being used, 
rather than general divisors, it must be shown how to derive the necessary functions that 
are required in M iller’s algorithm from the octupling operation Let D\  =  (P)  -  (oo) 
be the initial divisor, where P  =  (xp , yp)  To obtain the divisor D $, D \  must be doubled 
continually to get D2, £4 and then £>§ For each D n ~  n ( P )  — rc(oo), an equivalent divisor 
D'ri is considered, such that D n = D ’n +  (Jn) The function fa is the required function that 
has divisor
( h )  =  8(P)  -  ([8]P ) -  7(oo)
The function /g is built up m stages, by extracting a function f n at each iteration such that 
f n = (y +  v ( x ) ) / u ;(x), where v(x)  is from the Cantor composition step, and u ' ( x ) is from 
the Cantor reduction step
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The initial divisor Di = (P) — (oo) is represented in Mumford notation as
[ui u i ]  =  [ x  +  x p  yp\
The function fi can be taken to be 1 D\  is then doubled to obtain D 2 =  2(P)  -  2(oo) 
This is done by using Cantor composition on [v\, ?;i], which yields
[u2, v2] =  [x 2 +  x 2P (x4p +  r 2p )x  +  y 2p]
As this divisor is already reduced, then ~  ^>2 and f 2 = l  D 2 is then doubled to obtain 
D 4 =  4 (P)  -  4(oo) Again, doubling [u2, ^2] using Cantor composition gives
[u4, V4} =  [x 4 +  x 4p x 3 +  (xP +  x 4P) x 2 4- (xp )x  4- Vp]
This divisor is clearly not reduced, as has degree 2g Therefore, Cantor reduction must 
be applied to [u4, V 4 ],  which yields the divisor D '4 = [ulA, v4] such that
[u4, v^] =  [ t 2 +  x  4- (xp* +  Xp), (&p* 4- l )x  +  (?/p +  Xp +  x 2p +  1)]
Therefore, D 4 = D '4 4- ( / 4X where / 4 =  (y 4- v ^ c ) )  /  u'A(x)  Finally, Dg is obtained by 
doubling D f4, using Cantor composition on [u 4 , v'4\ to give
[u8 ug] =  [t/4(x )25 (x p  -1- l ) x 2 4- (xf? 4- xp  )x +  {ylp  4- Xp6 +  rep 4-1)]
Again, this divisor is not reduced Reducing [us, us] gives a divisor D f8 =  [ug, Ug] such that
[u8î üs] = + (x6p + 1)> yQp + ¿ p 8 + 1 ]
Note that Dg — (P ')  — (00), where P f = a<fr2b(P),  which confirms the octupling formula 
that was given previously /g is given as /g =  (y 4- ug(x))/i/8(x), and therefore Dg —
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D'& + ( h )’where
h  =  f t  f i  î i f k  =■23 r 2 2 1 2 r t
4 3 5 The final exponentiation
The group order for the curves Cd is # P iC c (F 2™) =  22™ ± 2 3^m+1^ 2 +  2m ±2^m+1^ 2-f-l 
It is more convenient to use this group order, rather than a subgroup order, to compute the 
Tate pairing This is because # P ic ^ ( F 2^ )  has a Hamming weight of 5, which means that 
only 4 additions must be performed in M iller’s algorithm All cryptographic applications 
require a unique value, and so it is required to add the final exponentiation at some point m 
the protocol Using the group order, the final exponentiation M  for the curves Cd is
Evaluating the exponentiation to M  using standard exponentiation techniques in F 2i2m 
is computationally expensive However, the cost can be greatly reduced by using the idea 
of Barreto et al [5] The exponentiation to (212r" -  1) can be factored as (212r" — 1) =  
(26'" -  1)(26™ +  1) As detailed in chapter 3, an element x e  F,;fc can be exponentiated to 
the power o f  qk / 2 using a trivial operation In this case, an element x  =  (u +  bso) G F 2i2m 
can be exponentiated to the power of 26”' as x 2&ni = ((a +  b) +  tao) Therefore, the 
exponentiation to the power o f  26m -  1 can be computed with a single multiplication and
inversion in F 2i2 771
Once an element x e  F 2i2m has been exponentiated to the power of (26m — 1), it 
has norm 1 with respect to F 2em In other words, x 26m+1 =  1 This implies that x -1 =  
x 26m, and so inversion can be performed on x  for free As this property holds for any 
subsequent exponentiation, an expensive inversion operation need only be performed once 
when computing the final exponentiation The remaining exponentiation to the power of
2 1 2 m  -  1 2 1 2 m  -  1
#PicQc {¥2m) 22™ ± 2(3m+1)/2 + 2m ± 2(™+1)/2 + 1
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(26w +  l ) / # P i c ^ ( F 2m) can be factored as
f t  ^  — ( 2 m  X  o (™ + l)/2 4 . 1 \ f 9 3m x  o t37^ 1)/2 _L -n 
# P lc° (F2. )  -  (2 T 2  +1)(2  T 2  + 1 )
The fact that the group order divides 26m +  1 will be used in the next chapter to obtain 
an even moie efficient means of computing the Tate pairing In the meantime, the product 
given above can be unrolled as
(24m + 23m + 22m+l + 2™ + l) ip (2(m+1)/2(2Jm + 22m + 2m + 1))
Therefore, the entire final exponentiation to (212m -  1) /# P ic ^ ( F 2”*) can be computed 
with only 7 multiplications, 1 inversion, (m  +  l ) /2  squarings and some trivial Frobenius 
actions in F 2i2m As this is a relatively small computational cost, the emphasis must now 
be on improving the speed o f M iller’s algorithm itself
4.4 Computing the Tate Pairing
In this section, it is detailed how to compute the Tate pairing efficiently using the supersin- 
gular genus 2 curves that were selected earlier, as well as all o f the optimisations that were 
derived in the previous section
4 4 1 Using an octic basis
Recall that the group order for the supersmgular genus 2 curves Cd y 2 +  y =  x 5 +  x3 +  d 
over F 2m, where m  is odd and d 6 {0, 1}, is given as
# P ic £ (F 2- )  =  22r" ±  2(3™+1)/2 +  2 m ±  2(w+1)/2 +  1
Therefore, using the group order in M iller’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing im­
plies a loop size of 2m  iterations, assuming a standard double-and-add algorithm This 
algorithm can be combined with the simplified explicit formulae for doubling elements of
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Picg?(F2m) as given in Algorithm 7 The resulting algorithm yields an efficient pairing 
implementation on both degenerate and general divisors However, in the previous section 
it was shown that these curves support an extremely efficient octupling operation Ex­
plicit formulae were then denved for the intermediate functions that are required in M iller’s 
algorithm m the case of degenerate divisors Given a divisor D =  (P ) -  (oo), where 
P  =  (xp , yp) ,  the function associated with [8\D  is
, , V ( V + V4 { r ) \ 2 y  + Vg(r)
where
v±(x) =  x3 +  (x% +  x p ) x 2 +  ( x p ) x  +  yP)
v8(x) — (x'p + l ) x 2 + (x3p + x p jx  4- (yp6 4- x lp + Xp 4-1)
Note that the denominator v!A(x)2v!%{x) is evaluated only at x, which is the x-coordinate of 
the distorted image point The distortion map ip defined previously maps the x-coordinate 
o f  the point to the field F 26m Therefore, the denominator is also defined over F 26m and is 
eliminated by the final exponentiation
The goal is to compute the Tate pairing {P,?p{Q)) on the degenerate divisors D\ = 
(P) — (oo) and D 2 ~  (Q) — (oo) At each iteration of the algorithm, the point P  is octupled 
and the function given above is calculated As a result, one would expect Miller’s algorithm 
to have 2 m / 3 iterations, as opposed to 2 m  iterations when doubling However, there are a 
number of problems with this approach when a pairing is computed on degenerate divisors 
The group order # P ic ^ ( F 2m) has a Hamming weight o f 5, meaning that four additions 
must take place in M iller’s algorithm However, the final addition yields a vertical line 
function and does not need to be computed as a result [23]
The first problem is that the number of doublings that must be performed between each 
addition in the group order might not be a multiple o f 3 If this is the case, then either 
one or two extra doublings must be performed However, even a single doubling of a
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degenerate divisor D =  (P )  -  (oo) results in the general divisor [2}D =  2(P)  -  2(oo) 
The second problem relates to the additions that must be performed In the overwhelmingly 
common case, any addition performed on a degenerate divisor will yield a general divisor 
Therefore, the computational advantage of using a degenerate divisor as the first input to 
Miller’s algorithm is quickly negated
Here we propose an alternative approach which overcomes these problems Let D = 
(P ) — (oo) be the first input divisor to the Tate pairing It is required to construct a func­
tion f ,  such that ( / )  =  [N]D =  [N ]((P ) — (oo)), where N  is defined to be the group 
order # P ic ^ ( F 2m) in this case Rather than construct /  in stages as in Miller’s algorithm, 
note that j  is composed of several intermediate functions Let D 2t be the reduced divisor 
equivalent to [2*]((P) — (oo)), and let f 2i be the function such that
[2‘] ( ( P ) - M )  = D2, + (/2.)
Let D'  be a reduced divisor equivalent to D 22m ±  D 2{3m+i)/2 , and let }i\ be the function that 
arises from this addition process such that
D 22m i t  Z^2(3m-fl)/2 = D  (^ l)
Similarly, let h2 be the function that arises from the addition of D ' with D 2™, and let be 
the function from the addition (subtraction) o f  the reduced divisor equivalent to D'  +  D 2m 
with D 2(m+1)/2 The final function that arises fiom the addition with D  can be omitted as it 
is eliminated by the final exponentiation The function j  is then constructed as
/ = /22m /2(Jm+1)/2 /2m f 2(m+l)/2 hi h2h3
Therefore, rather than compute /  using a double-and-add algorithm, it is possible to 
compute each f 2i that is required separately No additions take place when computing any 
o f these values, which removes the need for conditional statements inside the loop The
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additions that are required to compute the h l functions are performed afterwards, and thus 
the problems associated with using degenerate divisors are avoided If the / 2* functions are 
calculated separately, the number of iterations of M iller’s algorithm will far exceed 2m /3, 
thus defeating the purpose of this optimisation A better strategy is to have a single octu- 
pling loop up to 2A/i/3 Then whenever the index reaches the required value, the function 
at that point can be saved These function values can then be multiplied together after the 
loop
As an octupling is performed at each loop iteration, the function values must be saved 
at the nearest index to i However, depending on the value of z, one or two extra doublings 
might have to take place to get the correct value for / 2, Let D' — (P ')  — (oo) be the 
degenerate divisor that corresponds to the function that is saved in the loop It has been 
shown previously that doubling a degenerate divisor does not contribute any line function 
to the accumulating function Therefore, if an extra doubling must be performed, it is only 
required to square the function to obtain the correct value for j 2t
A further doubling yields the divisor [4]Df =  4 (P ')  — 4(oo) The explicit line function 
for this divisor was given previously as
y  +  v4 (x) = y  +  x 3 +  (x8P, +  x p , ) x 2 +  {x%,)x +  y P,
Therefore, when two additional doublings must be performed, it suffices to square the func­
tion twice, and then to multiply it by the function given above Rather than evaluate this 
function at 0 (Q ), where Q = ( iQ .gg ) ,  it is possible to build the distortion map ip into the 
function This is given here in the basis defined earlier for F 2i2m The constant term is
{yQ +  x q { 1 +  XQ +  ¿ p ' +  ¿ p ')  +  zp,XQ +  yp,},  
and the remaining terms are
{tq + rp,,Tp, -i- xp,, 1 ,xq + £q50, 1,0 0,0,0,0}
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Finally, the functions hi,  h<i and hs that correspond to the additions in the group order 
must be calculated This is easily done by adding the relevant divisors D2, and extracting 
the functions that are required from the addition process It is a relatively simple matter 
to construct the divisors D 2l Firstly, the convention that j? 1 =  is adopted for con­
venience Given a point P  =  (x p ,i/p ), then [23i]P  can be derived by generalising the 
octupling formula The ¿-coordinate of [23l]P is given as
C6*) . / \Jp + 7i (0 3
where 71(7) is 1 when 1 is odd and 0 otherwise The ^-coordinate o f  [23']P  is given as
l/p6 ,)  +  7 i ( i ) » p ' + 1 )  +  7 s ( ? ) >
where 73 (i) =  1 when ¿ =  1,2 m od 4, and 0 otherwise The exponents in brackets in 
these formulae are reduced modulo m, as x 2™ — x  for x  € F|m However, the 1 in D 2i 
may not be an exact multiple o f 3 This is easily solved by performing at most an extra 
two doublmgs using the approach described previously The divisors D 2i are then added 
together using Cantor composition and reduction, and the relevant functions are extracted 
and multiplied to obtain /
4 4 2 Precomputing the first point
At each iteration o f the octupling algorithm to compute the f 2i functions, it is necessary 
to octuple the iterating point P,  and to evaluate the explicit functions that were derived 
previously at the image point ip(Q) It has been shown that the denominator o f this function 
does not need to be computed, as it is eliminated by the final exponentiation Therefore, the 
function that must be computed at each iteration is the product a/3, where a  = (y-\-va(x ) ) 2 
and ¡3 = (y +  Dg(a:)) These functions are evaluated at ip{Q), which is the point that results 
from the application of the distortion map ip to the point Q e C (¥ 2  rti ) Let P  = ( xp  yp)
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Then ua(x ) and yg(x) are given as
04^x) — X3 ~t~ (¿p  "f~ X p)^2 +  (i-p)j/ +  i/p,
Vg(^) =  ( xp  +  l )^2 +  (^p2 +  x lp ) x  +  (l/p +  Zp +  JTp8 +  1)
It is important to optimise the generation and evaluation of the a/3 product, as it is 
computed at each iteration of the loop The first optimisation is to build the distortion map 
into the formulae for a  and ¡3 This means that the second input point to the Tate pairing 
is now Q = [xQ.yq)  6 CQFVO, rather than ip{Q) € C (F 2i2m) Recall that the distortion
map is ip(x, y) =  (x w , y  -\- $2%2 +  s \ x  +  so), where Sq +  sq =  w b +  w 3, si — w 2 w 4 
and 52 =  tv4 +  1 Then
(y +  ^ ( x ) )  =  vq  + s2Xq  +  si x Q +  50 +  {xq  +  iu)3 -f (x% + x 4p ) (x q  +  w ) 2 +
( x p ) (a Q + w)  +  yp
Squaring this function gives
a — Vq “I“ S2XQ + sixQ + so + XQ + xQw2 + xqw4 + w6 +
(x)p +  Xp)(Xg Hr W4) -{- (x p )(x g  -f li/2) +  y%
The basis fo rF 2i2m was constructed to avoid the need for explicitly calculating elements 
such as w 4 Therefore, the formula for a  must be rewritten in terms of this basis Let 
s2 =  w, s 2 — w 4 -f w -f 1 and Sq = sq +  w 5 +  w s Then the constant component of a , 
written in the basis for F 2i2)n, is
{Vq +  x q +  x q +  1 +  (x p +  x p )x q +  x %x q +  yp}>
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and the remaining components are
{■Iq H- ¿Qi xq 1 ¿p, 0 x]d + xp, 0,1, 0,0j 0, 0, 0}
Similarly, applying the distortion map to ¡3 = (y +  os( r)) gives
P  =  ?/Q +  5 2 X q  +  S lX Q  +  5 o  +  (a^p2 +  1 ) ( x q  +  l i ; ) 2 +  ( x p  +  T p  ) ( c c q  +  l i j )  +
(y-p +  Xp +  x f  +  1)
Expressing ¡3 in the basis derived for the field F 2i2m has constant component 
{VQ + (x f i ) xQ  +  { x f  + x f t ) x Q +  y f  +  X p^l +  x 3p )  +  1} 
and the remaining components are
{z3p + Jl)d , ¿Q + Jb3p + 1, 0, Xq + JvQ, 0 1,0, 0,0,0,0}
It is possible to precompute any power of tq  that is required for both o- and ¡3, as 
these terms are constant throughout the algorithm However, as the point P  is octupled 
at each iteration, it is required to constantly update the values o f  x p  and ijp in a  and (3 
Note that the values required for r p  and yp  m a  and ¡3 are generally of the form r 2p 
for some ? However, there are only rn possible values for ?, as r 2p — x p  Therefore, 
rather than explicitly octuple P , it is better to precompute all o f the possible powers of r p  
and yp  These powers can be stored in an array and then accessed in the algorithm using 
array indexing Firstly, two arrays of size m  are instantiated Each index ¿ in the arrays 
then consists o f the value x p  and yp  This precomputation requires 2?n squanngs in F 2m, 
which is a relatively small cost
The formulae given for a  and ¡3 must then be rewritten, so that the required powers 
for x p  and yp  can be accessed from the precomputed arrays, rather than from the explicit
97
octuplmg of P  This can be done by using the formulae given for computing [23,]P  Firstly, 
a  is examined Recall that 71 (¿) is 1 when 1 is odd and 0 otherwise, and 73(f) =  1 when 
¿ =  1,2 m od 4, and 0 otherwise The constant term of a  is then
f  2 1 6 1 / (6i+4) (6i+3)\ 4 I ( (6H-3) . -i . / \ \  2 . (6^+3) ,{yQ +  xQ +  {x P + X P ) XQ +  U p  +  1 +  7 i ( 0 M q  +  i /p  +
7 lW z p ,+4) +  73«) +  1}
and the remaining components are
{ x q  +  X g ,  X q  +  +  7 1 ( 1) +  1 , 0 , X p l +   ^ +  x ^ + 3 ) , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 },
where x ^  ~  x T  as before Similarly, for (3 the constant term is
{VQ  +  x p^ +5\ x Q +  x q ) +  % pt+4\x ^ p  +5  ^ +  x q  +  7 i( z )  +  1) +  V p l+ 4  ^ +  73 M  +  
7 i ( 0 z q  +  1},
and the remaining components are
+ x ^ 1+4\ xq  +  x {p l+5) + 7 i ( i )  +  1 , 0 ,  Xq +  a : g ,  0  1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 }
Therefore, a  and f3 are constructed at each iteration of the loop with only two multi­
plications in F 2m each, assuming that all o f  the powers of x q  and t/q that are required are
precomputed This is a large saving on having to explicitly calculate the required powers o f 
x p  and yp  at each iteration The remaining task is to show how to multiply a  and (3 in an 
efficient manner A general multiplication in F2i2m is an expensive operation as it costs 54 
multiplications in F 2™ However, both a  and (3 are o f the form (a +  bw +  cw2 +  dw4 +  so) 
It is possible to derive a special multiplication routine that exploits the sparse structure of 
both a  and ¡3 This routine is derived in Appendix A 3, and costs only 11 multiplications in 
F2m using some Karatsuba-like optimisations
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4 4 3 Absorbing powers of 8
As described in the previous subsection, the functions a  and ¡3 are calculated at each it­
eration of the octupling algorithm These functions are first multiplied together using the 
explicit routine given in Appendix A 3, and then with the accumulating variable /  How- 
ever, it is necessary to first exponentiate the accumulating variable /  €  F 2i2m to the power 
o f 8 This can be achieved with three squarings in F 2i2m As a squaring in F2i2m takes 12 
squarings in F 2™, the total cost per iteration of the algorithm is 36 squarings in F 2m
However, it is possible to avoid these squarings by building the exponentiation into 
the a  and (3 terms inside the algorithm This technique is feasible for finite fields of low 
characteristic, and was introduced to pairing based ciyptography by Duursma and Lee [23] 
The first function that must be computed is j 2(m+i)/2 This can be obtained by (m — l )/6 
iterations of the octupling algorithm and a doublmg Therefore, for the index 1 = 0 to 
(m -  l ) / 6, a  and ¡3 must be raised to the power of 2(m~7“ 01)/2, to avoid octupling the 
accumulating variable j
The next function to be calculated is f 2m This can be obtained with ( m —1 ) /3  iterations 
of the octupling algorithm and a further doubling So, for the index t =  (m  -  l )/6 to 
( m —1)/3, a  and ¡3 must be exponentiated to 2(m -4-3î) However, further work is necessary 
if the functions that were previously calculated are to be reused The exponentiation used 
to calculate / 2(m+i)/2 is 2(m-7-6*)/2 Therefore, to reuse this function it is necessary to 
exponentiate it to the power o f  2Îm_1^ 2, as (2(m -7- 6l^ 2)(2(m -1^ 2) =  2(m~4_3î)
The function / 2(3m+1)/2 is computed with ( m - l ) / 2  iterations of the octupling algorithm 
and two doublings For the index t =  (rn —1)/3  to (m  — 1)/2 , this involves exponentiating 
a  and ¡3 to the power o f  2(3m -9- 6lV2 As before, some extra work must be done to reuse 
the functions that have been previously calculated Finally, the function / 22m is computed 
with (2m  — 2) /3  iterations of the octupling algorithm and two doublings For the index 
t =  (m — l ) / 2  to (2 m  -  2 )/3 , a  and (3 must be exponentiated to the power of 2(2m_5_3î), 
again with some further work to reuse the functions
Therefore, the algorithm to compute each of the four / 2* functions consists o f  four
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separate loops o f  (iri -  l )/6 iterations each Each loop contains separate formulae, each 
of which is obtained by exponentiatmg the formulae for a  and ¡3 given previously to the 
required power This requires the precomputation of Xq and ¿/q, for every 0 < i < m, 
and using array indexing in the formulae It costs two multiplications in F 2^  to construct 
each term, which is exactly the same computational cost as that given previously for a  and 
¡3 The actual process of exponentiatmg a  and ¡3 will be examined in more detail in the 
following chapter
Each time a function is reused, it is necessary to perform (m ~  l ) /2  squarings, some 
multiplications as well as some applications of the Frobemus endomorphism in F 2i2m Per­
forming these operations four times negates any o f the advantages associated with elim­
inating the octupling of the accumulating variable However, it is better to group all of 
the operations that require the exponentiation to together, so that this powering is
only computed once As any application of the Frobemus map can be trivially computed, 
the additional cost o f this optimisation is only (m  -  l ) / 2  squarings and 7 multiplications 
in F2 12m
The total cost o f this optimisation is as follows 2m  additional squarings in F2™ must 
be performed in the precomputation stage Then, 6??^  — 6 squarings in F 2”* and 378 mul­
tiplications in F 2m are computed after the loops The previous strategy of squaring the 
accumulating variable three times per iteration costs roughly 24m squarings m F 2™ in to­
tal, as the loop size is approximately 2m /3  Therefore, this optimisation saves roughly 18m 
squarings, at the cost o f 378 multiplications For values o f  m  that are used in practice, this 
optimisation is faster than that given in the previous subsection However, the complexity 
of implementing this approach is considerable
4.5 Experimental Results
In this section, experimental data is provided to validate our assertion that efficient pairing 
calculation is possible on genus 2 curves over F2™ The first task in implementing any o f
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the techniques given in this chapter is to selcct m  There are a number of conditions on 
the selection of m that must be satisfied so that the implementation of the Tate pairing is 
invulnerable to attack, as discussed at the start o f  this chapter Firstly, tti must be chosen so 
that # P ic ^ ( F 2- )  has a large prime factor Secondly, P i c ^ ^ m )  must be large enough to 
resist any generic attack against the DLP in this group Thirdly, as the embedding degree 
of the genus 2 curves is k =  12, a further condition on m  is that F*12m is large enough to 
resist any sub-exponential time attack on the DLP
Various examples of m  that satisfy all o f these conditions for the two curves Co 
y 2 +  y =  x 5 +  and C\ y 2 +  y  =  t 5 +  x 3 +  1 were given earlier in Table 4 3 The 
values that were chosen for m  range from m  ~  79 to m  =  239 All o f these values are large 
enough to satisfy the security considerations detailed above Therefore, the smallest values 
of m are chosen for each curve, as the larger m is, the more computationally expensive the 
arithmetic in both P ic j l ^ m )  and F*12m For the curve Co the value for m i s m =  103, 
and for the curve C\ the value is m  =  79 As will be detailed later, these parameters have 
the advantage that an element o f F 2™ can be represented inside a single hardware register 
(assuming our computing platform)
Table 4 4 details the experimental results on the supersingular genus 2 curve C\ over 
F279 Table 4 5 details the experimental results for the curve Co over F2io3 The first three 
cases in each table give timings for the implementation of the Tate pairing using the group 
order for each curve All three cases in each table share the fast means of performing finite 
field arithmetic as detailed previously, as well as the efficient method to compute the final 
exponentiation The first case m both tables is an algorithm to compute the Tate pairing 
where both input elements are general divisors A standard right-to-left doubling algorithm 
is used, where the iterating divisor is doubled using the explicit formulae given previously 
in Algorithm 7
The second case in both tables uses degenerate divisors and octupling to compute the 
Tate pairing This algorithm precomputes the relevant powers o f the first input point to avoid 
explicitly octupling at each iteration The third case in both tables also uses degenerate
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divisors and octuphng to compute the Tate pairing However, it precomputes powers o f 
the second input point to avoid having to octuple the accumulating variable each iteration 
Finally, the fourth case in both tables gives the timing for scalar multiplication using the 
octuphng formulae given in Algorithm 8 The scalars in question are m  bits long and have 
a random Hamming weight This timing is included to compare the cost o f computing the 
Tate pairing with that o f scalar multiplication on the curves Cd All o f  the timings are given 
in milliseconds
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these tables is that the Tate pairmg can 
be computed efficiently on (supersmgular) genus 2 curves over ¥ 2^  A striking conclusion 
from the tables is that the degenerate divisor case yields a far more efficient implementation 
than the general case This result shows that it is worth using cryptographic protocols 
in the genus 2 setting that take advantage of pairing computation on degenerate divisors, 
as detailed by Frey and Lange [29] It can be seen that the optimisation of avoiding the 
octuphng o f the accumulating variable by building the exponentiation into the intermediate 
functions mside the algorithm gives a slight improvement over the simpler method Finally, 
it can be concluded that pairmg calculation on genus 2 curves over F 2m is not as efficient as 
scalar multiplication, although the difference between them is narrower than was previously
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thought
All o f the experiments were performed on our platform of a Pentium IV, which has 
a clock speed of 2 8 GHz, and which runs version 2 6 15 of the Linux kernel The code 
is written in C/C++ and is compiled using version 4 03 of the GCC/G++ compiler suite 
The efficient implementation of the finite field F 2™ is taken from MIRACL 5 01 Recall 
that ni was chosen so that an element o f  F2™ can be represented inside a single hardware 
register, rather than using a multi-precision representation More precisely, arithmetic in 
F 2™ is performed in the 128-bit registers available to the Pentium IV, which support the 
SSE2 instruction set SSE2 is a SIMD (Single Instruction, Multiple Data) instruction set, 
meaning that a single SSE2 instruction manipulates the entire 128-bit register This offers 
improved performance over the use o f  four separate 32-bit registers In particular, this 
instruction set enables the multiplication of elements in F 2™ that is about twice as fast as a 
standard multi-precision implementation
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was shown that pairing calculation on supersingular genus 2 curves over 
F 2m is efficient, and is a valid candidate for the practical implementation of pairing based 
protocols as a result Firstly, it was shown how to select curves with the maximum em­
bedding degree permitted for genus 2 curves It was shown how to select m  such that the 
relevant security parameters are satisfied, and formulae were given to double elements in 
P ic ^ (F 2™) that exploit the special form of the curve equations that were chosen
It was detailed how to construct the extension fields that are required The use of degen­
erate divisors in pairing computation was then explored An octupling automorphism was 
derived, and explicit formulae were given for the intermediate functions that are required 
m M iller’s algorithm It was shown how to compute the final exponentiation efficiently 
Then the actual implementation of the Tate pairing on these curves was detailed It was 
shown how to avoid the problems associated with using degenerate divisors, and how to use
103
precomputation to speed up the algorithm
Finally, experimental results were given It was demonstrated that it is possible to com­
pute the Tate pairing using general divisors efficiently If  degenerate divisors are used, 
then the implementation is particularly efficient However, the results given in this chapter 
should be viewed more as a proof of concept, rather than in a practical manner This is be­
cause the methods used to compute the genus 2 Tate pairing in this chapter are superseded 
by simpler and faster methods that will be described in the following chapter
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Chapter 5
The r jx Pairing
51 Introduction
In the previous chapter, an efficient implementation of the Tate pairing was described on 
the supersingular genus 2 curves Cd y 2 +  y  =  x b +  x 3 -f d over where d e  {0, 1} 
These curves have the maximum embedding degree for supersingular genus 2 curves of 
k = 12 As the group order for these curves is approximately # P ic £  (F2m) «  22m, M iller’s 
algorithm requires around 2 m / 3 iterations if the fast octuphng operation on Cd is exploited 
However, implementing this algorithm efficiently is difficult due to the additions that must 
be performed
In this chapter, it is shown how it is possible to achieve an implementation of the Tate 
pairing on the same genus 2 curves by using the rj pairing construct The rj pairing requires 
rn iterations o f  M iller’s algorithm using the octupling operation m the genus 2 case, as 
opposed to 2ra /3 iterations using the straightforward method However, the arithmetic 
associated with the 77 painng is substantially less expensive to compute, and thus it yields 
an efficient painng implementation The resulting algorithm is approximately as efficient as 
the method given in the previous chapter, but is much simpler to describe and to implement
It is then shown how for certain supersingular elliptic curves it is possible to avoid the 
final exponentiation when computing the 77 pairing, as long as the vertical line functions are
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included in the pairing computation This is the first time that a method has been given to 
compute the Tate pairing for cryptographic purposes that has no final exponentiation This 
technique is not useful in practice, as the evaluation of the vertical line functions in Miller’s 
algorithm is costly However, it is likely that future research will find an application for this 
idea
It is then shown how it is possible to achieve a more efficient pairing computation 
on the genus 2 curves by using the ijr  pairing This pairing has a more complicated 
final exponentiation than the r] pairing, and an extra addition must be performed after the 
loop However, it has approximately half the number of loop iterations of the ?? pairing 
Various techniques are detailed to achieve the fastest implementation possible Finally, a 
comprehensive series o f tests is conducted on the various painng implementations, and the 
chapter is concluded
This chapter contains joint work with Paulo S L M Barreto, Steven D Galbraith and 
Michael Scott, which has been accepted for publication in Designs, Codes and Cryptog­
raphy A preprint is available at the ePrint archive as Barreto et al [4] This chapter also 
contains joint work with Steven D Galbraith and Caroline Sheedy, which has been ac­
cepted for publication in the Journal o f Mathematical Cryptology A preprint o f  this paper 
is available at the ePrint archive as Galbraith et al [33]
5 2 The Theory of the t]t  Pairing
Recall that Duursma and Lee [23] introduce several optimisations which lower the com­
putational cost o f the Tate pairing These techniques apply to supersingular hyperelliptic 
curves of the form C  y 2 = x p — x  +  d over Fpm, where d =  ± 1, p  =  3 m od 4 and 
m  and 2p  are co-prime These curves have an embedding degree of k = 2p Rather than 
using the group order # P ic ^ ( F pm) to compute the Tate pairing, Duursma and Lee propose 
using a multiple of the group order o f  the form N  — ppm +  1 This order has Hamming 
weight 2 m  base p, meaning that only a single addition must be performed in M iller’s al-
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gonthm However, Duursma and Lee show that as the addition takes place on the final 
iteration of the algorithm, the line function that corresponds to the addition is a vertical line 
function Therefore, the addition does not need to be computed, leading to the elimination 
o f conditional logic from the algonthm
As the order used to compute the Tate pairing is N  = pPm +  1, the final exponentiation 
is computed as
M  = (qk -  1 ) / N  =  (p 2pm -  l ) / ( j / ’m +  1) =  j T 1 -  1
which can be trivially computed with a multiplication and inversion in Fp2rm Duursma and 
Lee also introduce the idea o f pairing computation on degenerate divisors and hence points 
on the curve, as covered in the previous chapter Instead of deriving the intermediate line 
functions in M iller’s algorithm from the Cantor composition and reduction of the iterating 
divisor, Duursma and Lee provide explicit formulae which depend only on the coordinates 
of the original input point It is also shown how to absorb the exponentiation to p in Miller’s 
algorithm into the explicit formulae
Therefore, the proposed pairing implementation has a trivial final exponentiation and 
the arithmetic inside the loop can be computed efficiently However, these optimisations 
come at the cost of a longer loop of pin  iterations Duursma and Lee’s most significant 
contribution is to show how the number of iterations o f the loop can be shortened from pm  
to in This is done by absorbing the exponentiation to p  inside the explicit formulae The 
resulting algorithm enables an extremely efficient implementation of the Tate pairing
Unfortunately, there are very few specific hyperelliptic curves of the form given by 
Duursma and Lee that have a suitable embedding degree over a finite field of low character­
istic In fact, only the elliptic curves y 2 — x 3 -  x  +  d over ¥ 3™ with an embedding degree 
o f ^ =  6 are interesting for pairing based cryptography Kwon [66] transfers the ideas of 
Duursma and Lee to the elliptic curves y2 + y = x 3 + x  + d over ¥ 2**, where d 6 {0,1} 
and the embedding degree is k  =  4 In joint work with Barreto, Galbraith and Scott [4],
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we show how to generalise and extend the Duursma and Lee loop shortening approach to 
arbitrary supersmgular curves by introducing the i)t  pairing construct
Let C  be a supersmgular (hyperelhptic) curve over ¥ q, where q = pm, with an embed­
ding degree of k >  1 Also, let 0  be a distortion map on the curve C  which enables the 
denominator elimination technique Let N  be the order that is used to compute the Tate 
pairing, which can either be the group order, a multiple o f the group order, or a prime sub­
group order Let D \ ,D 2 €  P ic£ (F 9) have order dividing N ,  and =  ( /n ) ,  for some
function /  Then the level N  Tate pairing is computed as
(Di,  <P(D2))n =  /A r ( 0 ( D 2 ))
The rjx pairing is not a new bilinear pairing but simply an alternative means of comput­
ing the Tate pairing on certain supersmgular curves The mam idea of the tfr pairing is to 
compute the Tate pairing using an order T  e  Z, such that
rrr(D u il>(D2)) = fT (1>(Ih))
Unlike the straightforward method to compute the Tate pairing, the condition that [T]D\ =  
(oo) can be dropped In order to get the loop reduction idea of Duursma and Lee, the goal 
is to select a value for T  that is smaller than N  However, the vast majority of choices for 
T  will not yield a non-degenerate, bilinear pairing The following lemma gives a method 
for selecting T  such that the tjt painng fulfils all o f the properties of a bilinear pairing 
However, this lemma merely shows what values of T  yield a bilinear pairing, it does not 
show how to select T  such that T  < N  The key requirement is an automorphism on the 
curve, such as the octuphng automorphism derived in the previous chapter
Lemma 4 Let (D \ ip(D2 )) n  be the Tate pairing as defined above Then i f  L , a and T  are 
co-prime to N  the 7]j  pairing is a non-degenerate bilinear pairing such that
(m (Du D2)M)aTa~l = ({DMD2))$!)L, 
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where the following properties hold
1 [T]D = ^f(D) where 7  is an automof phism o f  C  which is defined over
2  7  and ip satisfy the condition 7 ipq — ip
3 T a +  1 =  L N  fo r  some a 6 N and L  6 %
4 T  = q +  cN  fo r  some c G Z
For a proof o f this lemma, see Barreto et al [4]
5 3 The Genus 2 r] Pairing
The aim of this section is to select a value for X such that the tjt pairing is bilinear and 
non-degenerate for the supersingular genus 2 curves that were considered in the previous 
chapter If T  can be chosen to be approximately equivalent to 22m, then it may be possible 
to derive a pairing implementation that is as efficient as the octupling algorithm given in the 
previous chapter
5 3 1 Finding a suitable value for T
Consider the curves Cd y1 +  y = x5 +  x3 +  d over F2™, where d =  {0,1} As was 
detailed in the previous chapter, these curves have the maximum embedding degree for a 
supersingular genus 2 curve of k =  12 Recall that for an element D  £ P ic ^ (F 2^ ) ,  such 
that D = (P ) — (00), it is possible to octuple the divisor D  as [S]D =  (P ' ) — (00), where 
P f =  a<p2e (P ), <t>2 is the 2nd power Frobentus map and the map a is given as
o (x ,y )  = (x  +  1 , 7/ +  x 2 +  1),
where a 2 =  — 1 A distortion map for Cd is
ip{x, y) = ( x - \ - w ,y  +  s2x 2 +  s ix  4- s0),
109
which supports the denominator elimination technique, as the x -coordinate is mapped to 
the quadratic subfield of F 2i2m
The first condition to be met in selecting T  is to find an automorphism 7 o f Cd which 
is defined over F^, such that [T\D  =  7 (D ) The obvious candidate is the map [8]P  =
[23]P = (j(j)2b(P) However, using the value T  =  2 3 does not yield a bilinear pairing 
Instead, consider the map [23m]P  =  crm0 26m(P) =  crm (P ) Then 7 =  a m is also an 
automorphism on the curves Cd defined over ¥ q Normally, q =  2m denotes the base-field 
However, here the notation q =  23m is used to take advantage o f the fast octupling operation 
in computing the ? ] t  pairing Therefore, T  is defined as T  = q =  23m
The next step is to prove that the automorphism 7 and the distortion map ip satisfy the 
condition that 7^  =  Let q =  23m as above, where m  is prime and 7 =  a m Recall 
that w 8 = w  +  1, s i =  w 2 +  w 4, s2 = w 4 +  1 and Sq +  so — +  w 'd Then sf =  s i ,
s2 =  62 +  1 and =  so 4- w 2 As m  is prime, it must be congruent to either 1 or 3 modulo 
4 Firstly, let m  =  1 m od 4 and thus 3m  =  3 m od 12 Then
7  ^ q(x ,y )  =
= crip23(x y)
= a(x  + w + 1 y + ( 5 2  + l ) x 2 + s \ x  -f so + w 2)
= (rr + w, y + s2r 2 + sir + s0)
=  i>(x,v)
Let w 2° = w  +  1, sf'3 =  s i ,  s f  = s2 +  1 and s{f =  s q +  w 2 +  1 Now let m  =  3 m od 4
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and thus 3m  =  9 m od 12 Then
7 <l>v(j-,y) = o'm|/,23mU Iy)
=  a 3ip2\ x , y )
=  - c r ( a ;  +  u> +  1 , y  +  ( s 2 +  l ) r r 2 +  s i x  +  so +  +  1 )
= (x + w, y -f 52^2 + s i x  + so)
=  ^ 0 ,y )
Therefore, an automorphism  7 has been denved for the curves such that 7 ipq = ip 
and [T\D =  7 (D), where T  = q = 23m It remains to satisfy the conditions that T a +  1 =  
L N  for a €  N and L  E Z, and T  = q +  cN  for c 6 Z As T  = q, it follows that c =  0 
In the previous chapter, the fact that the group order for the curves C^ divides 26m +  1 was 
used to derive an efficient means of computing the final exponentiation Let N  =  26m +  1, 
in which case the equation T a +  1 =  L N  is satisfied as (23m)2 +  1 =  ( l) (2 6m +  1), and 
hence a — 2 and L  =  1 The final exponentiation is M  — (212m — l ) / ( 2 6m + 1 )  =  26m — 1,
which can be computed with a conjugation with respect to F26m, a multiplication and an
inversion in F2i2m
Thus all the conditions of the r) p pairing have been met, and the resulting bilinear pair­
ing is computed as
(ri l ( D u D 2)M )2“ = ({D 1 , i , ( D 2))N )M
Computing the ryr pairing in this way with T  = q = 23m requires 3m iterations of M iller’s 
algorithm However, as an octupling operation is used to compute the intermediate func­
tions, only m  iterations are required Computing the Tate pairing with N  — 26m +  1 and 
using the octupling operation requires 2m iterations of M iller’s algorithm As detailed in 
the previous chapter, the Tate pairing can be computed using the group order and octupling 
in 2m /3  iterations However, this approach does not have the benefits o f  the ?]t pairing,
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such as a cheap final exponentiation and no conditional logic mside the loop
5 3 2 Optimising the arithmetic
The i)t  pairing when T  =  q =  23m can be viewed as a generalisation of Duurmsa and Lee’s 
idea to the genus 2 curves C& To distinguish this case from an even faster instantiation of 
the Tfr pairing later in this chapter, the subscript T  is dropped when T  =  q Hence, this 
pairing is referred to as the 77 pairing Given a divisor D  == (P ) -  (00), where P  =  
(x p ^y p ) ,  the function / 8#p associated with [8]D was derived m the previous chapter As 
the denominator o f this function can be discarded due to the form o f the distortion map, 
f s  p  is given as
h p(j- , y) = (y + «4 (j-))2(y + «sW),
where
V4 ( x )  =  X 3 +  ( T p  +  x ‘p ) x 2 +  ( x 4p ) x  +  I j p
V s ( x )  =  [ x 3p  +  l ) x 2 +  (ip +  Z f ? ) x  +  ( ' t / p +  X p  +  X p  +  1)
The notation a(3 is used for this intermediate function evaluated at the distorted image point, 
where a  =  (y  +  t>4(^))2 and p = (y + vg(x))
An explicit formula to compute the pairing on the genus 2 curves using the input
divisors D i = (P) — (0 0 ) and D 2 = {Q) -  (00) is then given as
m —1
v (p ,Q ) =  I I
As detailed in the previous chapter, a number of optimisations are available to expedite the 
computation of aj3 at each iteration of the loop Rather than compute the various powers of 
x p  and yp  that are required at each iteration, it is possible to precompute all o f the possible 
values and to store them in an array This approach costs 2 m  squarings before the loop, but
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the cost o f calculating the functions inside the loop reduces to only 4 multiplications per 
iteration o f the loop
In order to avoid octupling the accumulating variable at each iteration of the algorithm, 
the exponentiation can be absorbed into the formulae inside the loop To do this, a  must be 
replaced with a 2'**'™ 1 and ¡3 with /?23(m 1 l\  which involves precomputing powers o f  lq 
and yQ In Appendix A 1, it it shown how to derive explicit formulae for these terms This 
optimisation replaces 3m  squarings m F 2i2m with 2m  squarings in F 2™, which is a large 
improvement Finally, it is possible again to exploit the sparseness o f  the a  and ¡3 terms, by 
unrolling the multiplication using Karatsuba-like techniques, as detailed in Appendix A 3 
The resulting algorithm to compute the 77 pairing is given in Algorithm 9
We now examine the computational cost of the algorithm in terms of operations in F 2m 
The precomputation takes 4m  squarings in F 2™ At each iteration of the algorithm, the 
calculation of the a  and /? functions takes only 4 multiplications in F 2m The multiplication 
of a  and ¡3 using the Karatsuba approach takes 11 multiplications in F 2m Finally, this value 
is multiplied with the accumulating variable / ,  which takes an expensive 54 multiplications 
m F 27™ Therefore, for a loop size m , the total computational cost is 4m  squarings and 69m 
multiplications in F?™ The final exponentiation is trivially computed as a multiplication, 
an inversion, a squaring and a few Frobenius actions in F 2i2m Experimental results for the 
genus 2 77 pairing are given later in this chapter
5 4 Avoiding the Final Exponentiation
It is also shown in our paper [4] how to compute the 77 pairing using supersingular elliptic 
curves over characteristic 2 and 3 In this section, we show how the final exponentiation 
required to compute the i] pairing for the charactenstic 2 elliptic case can be omitted if the 
vertical line functions are included in M iller’s algorithm This is the first time that it has 
been demonstrated that the Tate pairing can be computed without a final exponentiation for 
a cryptographically useful exponent This observation also holds true for the genus 2 case,
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Algorithm 9 The genus 2 77 painng
In p u t  D \ = (P) -  (oo) ,D 2 = (Q) -  (oo) e  P ic£ (F 2»>), P  =  ( x P yP ) ,Q =  (r Q,y Q) 
O u tp u t  /  =  77(P, Q) e  F 2i2m
1 > Initialisation set 7 = 1 if m = 1 mod 4, otherwise 7 = 0
2 > Precompute powers of P and Q
3 x\[i\ <- x%, yi[i\ <- y£, x2[z] <- zg, y2[i] <- yg, 0 < 2 < m -  1
4 / ^ 1
5
6 for ? =  0 to rn -  1 do
7 > All fc* in the next 2 lines to be considered modulo m
8 k i <— (3rn -  3 -  3a), k2 (&i +  1)» 3^ <— (&2 +  1)
9 &4 (3?), 5^ (A4 + 1), fcg <— (/cs + 1)
10
11 > Calculate a <— a + fru; + civ2 + dwA + so
12 d <- xi[/c4] +  x\[kz\
13 a ^ y2 [fo] + ( x i  [/r4] + 1 + x2 [A*] ) ^2 [k2\ + d x2 [A;3] + Vi [^ 4] + 7
14 6 <- X2[h) + t2[A;2]
15 r  <— r 2 [*3] +  T i f k a ]  +  1
16
17 > Calculate ¡3 ^  e + f 2w + Qw2 + hw4 + so
18 f 2 *■ xi  [A.s ] +  x i[ fc 6]
19 e <— 2/2[fei] + Ì2 x2[k1] + yi[ks\ +xi[ke] (xi[/c5] + £2 2^]) + xi[k5\ + 7
20 y <— x2[&i] + xi [/eg] + 1
21 h ^  X2[k2] + x2[k\]
22
23 > Unroll a/3 multiplication using Karatsuba
24 dh <— d h,dg <— d g, c/i <— c h,cg <— c g,ae a e, b j2 <— 6 f 2
25 to ae + c/i + t/y + dìi
26 ii (a + ò)(/2 + e) + ae + ò/2 + dh
27 f2 <— + c) (y + e) + ae + cy + bf2 + ch + dg
28 Ì3 «— (Ò + c)(g + /2) + fr/2 + cy + e/i + dy + 1
29 ¿ 4  <— (a + rf) (/i + e) + ae + t//i + cy
30 ¿5 *- (6 + d)(/i + /2) + bj2 + dh + ch + dy + 1
31 tii *- (¿o,ii,Ì2 ¿3 4^,Ì5,a + e + 1,6 + ^ jC + yjO^ -h/i,0)
32 /  f  77!
33 end for
34
35 D> Perform the final exponentiation
36 / < - / (  26m-l)(2 ){23- )
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however we have been unable to prove this as yet Instead, we include the proof for the 
supersingular elliptic case in characteristic 2
These curves are given by an equation of the form Ed y 2 +  y =  x 3 +  x  +  d over 
F 2- ,  where d € {0,1}, and have an embedding degree of k = 4 Kwon [66] shows how to 
transfer the Duursma-Lee techniques to compute the Tate pairing efficiently on these curves 
In our paper [4] it is (independently) shown how to compute the ij pairing efficiently using 
these curves, which results in essentially the same algorithm as that given by Kwon A 
distortion map is ip(x, y) =  (rz; +  s 2, y  +  sx  +  ¿), where s £ F22 satisfies s2 -f 5 +  1 =  0, 
and t € F 24 satisfies t2 +  t +  s =  0 Note that the x-coordinate is mapped to a subfield 
of F 24m, and hence the denominator elimination technique applies These curves support a 
simple doubling formula, such that for a point P  = (xp , yp) € E (F 2™), then
\2l]P = (j 2j + i , i / 2> +  + r ( i ) ) ,
where r(z) =  1 if z =  2 ,3  m od 4 and zero otherwise The group order for the curves Ed 
is given as # J 5j ( F 2m) =  2m ±  2(m+1)/2 + 1  Rather than use this order to compute the Tate 
pairing, the // pairing can be computed on these curves using a loop o f m iterations with no 
additions After this loop, an exponentiation to the power o f  22m -  1 must be performed 
to obtain a unique value suitable for cryptographic use This can be easily computed using 
a conjugation with respect to F 22m, a multiplication and an inversion in F 24m After the 
exponentiation has been applied, the resulting element o f F 24m has order dividing 22m +  1 
As 22m + 1  is the norm map with respect to F22m, the pairing value is said to be an element 
o f norm 1
There is no need to include the vertical line functions when the distortion map ip is used, 
as they are eliminated by the final exponentiation to 22m -  1 However, here we show that 
the final exponentiation can be omitted, as long as the vertical line functions are included in 
M iller’s algorithm Firstly, it is shown how to construct the field F 24m The extension field 
F 22m is defined by the irreducible polynomial s 2 +  6 +  1 =  0, where s £  F22 Similarly,
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the field F24m is defined as a quadratic extension oi F22m using the irreducible polynomial 
i2 +  £ -|-a  =  0, where t e  F24 The conjugate of an element a = (a 4- bt) G F24m (with 
respect to F22m) is written as J  =  (a 4- b) 4- bt Also, the norm of j  (with respect to F22m) 
is written as
The conjugate of a function was defined previously m Chapter 3 Let h(Q ) be a function 
that is evaluated at a point Q 6 E (¥  k) Then the conjugate o f h(Q ), denoted h(Q ) is equal 
to h ( —Q ) ,  where - Q  is the opposite of Q  Let l p ( r }y)  =  y — yp  -  A (r — r p )  be the 
equation of the tangent to the curve at P , and let up (a) =  jl -  j  p  be the vertical line 
through P  Then it is well known that
The aim is to show that 2 has norm 1 (with respect to F 22m), and hence zz  = 1 , where
(a -f bt)(a 4- bt) = a2 -I- ab-\- b2b
Ip W Q W p W Q ) )  = v p W Q ) ) 2^ p W Q ) )
The y  pamng for the elliptic curves E (/ is written as the product
z = z22m Using the equality given above, zz is written as
This can be simplified by cancelling the t>[2*+i]p{fp(Q)) terms as
_  - 1
z z  f i  v ^ p W Q ) ) 2"1- 1
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By setting j  = i +  1, this can be written as
since
Up ( tP { Q ) ) 2 —  { X Q +  "1“ X p Ÿ  —  X Q  +  S2 +  X p  -h 1 —  U[2m]p(0(Q))
Therefore, as the q painng has norm 1 with respect to the quadratic subfieîd, assuming the 
vertical line functions are included, the final exponentiation can be omitted
It remains to determine how the value of the // pairing without any final exponentiation is 
related to the value of the // pairing when the final exponentiation is included Let 2 e  F 24m 
be the output o f the // painng when vertical lines are included in M iller’s algorithm As it 
has been shown that z is an element o f norm 1 with respect to F 22m, then z22m+1 =  1 This 
implies that z22m =  z " 1, and z22m_1 = z ~ 2 Therefore
m-1 2 m ~ î \  2 2 m — 1 /  1 /  \ ~ 2t j  / J[2»]pMQ)) \  \  _  f ' y r  (  ¿[2»]pMQ)) \
f=o x ^ + ^ p i ^ i Q ) ) )  J  \ v [2' +i ]p ( /* P ( Q ) ) )
However, as exponentiating to the power of 22rn -  1 removes the need to compute the 
vertical line functions, this can be rewritten as
i 1 \ 22m — 1 /  1 / v nm — 1 — i \ — 2(n - (n ( « y
This equivalence shows how the two different methods to compute the 77 painng are related 
Therefore, it has been shown how to avoid computing the final exponentiation to 22m -  
1, at the cost o f  losing the optimisation o f denominator elimination The exponentiation 
to 22m -  1 can be computed essentially as a multiplication and an inversion in F 24m By 
repeatedly taking the norm with respect to the quadratic subfields of F 24m, it is possible to
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reduce the inversion in F 24m efficiently to an inversion in F 2m In contrast, the algorithm 
that includes the vertical line functions requires the computation of an inversion at each 
iteration of M iller’s algorithm This can avoided by using the two-variable approach of 
Galbraith et al [31] However, this technique involves extra arithmetic at each iteration of 
the loop, as well as an mversion after the loop Therefore, it can be concluded that there is 
no benefit to using the new pairing algorithm introduced in this scction, when compared to 
the denominator elimination technique
However, if it can be shown that it is possible to avoid the final exponentiation in cir­
cumstances where it is expensive to compute, then this new technique may find a practical 
use In our paper [33], it is shown by a similar proof that the final exponentiation can also be 
avoided when computing the 77 pairing using the (Duurmsa-Lee) supersingular hyperelliptic 
curves y 2 = x p — x  +  d over F pm, where d =  ±1  and p = 3 mod 4 This technique also 
applies to the genus 2 7/ pairing
5.5 The Genus 2 r/T Pairing
It has been shown that the genus 2 7/ pairing yields an efficient and simple pairing imple­
mentation, which is approximately as efficient as the implementation of the Tate pairing 
given in the previous chapter The genus 2 7/ pairing uses the value T  = q — 23m to com­
pute the pairing, which results in a loop of m  iterations using the fast octuphng operation on 
the curves Cd However, it remains to be seen whether the theory of the y  / pairing permits 
the selection o f a value for T  that is smaller than q =  23rn In this section, this open ques­
tion is addressed in the affirmative The convention to drop the subscript T  when T  = q 
was previously described In this section, the pairing implementation is simply referred to 
as the rjp pairing, as the subscript T  denotes “truncated”
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5 5 1 Finding a suitable value for T
Recall that four conditions must be satisfied to implement the pairing The first condition 
is that [T\D  =  7 (D ), where 7 is an automorphism of the curve which is defined over ¥ q 
For the 7] pairing on the supersingular genus 2 curves Cd, this condition is satisfied by 
setting T  = q = 2Sm and 7 =  <jm, where a (x , y) =  (a; +  1, y  +  x 2 -f 1) It was shown 
that the second condition o f the rjj pairing, that 7%pq = ip, holds for the q pairing on the 
genus 2 curves Cd, where ip is a distortion map on the curve that supports the denominator 
elimination technique It was then shown that instead o f using a multiple of the group order 
N  =  26m -J- 1, the value T  = q — 23m can be used to compute the rj pairing
The goal of this section is to find a value for T  such that T  is smaller than q = 2 dm, 
and that the t j t  pairing using this value is bilinear and non-degenerate The first condition 
that must be satisfied is that [T ]D  = 7 (D ) Recall that the group order for the curves Q  is 
given as
#Pic£(F2m) = 22m ± 2<3m+1)/2 + 2m ± 2(m+1)/a + 1
Rather than use the multiple N  =  (26m + 1 ) of # P ic^ (F 2m), as for the i) pairing, consider 
the multiple N  such that
N  =  (2m ^  2(m+1>/2 +  l) (# P ic £ (F 2m)) =  23m ±  213"^ 1)/2 +  l
Let q =  23m as before Note that
q -  N  =  23m -  (23m ±  2(3m+1)/2 -f 1) =  zp2(3m+ x)/2 _  1
Define T  = q - N  = ^ 2 (3r"+1)/2 -  1 Then
\T\D = [ q -  N]D = [q]D -  [W]D =  \q\D = 7 (D)
119
Therefore, the condition that [T}D  =  7 (D ) is satisfied by using the automoiphism 
7  =  a m As this is the same value for 7  that was used to compute the q pairing, the second 
condition that 7 ^  =  ip is already proven The condition that T  = q + tN ,  where c €  Z, is 
easily seen to satisfy c =  — 1, as T  = q ~  N  The remaining condition that must be satisfied 
on T  is T a +  1 =  L N ,  for some a e  N and L e Z  Let a =  2 Then
T 2 +  1 =  2(23m ±  2^ 3rn+1^ 2 +  1) =  2 N
Therefore, a = L  =  2 Thus, all the conditions of the r}T pairing have been satisfied, and a 
bilinear pairing on £ 1, £>2 £ P ic^ (F 2^ )  is computed as
MDi,D2)")r = {Duil>{D2))%,
where the final exponentiation is M  =  (212m — l ) / ( 2 3m d= 2 3^m+1^ 2 +  1)
Rather than compute the rjr pairing using the divisor D j and the order T  =  —2(3m+1)/2— 
1, it is convenient to use the opposite o f D \ and the order - T  =  2(3m+1)/2 +  1 to avoid 
performing an inversion Therefore, T  is now defined as T  ~  2 3^m+1^2 ±  1 Comput­
ing the t]t  pairing in this manner implies a loop size of (3m  +  l ) /2  iterations However, 
observe that T  can be written as T  =  23(m-1)/2+2 ±  1 Therefore, the rjr pairing can be 
computed as (m  —1)/2  octuplings, as well as two doublings and an addition This is clearly 
far supenor to the m  loop iterations of the 77 pairing, as well as the 2m /3  loop iterations of 
the method given in the previous chapter
5 5 2 Optimising the arithmetic
There are two obstacles to implementing the genus 2 r\x pairing efficiently, namely the 
complicated final exponentiation and the final doublings and addition Firstly, the final 
exponentiation is examined In the 77 case, the final exponentiation can be computed essen­
tially as a multiplication and an inversion in ¥ 01^  In the t) t  case, the final exponentiation
120
is to the power of M T  Recall that M  is given as
2 l2m _  1 (26™ -  1)(26"' + 1)
M  ~  N  ~  2 sm ±  2(3m+1)/2 +  1 
This expression can be simplified by using the fact that
P
26m + 1 = (23m ± 2^ 3m+1^2 + i)(23m =f 2^ 3m+1^2 -f 1)
Therefore, the exponentiation to M  is computed as
M  =  (2bm -  l) (2 3nt 2(3m+1)/2 +  1)
The entire final exponentiation is then written as
M T  =  (26m -  l) (2 3m 2 tim+1)/2 +  l ) ( ^ 2 3^m+1)/2 -  1)
=  2^®m _  l ) ( 23m +  24m2^ Tn+1^ 2 — 1)
The exponentiation to (26r" -  1) can be achieved with a conjugation with respect to F 26m, 
as well as a multiplication and an inversion in F2i2m The remaining exponentiation can be 
computed in (m +  l ) / 2  squarings, 2 multiplications and a few Frobemus actions in F 2i2m 
Therefore, it has been shown how to compute the final exponentiation required for the t]t  
method in a relatively inexpensive way
The second disadvantage of the genus 2 qr  pairing, when compared to the q pairing, 
is that two doublings and an addition must be performed after the loop of (m -  l )/2 iter­
ations However, vanous techniques can be used to reduce the penalty of performing these 
operations Let D i = (P) — ( o o )  be the degenerate divisor that is used as the input to the // t 
pairing The final addition that must be performed is an addition of divisors [2i3"'+1^ 2]JDi 
and [± l]D i, where [± l]D i is a degenerate divisor o f the form [± l]D i =  ( [± 1]P ) -  ( o o )  
However, it will be shown that the final addition does not need to be performed in the case
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that D \ is a degenerate divisor, as it does not contribute to the pairing value
The order o f the divisor D \ — (P ) — (oo) divides N  =  23m ±  2(3m+1)/2 -f-1, as TV js a 
multiple o f the group order Using the formula derived for the genus 2 q pairing, [23m] D\ 
is a degenerate divisor of the form [23m]D i =  a m(P) -  (oo) Therefore the final divisor is 
given as
[2(3m+l)/2 ±  j p i = [Afj£ ,i _  p * ’1]!)! =  (Tcrm(P)) -  (oo)
Therefore, the divisor [2(3’" 1 l)/2jD i is given as
[2 ( 3 m + l ) / 2 p i  =  p ^ 1) / 2 ±  l ] D i  -  [ ± l ] D i
=  (T*m(P)) -  (oo) -  ([±1]P) -  (oo)
=  (T<Tm(P)) +  (=FP) ~ 2(oo)
Therefore, when the final addition is performed in the degenerate case, the composition
operation in Cantor’s algorithm cancels out the ( + P )  by using a vertical line function,
which can be omitted from the algorithm
The final two doublings are now considered, again in the case for a degenerate divisor 
D i =  (P) -  (00) The divisor after the octupling loop is D ' =  =  (P f) -
(00) Doubling this divisor using the Cantor composition algorithm yields a divisor o f  the 
form [2]D ( =  2(P ')  -  2(co) As this divisor is already reduced it does not contribute any 
line function to the accumulating function It is known from the explicit formulae derived in 
the previous chapter that the line function that comes from the doubling o f a special divisor 
o f the form 2 (P ')  -  2(oo) is
Z(r, y) =  y  -f- t 3 -f- (x%, +  x p ,)x 2 +  (xp,)a  +  y%.
Therefore, to compute the operations that are required after the octupling loop, it suffices 
to square the accumulating variable /  twice, and then to multiply it by the function above
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In the previous chapter it was shown how to build the distortion map into this function, in 
order to avoid manipulating points over the extension field F 2i2m
Therefore, it has been shown how to compute both the final exponentiation and the final 
addition/doublings efficiently An explicit formula to compute the t]x pairing on the curves 
Cd using the input divisors D \ = (P) -  (oo) and D 2 = (Q) -  (00) is
where I is the function defined above All of the optimisations used to compute the rj 
pairing for the curves Cd can be used to compute the t)t  pairing To avoid octupling the
shown how to derive these formulae in Appendix A 2
Therefore, it has been shown how the octuplmg loop, the final operations and the final 
exponentiation can be computed efficiently The algorithm to compute the genus 2 
pairing is given in Algorithm 10 in the case that m  — 103 For other values of m  it suffices 
only to change the formula for extracting the current point after the loop The cost o f the 
precomputation is 4m squarings in F 2 m, which is the same as for the 77 pairing The cost of 
the arithmetic at each iteration of the loop is 69 multiplications in F2m, again the same as for 
the T) pairing However, the loop is only of length (m — l) /2  instead o f rn for the 77 pairing 
Note that computing the final doubling function takes only two multiplications in F 2m, as 
all o f  the required powers o f  (xp , yp) and (xq, yq)  are precomputed Experimental results 
for the genus 2 rfr painng are given in the following section
5 6 Experimental Results
In this section, experimental results are provided to verify our claim that it is possible to 
compute the Tate pairing efficiently using the genus 2 77 and rjr pairings The first task in 
implementing either pairing is to select suitable values for m  Recall that the prime rn must
accumulating variable, a  and ¡3 must be replaced with a
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Algorithm 10 The genus 2 rfj pairing when m  = 103
I n p u t  D i =  (P ) -  (oc) ,D 2 =  (Q ) -  (oo) e  P ic ^ (F 2>n),P =  ( x p ,y p ) ,Q  =  (X Q ,yQ) 
O u tp u t  /  =  % (P, Q) e  F 2izm
1 > Initialisation set 7 = 1 if m = 1 mod 4, otherwise 7 = 0
2 > Precompute powers of P and Q
3 xi[z] x £ , yi[z] <- x 2[z] x 2q , y2 \i\ <- 2/q, 0 <  z <  m  -  1
4 /  <— 1
5
6 for z =  0 to (m  — 3) /2  do
7 > All k* in the next 2 lines to be considered modulo m
8 k\ (3m  — 9 -  6 i)/2 , k2 {k\ +  1), £13 (^ 2 +  1)
9 &4 (3m  -  3 +  6z)/2, <— (k4 +  1), Â,6 <— (k5 +  1)
10
11 > Calculate a <— a + bw + cu>2 + cfau4 + so
12 (I <— X i[k4] ~\r Xi[k$]
13 a <- Î/2IN + {xi[k4} + 1 + x 2[h]) x2[k2] + d x 2 [h] + yi[k4] + 7
14 6 <— X2[&3] +  x 2 \k2\
15 r  <— T2 [h \ +  ri[/r4] +  1
16
17 > Calculate ¡3 e + j 2w + gw2 + to4 + 50
18 f 2 <— xif&s] +  x i [¿e]
19 e <— y2[fci] + J2 X2 [ki\ + yi[k5] + x i[k G] (xi^ s] +x2[fc2]) +^1 (^ 5] + 7
20 g <- x 2[&i] +Xi[fc6] +  1
21 h <— X2 [k2] +  x 2 [ki\
22
23 } <- j  (a ¡3)
24 end for
25
26 > “Extract” current point (x P yP )
27 x P *— Xi[m — 3] -j- 1
28 yP <— y \[m  -  3] +  x i[m  -  2]
29
30 o Perform the final doublings/addition
31 t  <- (y2 \0\ + x 2[l] (1 +  x 2 [0] 4- X![3] + x \ [2]) +  x \ [2] x2[0] +  yi[2\)
32 f ^ f 4 ( / , r 2[l] +  r 1[2 ],r1[3] +  r 1[2] 1, x2[l] +  x2[0], 0,1 , 0,0 , 0,0 , 0)
33
34 > Perform the final exponentiation
3 5 f  y(2 6m -l)(2 3m - 2 4m 2(m+ 1)/2 -l)
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be chosen so that P ic ^ ^ ™ )  has a large prime factor, and that P ic ^ ^ ™ )  and F*fcm are 
large enough to resist any attack on the DLP in these groups In the previous chaptcr, the 
value m  =  79 was chosen for the curve C \ y 2 +  y =  x 5 +  x3 +  1, and m  =  103 was 
chosen for the curve Cq y 2 +  y =  +  x 3 These parameters fulfil the security conditions
detailed above, and have the advantage that an element o f  F 2m can be represented by a 
single machinc word, which greatly aids in the efficient implementation of the underlying 
field arithmetic
The second task is to select other pairing implementations against which to compare 
the efficiency of the algorithms given in this chapter In the previous chapter, it was shown 
how to implement the Tate pairing efficiently using the group order o f the curves Cd As 
the same values for m  are used in both chapters, it is possible to compare the experimental 
results directly However, in order to gauge the true efficiency o f pairing implementation 
using supersingular genus 2 curves over low characteristic, it is necessary to give expen- 
mental results for an equivalent implementation on an elliptic curve To give an accurate 
comparison with the genus 2 case, the elliptic curve in question should be supersingular and 
defined over a finite field of characteristic 2
The natural candidates are the elliptic curves E 4 y 2 + y = x 3 +  x  +  d over F 2m, 
where d 6 {0,1}, that were used previously in this chapter In our paper [4], it is shown 
how to implement the i]i pairing efficiently on these curves To compare against the genus 
2 implementations, suitable prime values for m  must be chosen so that km  is roughly the 
same for both cases In this way, the output o f the 7]t pairing for both curves has the same 
resistance against attacks on the DLP (as it is an element in F*fcm) Two security levels 
are defined, following from the values for k m  in the genus 2 case Firstly, for the value 
m  =  79 in the genus 2 case, a suitable value for m  in the elliptic case is m  =  239, as then 
k m  £3 950 for both curves Secondly, to compare with the value m  — 103 in the genus 2 
case, m  ~  313 is chosen in the elliptic case, as k m  «  1230 for both curves Note that the 
values chosen for m  in the elliptic case are selected solely to compare the relative efficiency 
of the two cases More specifically, m  is not chosen so that # E ( F 2m) has a large prime
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Table 5 I Expenmental results - 950-bit security level
Case Description Running time (ms)
1 Genus 2 group order 1 89
2 Genus 2 q degenerate 1 71
3 Genus 2 77 general 6 50
4 Genus 2 7] i degenerate 1 11
5 Genus 2 /¡t  general 3 60
6 Elliptic t]t 1 80
Tabic 5 2 Experimental results - 1230-bit security leve
Case Description Running time (ms)
1 Genus 2 group order 2 69
2 Genus 2 // degenerate 2 60
3 Genus 2 rj general 9 96
4 Genus 2 rjj degenerate 1 65
5 Genus 2 tjr general 5 48
6 Elliptic t]t 3 64
factor
TabJe 5 1 details the experimental results for the 950-bit security level, and Table 5 2 
details the experimental results for the 1230-bit secunty level The first case in each table 
is the time taken to compute the Tate pairing using the group order, as given in the previous 
chapter The second case is the algorithm to compute the genus 2 77 pairing using degenerate 
divisors, and the third case in each table is the algorithm to compute the genus 2 77 pairing 
using general divisors Similarly, the fourth case is an algorithm to compute the genus 2 i]t  
painng using degenerate divisors, and the fifth case is an algorithm to compute the genus 
2 Tjr pairing using general divisors The sixth case in each table is the equivalent timing 
using the elliptic curves E (j All of the timings are given in milliseconds
The first conclusion to be drawn from the results is that the genus 2 77 painng yields 
a running time approximately equivalent to that o f using the group order to compute the 
Tate painng The genus 2 77 painng has a longer loop size than when the Tate pairing 
is computed using the group order However, this result shows that this is compensated 
for by the simpler arithmetic o f the 77 painng inside the loop, as well as the cheaper final
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exponentiation The second conclusion is that the genus 2 ¡¡t  pairing is substantially more 
efficient than the genus 2 // pairing This is not a surprising result, as the rjx pairing has a 
considerably shorter loop size than the q pairing However, this is mitigated somewhat by 
the more complicated final exponentiation in the ijr case
The third conclusion is that pairing implementation using degenerate divisors is consid­
erably more efficient than the general case, for both of the genus 2 7/ and pairings This 
result confirms the findings of the previous chapter However, the most surprising conclu­
sion to be drawn from the experimental results is that the genus 2 rfr pairing on degenerate 
divisors outperforms the elliptic r]x pairing This is the first time that it has been shown that 
a genus 2 pairing implementation can be faster than an equivalent elliptic curve implemen­
tation This result is largely due to the smaller field sizes used 111 the genus 2 case, as the 
theoretical complexity of computing the genus 2 777 pairing is larger than that o f the elliptic 
t/7 pairing As far as we are aware, this timing for the genus 2 77 / pairing is also the fastest 
pairing implementation reported thus far in the literature
All o f the experiments were performed on our platform of a Pentium IV, which has 
a clock speed o f  2 8 GHz, and which runs version 2 6 15 of the Linux kernel The code 
is written in C/C++ and is compiled using version 4 03 o f the GCC/G++ compiler suite 
The efficient implementation of the finite field F 2^  is taken from MIRACL 5 01 Recall 
that m  was chosen in the genus 2 case so that arithmetic in F 2™ can be performed in the 
128-bit registers available to the Pentium IV The SSE2 SIMD instruction set can then be 
used to multiply elements efficiently in F 2m The elliptic curve implementation cannot use 
this optimisation as the field size is larger than 128 bits We note that the timings provided 
are slightly different from the published timings, due to the need to remain consistent with 
experiments carried out in the previous chapter
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5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, it was shown that it is possible to compute the Tate pairing extremely effi­
ciently by using supersingular genus 2 curves over F 2™ and the t]t  pairing construct Firstly, 
the tjj pairing was introduced as a generalisation and extension of the optimisations given 
by Duursma and Lee [23] It was then shown how to apply the pairing to the genus 2 
case by using an order of T  =  q =  23m in M iller’s algorithm This results m a loop of 
m  iterations using the octuphng formula given earlier The subscript T  is dropped for this 
case, and the pairing is known simply as the 77 pairing Although the loop size is slightly 
longer than the 2 m /3 iterations of M iller’s algorithm that is required when the group order 
is used, the 77 pairing compensates for this by having simpler arithmetic inside the loop, as 
well as a final exponentiation that is easily computed
It was then shown how it is possible to compute the 77 pairing on supersingular elliptic 
curves in characteristic 2 without the final exponentiation to the power of 22m — 1, at the cost 
of including the vertical line functions in M iller’s algorithm This technique does not offer 
any improvement as the final exponentiation is computed essentially as a multiplication and 
an inversion in F24m It was also shown how a more efficient pairing calculation is possible 
in the genus 2 case by using a smaller value for T  when computing the t]t  pairing This 
pairing implementation requires some extra arithmetic after the main loop, as well as a more 
complicated final exponentiation when compared to the 77 pairing However, optimisations 
have been introduced to reduce these costs
Experimental results were then detailed It was shown that the genus 2 77 pairing is 
approximately as efficient as the implementation of the Tate pairing that was given in the 
previous chapter It was demonstrated that degenerate divisors yield a speed up over the 
more general case when computing both the 77 and t) t  pairings The experimental results 
also confirmed that the genus 2 tjt pairing is more efficient than the genus 2 77 pairing 
However, the results showed the surprising fact that the genus 2 t j t  pairing is more efficient 
than the t j t  pairing on supersingular elliptic curves over F2™, using an equivalent level of 
security This shows that not only are genus 2 curves competitive with elliptic curves in
128
terms of pairing implementation, but can in fact surpass them in certain circumstances 
Kang and Park [57] show that some of the conditions given in this chapter on the for- 
mulation of the ijr pairing are unnecessary Rather than using an automorphism 7 , it is 
possible to simply use the multiplication by q This results in a far simpler proof of the fit 
pairing than that given in our paper [4] Furthermore, it is shown that the only condition 
of the ¡¡t  pairing is that a supersmgular curve be used Kang and Park also show that the 
final exponentiation to T  that must be performed when computing the r)r pairing can be re­
placed with an application of the g-th power Frobenius endomorphism However, this does 
not result in any practical improvement, contrary to the authors’ claims, as the main cost o f 
the final exponentiation is the inversion that must be performed in the extension field
In a paper by Lee et al [72], our results on degenerate divisors are extended to general 
divisors in Mumford representation More precisely, Lee et al show how to extend our 
explicit formulae for computing the functions that are required in M iller’s algorithm from 
the degenerate to the general case, and how to evaluate these functions at a general divisor 
In a separate paper, Lee et al [71] show how to use the 77/ painng construct to compute 
the Tate pairing using a hyperelliptic curve of genus 3 These curves are o f the form y 2 =  
x 7 -  x  -f- d over ¥ 7™., where d = ±  1, and have an embedding degree o f k =  14 The curves 
that are used are part o f  the family of curves originally selected by Duursma and Lee for 
fast pairing computation This is the first presentation of pairing computation in genus 3 
However, the experimental results that are given are extremely inefficient compared to the 
results presented here for genus 2 curves
In this chapter, experimental results for the genus 2 77 and t]j pairings were given using 
a software implementation However, we have also developed efficient implementations of 
these pairings m hardware In Ronan et al [95], we show how a dedicated parallel hardware 
implementation o f the genus 2 r) painng yields an extremely efficient pairing computation 
The fastest pairing implementation over F2io3 takes place in 749 /¿-seconds This paper 
was the first published paper on implementing genus 2 pairings in hardware, as well as 
being the first paper to implement a pairing in hardware using a finite field of characteristic
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2 In a separate paper published as Ronan et al [94], we show how to implement the 
genus 2 r¡r pairing in hardware This implementation returned a time o f 137 /¿-seconds 




Pairings on Supersingular Genus 2 
Curves over ¥ p
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters described the implementation of the Tate pairing on a supersingular genus 
2 curve over F 2™ This is the most logical choice of field for pairing implementation, as 
supersingular curves exist with an embedding degree of k =  12, which is the maximum 
possible for genus 2 curves over finite fields of arbitrary characteristic However, it is also 
worthwhile to examine pairing implementation on genus 2 curves over a large prime field 
F p Large prime fields are interesting as they are efficient to implement, and are resistant to 
sub-exponential time attacks on the DLP in F* Theoretically, supersingular genus 2 curves 
exist over F p with an embedding degree of k =  6 However, only supersingular genus 2 
curves with an embedding degree of k =  4 are known to the cryptographic community at 
this point
In this chapter, it is shown how to efficiently implement the Tate pairing using a super- 
singular genus 2 curve over F p Firstly, the curve is introduced, and formulae are given for 
doubling a divisor m P ic^ (F p) and extracting the functions that are required for M iller’s 
algorithm These formulae are less expensive to compute than previous formulae given in
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the literature It is shown how to construct the field F p4, and how to perform arithmetic 
efficiently m this held It is shown how to exploit the distortion map to speed up the evalua­
tion of the image divisor at the line functions, and how to compute the final exponentiation 
efficiently
A new variant o f M iller’s algorithm is then described for hyperelliptic curves with an 
even embedding degree This improvement eliminates divisions from M iller’s algorithm 
even when the denominator elimination technique does not apply This algorithm is useful 
in certain circumstances for curves o f  genus g >  1 A theoretical analysis is performed 
of the cost o f computing the Tate pairing using the optimisations given in this chapter, and 
compared against previous work Finally, experimental results are reported that establish 
new benchmarks for pairing implementation on genus 2 curves over large prime fields, and 
the chapter is concluded
This chapter contains joint work with Michael Scott, which has been accepted for pub­
lication in the proceedings of Selected Areas in Cryptography, 2006 A prepnnt is available 
at the ePnnt archive as O hEigeartaigh and Scott [47] Some of the work on eliminating 
divisions in M iller’s algorithm previously appeared in a short paper at the ePnnt archive as 
O hEigeartaigh [46], and was presented at the rump session of the ECC 2005 conference 
We note that this idea was denved independently by Kobayashi et al [62] for the case of 
elliptic curves
6.2 The Curve
The first task is to select a supersingular genus 2 curve over F p with an embedding degree 
that is suitable for pairing based cryptography Choie et al [16] examine genus 2 curves 
given by an equation of the form
y 2 =  x 5 + a, a  €  F*
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5Choie et al show that this curve is supersingular whenever p ^  1 m od 5 To determine 
the embedding degree o f the curve for the other congruence conditions on p , it is required 
to compute the group order # P ic ^ ( F p) Recall that the characteristic polynomial o f the 
Frobenius endomorphism is given m the genus 2 case as
X c (T )  — T 4 4- a \T 3 +  a ^T 2 +  a \p T  +  p2,
where o\ =  #C (]Fp) -  1 — p  and 02 =  (# C ( ¥ p2 ) -  1 -  p 2 4- a2) / 2 Once o\ and <72 
have been derived, the group order is computed as x c ( l )  =  # P lccQ^V) Choie et al show 
that when p = 2 ,3  m od 5, then # C ( F p) =  p  4- 1 and # C ( F p2) =  p2 +  1, and hence 
ai — a2 — 0 Therefore, the group order is given as x c ( l )  =  P2 +  1 As (p4 -  1) is 
the smallest term into which (p2 4-1) divides evenly, then the embedding degree of the 
curve is k =  4 When p ~  4 m od 5, Choie et al show that the group order is equal to 
# P ic ^ ( F p) =  ( p 4 l ) ( p 4  1), and that the embedding degree o f the curve is bounded by 
k =  2 as a result
Therefore, the curve that is used for pairing implementation in this chapter is given as
C y 2 =  t 5  +  a, a e  F*, p =  2 ,3  m od 5
Rather than select an arbitrary value in F* for a, we take a =  1 for convenience This curve 
was used by Choie and Lee [17] to implement the Tate pairing They define the distortion 
map ij) that maps elements in C (F p) to Cf(Fp4) as
$( x , v )  = (Cs x,y) ,
where (5 is a primitive 5th root o f  unity in F p.t Note that (5 maps the ^-coordinate to 
Fp4, and hence the denominator elimination technique does not apply To see that ip is an
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endomorphism on C, observe that
y 2 — -\- a  — -f- ci — jJ* cl
It remains to examine which order to use in M iller’s algorithm One option is to use the 
group order # P ic ^ ( F p) =  p 2 +  1 This has the advantage of having a trivial final exponen­
tiation of p 2 — 1, which can be computed essentially as a multiplication and an inversion in 
Fp4 However, as p  is a large prime number, then the number of loop iterations in M iller’s 
algorithm, log2(p2 +  1), will also be large The second option is to use a prime-order sub­
group The advantage of this approach is that the prime order n  o f  the subgroup can be 
chosen to have a low Hamming weight, which results in a smaller number of additions in 
Miller’s algorithm If n is chosen to be considerably smaller than # P ic ^ (F p), then the 
number of loop iterations will also be small Therefore, it is better to use a prime subgroup 
order rather than the full group order in M iller’s algorithm
There are a number of criteria on the selection of the prime subgroup order rx and the 
large prime p Firstly, n must be large enough to resist any generic attacks on the DLP 
in P ic^ (F p)[/t] Secondly, F *4 must be large enough to resist any sub-exponential time 
attacks on the DLP Choosing suitable values for n and p  is a tricky problem, due to the 
wide range of algorithms available for solving the DLP in P ic ^ (F p) [n] and F *4 We follow 
the parameters defined by Lenstra and Verheul [74], which were used by Scott [105] to 
implement the Weil pairing These parameters are defined as (160/1024), (192/2048) and 
(224/4096), where the first number in each term is log2(ri), and the second number is 
log2 (pk) For a thorough comparison of security levels, the reader can consult Galbraith et 
al [35]
The security levels given above detail the number of bits that are required for both n  
and p  The first task is to choose concrete values for the prime subgroup order n  Recall 
that Barreto et al [5] explore the use o f  Solinas primes [109] when computing the Tate 
pairing These are prime numbers of the form n  =  2Q ±  2^ ±  1 When a Solinas prime
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Table 6 1 The prime subgroup order n  for each security level
Case log2(n ) n
1 160 n =  2159 +  217 +  1
2 192 n  =  2191 +  22 +  1
3 224 n  =  2223 +  213 +  1
is used in M iller’s algorithm only two additions are required Also, Duursma and Lee [23] 
show that the final addition can be skipped when the denominator elimination idea applies, 
as it corresponds to a vertical line function Therefore, a Solinas pnme n is used as the 
subgroup order, where log2(n) «  160, 192 and 224, for each of the three security levels 
defined above The values for n  that are chosen are given in Table 6 t
The next step is to choose the large prime p As the embedding degree of the curve 
is k = 4, p must be chosen so that log2(p) % 256, 512 and 1024 However, a condition 
on p is that the subgroup order n must divide the group order # P ic ^ ( F p) = p2 +  1 The 
probability o f a randomly chosen prime number p  o f  the correct number of bits satisfying 
this condition is negligible Therefore, a method must be given to construct p  Firstly, note 
that the condition on p  can be rephrased as p2 +  1 =  0 m od r?, and hence p = v ^ - l  
mod 7i It is a well known fact that —1 is a quadratic residue modulo r) if  and only if  n  =  1 
m od 4 All o f the values selected for n  in Table 6 1 satisfy this property
Therefore, the method to compute p  is as follows Let n  be the pnme subgroup order, 
such that n = 1 m od 4, and let t = y /^ 1  m od ti Choose a random value ui, such that 
p — vm  + 1 has the desired number of bits Then continually add n  to this value, until p  is a 
prime number with the required congruence conditions This method converges quickly on 
a suitable pnm e number p  The actual values obtained for p for each of the three security 
levels will be given later in this chapter Note that n 2 should not divide # P ic ^ ( F p), for 
reasons outlined in Chapter 2
As the subgroup order t i has a very low Hamming weight, the number of additions to 
be performed in M iller’s algorithm is negligible However, a doubling of an element m 
P ic^(Fp) must take place at each iteration of the loop Therefore, it is worth examining
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1Table 6 2 Comparison of the cost o f doubling m Pic£ (Fp)
Origin Doubling l(x)
Miyamoto et al [85] 
Lange [70]
Choie and Lee [17] 
Our work
I, 23M, 4S 
I, 22M, 5S 






how this operation can be optimised Lange [70] gives explicit formulae for doubling a 
divisor with a cost o f  1 inversion, 22 multiplications and 5 squarings in Fp (in the over­
whelmingly common case) However, these formulae are designed to be used in the context 
of scalar multiplication, and do not explicitly calculate all o f the functions that are required 
in M iller’s algorithm The formulae can easily be modified to extract the functions that are 
required, at the cost o f  3 extra multiplications
Choie and Lee [17] modify Lange’s formulae for doubling a general divisor to reduce 
the cost o f calculating the functions that are required in M iller’s algorithm The formulae 
they present cost 1 inversion, 23 multiplications and 5 squarings in F p> thereby saving 
2 multiplications over the previous approach However, it is possible to improve on these 
formulae In Table 6 3, we give formulae to double a divisor , v\\, in the overwhelmingly 
common case that the degree of u \ is 2, and g cd (iii, 2v{) =  1 The cost of these formulae is 
1 inversion, 22 multiplications and 4 squarings (the multiplication is saved in step 8) Note 
that as the characteristic o f Fp is odd, the h(x)  polynomial is assumed to be zero (where 
h(x)  is from the equation of the curve y 2 -f h (x )y  — j  (x))
We believe that the formulae in Table 6 3 are optimal, as they have the same compu­
tational cost as simply doubling a divisor as given by Lange [70] (in fact a squaring is 
saved over these formulae) In other words, calculating the functions that are required in 
M iller’s algorithm does not cost anything extra over the cost o f  doubling a divisor Table 6 2 
summarises the computational cost o f doubling a general divisor
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Table 6 3 Formulae for doubling for the curve C y2 =  x 5 4- a
Input
O utput
Di — [u\j Hi] w here u \ =  x z + u u x  4- u io , «1 =  « n x  4- 
D3 -  [u3, «3], ¿(x) such that [2]Z?i =  +  ((?/ -
Step E xpression C ost
1 C om pute v\  =  (2 « i)(  m o d  u i)  =  Onx +  zjIo
«11 =  2 u n ,  uio =  2uio
2 C om pute / =  r e s ( « i ,  <;~i) 2S +  3M
W0 = V%l3Wi = v \ x W2 = 4wq W3 -  U u V n ,
r =  u io ^2 4- « 10(^10 -  ^ 3)
3 C om pute a lm ost inverse o f  tnv* ~  r(2vi)~1( m o d  «1)
inv'y — —v u  , tnv'0 =  vlo — w  3
4
r ’Z
C om pute k! =  m o d  u i )  — fcjx 4- krQ 1M
IU3 =  UIi, IU4 =  2liio , Jfei =  2lUi +  U?3 -  W4 
k0 =  w h ( 2 i/;4 -  u/3) -  u;0
5 C om pute  s ' =  A '/m ;'(  m o d  771) 5M
wo =  fcpznuj, u^i =
s i  =  vIoM  ~ 'I’ll&Cb so =  -  U10W1
I f  s[ = 0 then  goto  step 6 '
6 C om pute  s = s \x  4- sq and s±L 11, IS , 5M
w i = 0" s i ) ~ \ i U 2 =  s[wu ws =  r2wx,
hi =  ¿1^2,50 -  SqW2
7 C om pute  / ( t )  =  suj 4- ui =  sj 4- /2 12 4- h  1 4- Iq 3M
h  =  ‘»l^n 4- s0 , Iq =  s0i/io  4- «10
¿1 =  (<5l +  S q ) (u h  +  U10) — Si Mu -  So«io +
8 C om pute it ' =  m o n i c ( ^ r - )  — t 2 4- u s \x  4- tMo IS + 2M
<¿30 =  w3(i;n 4- wj3(2 ttn +  sg) 
W31 =  2 s0 -  u;3
9 C om pute Vi ~  —l( m o d  U3) =  U31X +  ti30 3M
=  U31 ll,n =  W3U31 Ws = l2 ~  Wi ,W3 = U30w 2 
«31 =  («31 4- U3o)(^ 2  +  Si) “  ™3 -  m  -  l l , «30 =  ™3 ~  ¿0
11, 4S, 22M
6’ C om pute l(x) =  so ^ i 4- Vi
i riv = l / r , %  = So?r?7;, / i  =  so«n 4- u u , =  so ^ io  4- vm
1I +  3M
T C om pute U3 =  m o m c ( ^ - )  =  x  +  ¿a30 IS
Uso =  - 2 u n  -  si
8’ C om pute  vs =  —/( m o d  it3) =  3^0 2M




In this section, various techniques are described that enable the efficient implementation of 
the Tate pairing on a supersingular genus 2 curve over F p
6 3 1 Finite field arithmetic
As the embedding degree of the curve C  is k =  4, it must be shown how to construct the 
finite field F p4 For reasons outlined in Chapter 2, a polynomial basis representation is used 
rather than a normal basis representation Rather than construct F p4 as a quartic extension of 
F p, the field ¥ p2 is first constructed using an irreducible quadratic polynomial defined over 
F p Then the field F p4 is defined as a quadratic extension of Fp2, by using an irreducible 
quadratic polynomial defined over Fr,2 The advantage of this approach is that it is easier to 
optimise the arithmetic in F p2 than in a quartic extension of Fp These techniques can then 
be reused with minor modifications to optimise the arithmetic in F p4
The first task is to give irreducible polynomials that define the fields F p2 and Fp4 An 
irreducible binomial x 2 — ¡3 is used to define the extension field F p2, where (3 is a quadratic 
non-residue in ¥ p The quadratic extension o f Fp2 can then be constructed by adjoining the 
quartic-root of (3 It might seem like a good idea to choose ¡3 — - 1  It is well known that 
— 1 is a quadratic non-residue with respect to p if  and only if p = 3 m od 4 However, 
a quartic root o f — 1 exists in F p2, and so it is not possible to build a quadratic extension 
of Fp2 using a;4 +  1 A second choice for ¡3 is ¡3 =  — 2 If  the prime p is congruent to 5 
m od 8, then - 2  is a quadratic non-residue with respect to p  This value for (3 permits the 
construction of Fp4 as a quadratic extension o f F p2 Another advantage of using a prime 
p =  5 m od 8 is that a simple formula exists to compute square roots modulo p , which is 
required for generating random points on the curve
Elements o f the field Fp2 are then represented as (a +  b \/p ), where a, ò E F p, and 
elements of the field Fp4 are represented as (c +  where c ,d  € F p2 Addition and
subtraction in Fp2 and Fp4 are relatively cheap to compute However, it is worth examining
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how to optimise multiplication and squaring in these fields, as they are expensive opera­
tions to compute Let M  and S  be a multiplication and squaring respectively in Fp The
schoolbook method to multiply two elements in F p2 costs 4M  However, it is possible to
do better by using the Karatsuba technique in the following manner
(a +  b \/i3 )(x  + y / p )  = (ax — 2 by +  (ay +  b x )y /p )
= (ax -  2 by +  ((a  -f b)(x +  y) -  ax -  by)y/j3)
This costs only 3M  Similarly, a multiplication of two elements in Fp4 costs 3 multiplica­
tions in Fp2, and hence 9M  in total The next task is to examine squaring in F p2 and Fp4 
It is commonly assumed that a squaring is computationally equivalent to a multiplication 
when estimating the cost o f  pairing operations (e g see Koblitz and Menezes [65]) As 
detailed in Chapter 2, this is a reasonably valid assumption in F p However, it is possible to 
optimise squaring routines in extension fields so that a squaring is considerably less expen­
sive to compute than a multiplication The schoolbook method to square an element in F p2 
costs 2S  +  M  However, it is better to exploit the Karatsuba technique again as
(a +  b y /p ) 2 =  (a2 -  2 b2 +  2ab y/p )
= ((a +  b)(a — 26) +  ab +  2 a b \fp )
This costs 2M, which is M  cheaper than the cost o f a general multiplication in Fp2 Simi­
larly, squaring an element in Fp4 costs 2 multiplications in F p2, and thus 6M  m  total This 
is considerably cheaper than the 9M  required for a general multiplication in F p4 As the 
accumulating variable /  6 Fp4 is squared at each iteration of M iller’s algorithm, using this 
optimised squaring method is a substantial improvement over using a general multiplication 
routine
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6 3 2 Evaluating the line functions
The use of degenerate divisors was previously discussed m Chapter 4 for the characteristic 2 
case Recall that for a genus 2 curve, a degenerate divisor D  =  (P ) -  (oo) €  P ic^IFp) has 
a single finite point P  in the support This is in contrast to the more general reduced divisor 
D  =  ( P ) + ( Q ) —2(oo), with two finite points in the support In Chapter 4, the first argument 
to M iller’s algorithm was defined to be a degenerate divisor, as an automorphism on the 
curve was used to keep the divisor m its special shape However, there is no advantage to 
be gamed from doing this for the genus 2 curve under consideration in this chapter, as the 
first doubling will turn the degenerate divisor into a general divisor Therefore, a general 
divisor is used as the first input to M iller’s algorithm for all o f the pairing implementations 
in this chapter
However, a distinct advantage still exists in using a degenerate divisor as the second 
input to M iller’s algorithm Each time a doubling or addition is performed in Miller’s 
algorithm, a function is evaluated at the image divisor If  the image divisor is a general 
divisor, then the evaluation takes place using either the two finite points in the support 
of the divisor, or the Mumford representation of the divisor However, if  a degenerate 
divisor D  = (P) -  (oo) is used as the image divisor, it is possible to evaluate at the finite 
point P  This approach yields a modest speedup over using general divisors Frey and 
Lange [29] discuss in detail when it is permissible to choose a degenerate divisor as the 
second argument to M iller’s algorithm
Here it is assumed that the lme functions m M iller’s algorithm are evaluated at a degen­
erate divisor D 2 =  (V'(Q)) — (°°)> where ip(Q) is the point in Fp4 that results from the 
application of the distortion map ^  to a point Q 6 C (F p) At each iteration o f the loop, 
the iterating divisor D \  is doubled using Cantor’s composition algorithm to get the divisor
[2]Di A reduced divisor D 3 equivalent to [2]D\ is then obtained by using Cantor’s reduc­
tion algorithm, such that \2}D\ =  D 3 +  ((y — l ( x ) ) /a 3(0:)), where the functions l(x )  and 
113(3;) are extracted from the composition and reduction process These functions are then 
evaluated at ip(Q), an inversion is performed on 7/3(35), and both functions are multiplied
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by the accumulating variable
Firstly, the evaluation of 0(Q ) =  ( j^ (q ), Drp(Q)) at the function y -  l(x )  is examined 
The function l(x )  that is extracted from the composition process is given as l(x ) =  (x3^  -f- 
x 2l2 +  x l\  +  lo) Note that &i,Z2, h  and 1$ are defined in F p, as the iteratmg divisor is also 
defined over F p The values and can be precomputed, and so evaluating this 
function at tp{Q) has a cost o f 12 multiplications m Fp However, it is possible to save some 
multiplications over this by manipulating the image point ^ (Q )  Rather than explicitly 
calculate the distortion map on Q, it is possible to build the distortion map into the function 
evaluation Let Q =  (x q ,t /q ) e  C (F P) Recall that ^{Q ) =  (Cs^q, V q )  £ C'(Fp4), where 
(5 is a primitive bth root o f unity in F p4 Then - i ( x )  is written as
-1( a ) = -((¿qCs)3-^  + (x qC5)212 + (x q ( s)Ii + lo)
Two multiplications can be saved in this function evaluation by examining the relation 
between certain powers of £5 If is a primitive n th root o f unity in a field K , then its 
conjugates over the prime subfield Ko o f  K  are also primitive rith roots o f  unity [92] Also, 
Q  is a primitive nth root o f unity if and only if a and ri are co-prime Applying this to 
(5 means that the third power of £5 is related to the second power by conjugation, in other 
words ( I  =  C5
Note that ~ l(x )  as defined above can be written in the form a +  b(5 +  where
b — —x q I i , c =  - X q 12 and d =  — XqS\ Let (g = (rn +  n t ff i )  where m, n G F p2 Then 
it is possible to compute the function a +  5 +  cCf +  d ( f  as a +  b(5 +  ((c +  d)m  +  (c -
d)n \ fp )  Computing c and d takes only 2 multiplications in F p (with a precomputation of 1 
squanng and 1 multiplication) Computing (c +  d)m  and (c — d)n  takes 4 multiplications, 
with a precomputation of 6 multiplications Computing b( 5 takes 4 multiplications, with a 
precomputation o f 4 multiplications Therefore, the total multiplication count in evaluating 
the function is 10 multiplications, a saving of two multiplications, with a precomputation 
of 11 multiplications and 1 squarmg
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Evaluating the image point ifr(Q) at the function ¿¿¿(x) =  x 2 +  u$iz  +  1/30 costs 8 
multiplications in F p, by precomputing (xqCs) and (xqCs)2 This precomputation costs 6 
multiplications, by reusing some of the precomputation needed to compute the line function 
y -  l(x) Therefore, the total cost of evaluating both functions at ip(Q) is given as 18 
multiplications in F p per iteration of the loop, with a precomputation of 1 squaring and 17 
multiplications in F p
6 3 3 The final exponentiation
An exponentiation must be performed on the output of Miller’s algorithm to compute the 
(reduced) Tate pairing For a genus 2 curve with an embedding degree of k =  4, this 
exponentiation is to the power of (p4 — l ) / n  As the embedding degree of the curve is even, 
it is possible to extract the factor (p2 — 1) from the final exponentiation Exponentiating to 
this power can be trivially computed with a conjugation with respect to Fp2, a multiplication 
and an inversion in F p4 Using the basis described previously, a conjugation with respect 
to F p2 is implemented as x  ~  (a -  for an element x  = (a 4- b\fj3) e  F p4 The
remaining exponentiation to (;p2 -f- l ) / n  is an expensive operation to compute as it cannot 
be simplified further As detailed in Chapter 3, there are two techniques that are used to 
compute this exponentiation efficiently
The first approach is to use Lucas exponentiation, as proposed by Scott and Barreto [106] 
This method was detailed in Chapter 3 The alternative strategy is due to Hu et al [50] and 
Granger et al [42] The remaining exponentiation is given as x^p2+1^ n for an element 
x  6 Fp4 Firstly, note that (p2 +  l ) / n  =  a \p  +  <20, where a \ =  {p2 + l) /(p n )  and 
a o =  ((p2 +  1)/™) m °d  p The mam idea is to exploit the fact that exponentiating an ele­
ment m F p4 to the power of p can be trivially computed Therefore, the exponentiation can 
be performed by precomputing ai and ao, and by evaluating (x v)ai x a° Granger et al show 
how the technique of multi-exponentiation can be exploited to compute this term Essen­
tially, the idea behind multi-exponentiation is to use a single square-and-multiply algorithm 
to compute both exponentiations simultaneously This idea is also known as Shamir’s trick
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Table 6 4 Experimental results for the final exponentiation
Security level Multi-exponentiation (ms) Lucas exponentiation (ms)
(160/1024) 2 6 1 3
(192/2048) 12 5 7 5
(224/4096) 72 5 48 5
Granger et al give theoretical results that show that it is faster to use the Lucas sequence 
approach for curves with a low embedding degree Scott [105] provides experimental evi­
dence to verify this, by stating that Lucas exponentiation is better only when the embedding 
degree of the curve is k  <  4 In Table 6 4, timings are given on our platform of a Pentium 
IV, 2 8 GHz, to illustrate the performance of the Lucas exponentiation approach versus 
the multi-exponentiation approach to compute x^p2+1^ n for the three security levels of our 
curve As can be seen, the Lucas sequence approach is superior for all three levels
6.4 Computing the Tate Pairing
In this section, a new variant o f M iller’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing is described, 
and is compared against the denominator elimination technique for the genus 2 curve in 
question A theoretical analysis is also performed on the cost o f computing the Tate pairing 
using our optimisations
6 4 1 Modifying Miller’s algorithm
Recall that M iller’s algorithm as originally described involves performing an inversion in 
¥ pk at each iteration of the loop Field inversion is an expensive operation to compute, 
particularly so m the extension field F pk Galbraith et al [31] introduce a variant of M iller’s 
algorithm, which removes the need to perform an inversion at each iteration of the loop The 
basic idea of Galbraith et al is to postpone performing the inversion until after the loop 
To achieve this, two variables are used in the loop, which effectively replaces an inversion 
with a squaring at each loop iteration The algonthm of Galbraith et al to compute the
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Tate pairing ( D i ,D 2)ni where D \  €  P ic ^ (F p) and D 2 € PiCc(Fpfc), is presented in 
Algorithm 11
Algorithm  11 M iller’s algorithm to compute the Tate pairing, as per Galbraith et al [31]
I nput D \ e  P ic^ (F p), D 2 € P ic ^ (F pfc), where D \ has order w
O u tp u t  ( D 1, D 2) n k~ 1^ n
]
2 T ^ D 1
3 for i |_l°g2(n )J ”  1 downto 0 do
4 > Compute T ' =  (2 )T  — (c/d)
5 T  <- [2\T
6 ) c ^ j 2c c(£>2), fd  *— fd  d m
7 if n t =  1 then
8 t> Compute T f — T  +  D \ — (c/d)
9 T  T  +  D i
10 / c < - / c c( D 2), f d «— fd  d (D 2)
11 end if
12 end for
13 /  -  I d  fd
14 f  y(pfc- l ) /n
15 Return f
An important improvement on the approach of Galbraith et al is the denominator elimi-
nation technique of Barreto et al [5] In Algorithm 11, the iterating divisor D \ is an element 
o f the group P ic^ (F p), rather than P ic^ (F pfc) As a result, all o f the coefficients of the line 
functions are also defined over F p, as they are extracted from the addition process on D \ 
Rather than defining the image divisor D 2 to be a general element of P ic ^ (F pfc), let the 
^-coordinates o f all o f  the finite points in the support o f D 2 be defined over some subfield 
of F pfc In this case the denominator function, or the fd  variable in Algorithm 11, will also 
be defined over a subfield of ¥ pk However, the exponentiation to (pk^  — 1) which takes 
place as part o f the final exponentiation eliminates any function value that is defined over 
¥ pk/2 Therefore, there is no need to compute the fd  variable in Algorithm 11
Several techniques are used to implement the denommator elimination technique in 
practice The first method uses a distortion map to map elements of P ic^ (F p) to P iC c(Fpfc), 
where C  is a supersingular curve Some distortion maps map the x-cooidinates to a subfield
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o f F pfc by definition, and so denominator elimination applies when such a divisor is used 
as the second argument to M iller’s algorithm The second method uses quadratic twists 
o f elliptic curves, as covered in Chapter 2 The third method defines the second argument
denominator elimination technique
However, suppose that a degenerate divisor is used as the second argument to Miller’s 
algorithm for a hyperelliptic curve of genus g >  1 Then if this technique is used in order to 
implement denominator elimination, it will increase the weight of the image divisor Recall 
that a degenerate divisor D 2 in the genus 2 context has a single finite point in the support 
Applying the trace-zero map to £>2 results in a more general divisor with two finite points 
in the support For elliptic curves the divisor class group is isomorphic to the group of 
points, and thus any non-trivial class has exactly one finite point m the support Therefore, 
to use the denominator elimination technique in the genus 2 case, the functions in Miller’s 
algorithm must be evaluated at two points, rather than at a single point This reduces the 
efficiency o f denominator elimination
However, we present an alternative way to proceed, by introducing a new variant of 
Miller’s algonthm to compute the Tate pairing A prerequisite for this algorithm is that 
the embedding degree of the curve must be even, a condition shared by the denominator 
elimination technique Firstly, is is assumed that the finite extension field F pAr is represented 
as a quadratic extension of Fpfc/2 It is well known that once an element x  = (a +  b\J]3) € 
F pfc is raised to the power of pk/2 — 1 , then it is possible to replace an inversion with a 
conjugation, 1 e ( l)P fc/2_1 =  (x ) ^ 2“ 1 To see why this is so note that
D 2 to M iller’s algonthm to be a trace-zero divisor Let D f e  P ic^ (F p*.) be a general 
divisor Then a trace-zero divisor is computed as D 2 = D ' — D fpk/2, which supports the
1 (a +  byj]3)
(a +  6^ ) P fc/2- !  =  (a ~ ~ b y ^ )
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Similarly
=  ^ T Ï T p f 2' 1 =  (a -  b j p f /2- '  = {^ §(a  -  byj f 3)
This effectively replaces an expensive operation with one that is free to compute
This technique is exploited by Scott [105] to compute the Weil pairing Scott proposes 
exponentiating the pairing value to the power of p k ^2 — 1 , which means that the inversion 
in the Miller loop can be replaced with a conjugation However, no one has previously 
observed that it is possible to use this idea to compute the Tate pairing, without requiring 
any additional exponentiation The final exponentiation required to compute the reduced 
Tate pairing includes the factor (pkl 2 — 1), as (pk -  l ) / n  =  (pk/2 -  1 )(pA/2 +  1 ) /n  
Therefore, as the output o f  the loop is implicitly raised to the power of (///2 -  1), there 
is no need for the strategy of Galbraith et al o f using two variables to eliminate inversion, 
as the inversion in the main loop can be replaced by a conjugation The new algorithm 
is desenbed in Algorithm 12 for the hyperelliptic case As the variable is eliminated 
from the pairing calculation, a squaring is saved in F pfc at each iteration o f the loop, when 
compared to Algorithm 11
Algorithm 12 An improved algorithm to compute the Tate Pairing 
In p u t D\ e P ic^ (F p), D<i e  P ic ^ (F pfe)? where D \ has order n
O u tp u t ( j D i ,  D z ) ^ - 1 ^ 71 
i / - I
2 X <—
3 for i <— Ll°g2(n)J '-  1 downto 0 do
4 t> Compute T f = (2) T  -  (c/d)
5 T  [2}T
6 f  f 2 c ( D 2 ) d(D 2)
7 if n, = 1 then
8 > Compute T ' = T  + D \ ~ (c/d.)
9 T  <— T +
10 / - /  c (C 2) d (D 2)11 end if
12 end for
13 f  <_ y(pfc-i)/™
14 Return /
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Table 6 5 Complexity of function calculation per iteration in M iller’s Algorithm
Case Description Complexity
1 Original Approach I, 2M, S
2 Two-variable Approach 2M, 2S
3 Algorithm 12 2M ,S
4 Denominator Elimination M ,S
Algorithm 12 is still not as efficient as the denominator elimination technique, which 
saves a multiplication over this again at each iteration However, Algorithm 12 is a slightly 
more efficient technique to compute the Tate pairing on a hyperelhptic curve of genus g >  1, 
when using a distortion map that does not admit denominator elimination directly The 
reason for this is that the denominator elimination algorithm consists o f two evaluations at 
the lme function at each iteration (or one evaluation of a more complicated form if Mumford 
representation is used) Algorithm 12 consists o f one evaluation at the line function, and 
one evaluation at the vertical line function, which requires less computation to evaluate than 
the line function Algorithm 12 is also less restrictive than using denominator elimination, 
as it places no conditions on the form of the image divisor In fact, for an arbitrary image 
divisor D 2 which is fully defined over it is the most efficient algorithm to compute the 
Tate pairing in the literature Table 6 5 illustrates the complexity o f  the different algorithms 
in more detail
6 4 2 Using denominator elimination
Algorithm 12 is more efficient than the denominator elimination technique, assuming the 
use of a distortion map that does not give denominator elimination directly, and that the 
image divisor is a degenerate divisor However, it is possible to reduce the performance gap 
by using customized multiplication routines, as detailed in this section Given a degenerate 
divisor D  = ip(Q) ~  (00), where ip(Q) = ( x :y) £ C(¥pi) ,  the transformation R  — 
^ (Q )  — 'tp(Q)p yields an effective trace-zero divisor R  that is suitable for use with the 
denominator elimination technique This transformation can be easily computed, by using
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the fact that exponentiating an element in F p4 to the power of p2 is equivalent to a simple 
conjugation with respect to the quadratic subfield, and so
Therefore, rather than compute R  using Cantor composition and reduction, note that R  
can be constructed as R  =  ( r , y) +  ( r ,  —y) — 2 (o o )  The fact that the two finite points in the 
support of R  are similar can be exploited in M iller’s algorithm Let Q = (tq  yq)  € C( FP) 
Evaluating at the line function y — / ( r )  gives
VQ ~  ( ( ^ q C b ) 3s i  +  ( x q C s f h  +  (%Q&)h ~  k )
Rather than evaluate the line function at —V>(Q)P separately, it is possible to reuse the line 
function given above, due to the similarity between the two points When the line function is 
evaluated at ip{Q) the output is an element of Fp4 such that ((a  +  by/p) -f (c +  dy/P) \fj3) 
The evaluation o f the second point (x, —y) at the line function can be obtained with the 
transformation ((a  — 2y +  by/p) -  (c +  dy/p) yfp)  Therefore, the calculation of the second 
function is effectively for free, as it simply involves two subtractions and a conjugation 
using the function generated by the first point
Both functions must be multiplied by the accumulating variable /  6 Fp4 It is possible 
to exploit the fact that the two functions are similar in form, by writing a special multi­
plication routine As seen previously, a general multiplication in F p4 takes 9M  using the 
Karatsuba technique, where M  is a multiplication in Fv Let the first function j ci be equal 
t°  / c i  — (o +  b^/p)  and the second function / «  be equal to f r2 = (c -  by/p),  where
a, b, c e  F ^  Then, the multiplication of f cl and fc2 can be unrolled as
(a +  b t / p ) ( c  -  b ^ / f i )  =  ac  -  b2 s f p  +  b(c -  a) { /] )
Note that (c — a) 6  F /;, rather than F p2 The form of the ac multiplication can also be
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exploited by computing
at — (e + f  yf@){g + / y/P) — c9 ~ 2/2 + j (e  + g)yfp
The total cost to compute the multiplication of the line functions is 2M  +  S  for the ac 
multiplication, as well as 2M  +  2 M  for the overall multiplication, which results in 6M  + S  
instead of the general cost o f 9M  When this technique is implemented, we find that al­
though the denominator elimination method is theoretically slightly faster, the performance 
of denominator elimination and Algorithm 12 is roughly the same, for the genus 2 case 
under consideration However, we suggest that Algorithm 12 is a more natural algorithm 
to use in practice, as it is does not require the construction of customised multiplication 
routines, such as those given in this section
6 4 3 Theoretical analysis
In this section, the theoretical cost of computing the Tate pairing using the genus 2 curve 
C  y 2 = x b +  1 is analysed Firstly, the analysis o f Choie and Lee [17] is reproduced 
Let S', M, /  be a squaring, multiplication and inversion respectively in ¥ p Choie and Lee 
estimate the cost o f computing the Tate pairing (without including the cost of the final 
exponentiation) as
log2(n)(T f£> +  T c +  Td +  2Tsk +  2Tmk) +  (1/2) log2(n)(Ty\ -f Tc 4- +  2Tmk):
where
1 T o  = I  +  23M  +  5 S  - the cost o f  doubling a general divisor
2 T a =  /  +  23M  +  2S' - the cost o f adding two general divisors
3 Tc + Td — 22M  +  55 - the cost o f  evaluating the line functions c and d , with a 
precomputation of 8 M  +  3 S
4 Tsk =  8M  - the cost o f squaring in F pk (where k =  4)
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5 Tmi  =  9 M  - the cost o f multiplication in ¥ pk (where k =  4)
As Choie and Lee use a random subgroup order n  to compute the Tate pairing, (1 /2 ) log2(n) 
additions must be performed in M iller’s algorithm Let log2(^) ~  160 Then evaluating the 
formula given above yields a total cost for computing the Tate pairing as 240/ -j- 17688A'/ -f 
21635
The theoretical cost of computing the Tate pairing is now examined using the optimi­
sations given in this chapter Algorithm 12 is used in combination with a subgroup order 
o f very low Hamming weight The efficient formulae for doubling an element of P ic^ (F p) 
as given m Table 6 3 are used, as well as the efficient means of constructing F p4 Finally, 
the second argument to M iller’s algonthm is defined to be a degenerate divisor, and the ef­
ficient formulae that have been derived to speed up the evaluation of this divisor at the line 
functions are used Therefore, the theoretical cost for computing the Tate pairing is now 
given as (again without including the cost of the final exponentiation)
lo&2 (n )(^D  +  T c +  T(i +  +  2 Tm^) +  2(Tj\ +  T c +  T (\ +  2 Trnk):
where
1 T o  = I  +  22M  +  45  - the cost o f  doubling a general divisor
2 T a =  I  +  23M  +  25  - the cost o f adding two general divisors
3 Tf -f T j =  18M  - the cost o f evaluating the line functions c and d , with a precompu­
tation o f 17M  -1-1*9
4 Tsk =  6M  - the cost o f squaring in F p* (where k  =  4)
5 Tmi  =  9M  - the cost o f multiplication in Fpk (where k — 4)
Again, let log2(n) ss 160 Then the theoretical cost o f computing the Tate pairing 
is given as 1621 +  10375M +  6455 This is a substantial improvement over the results 
o f Choie and Lee The largest smgle factor in this improvement is the use of a prime
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Table 6 6 Theoretical complexity of M iller’s algorithm
Case Subgroup order Complexity
I Random [17] 2401, 17688M, 2163S
2 Solinas prime (our work) 1621, 10375M, 645S
3 NAF (our work) 2141, 13404M, 748S
subgroup order n  with a very low Hamming weight It is appropriate to examine the cost 
o f the new formula for a random prime order n  as well, to guard against a future attack 
that might exploit the Hamming weight of n  in some manner A random subgroup order n  
has a Hamming weight o f  (1 /2 ) log2(72) on average, meaning that (1/2) log2(n) additions 
must take place in M iller’s algorithm This is the approach taken by Choie and Lee [17] 
However, it is possible to improve on this
Computing the opposite o f an element in P ic^ (F p) is essentially for free, as detailed 
in Chapter 2 Therefore, both the addition and subtraction of divisors in P ic^ (F ;j) have 
the same computational cost Whenever a group has this property, it is possible to exploit 
the Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) [91] of the subgroup order n Let I = log2(n) Then the 
(binary) NAF of n  is an expansion r\ — where e  (0, ±1}, and n lv 1+\ =  0
for all ? >  0 The number of non-zero terms in the Hamming weight of the NAF of n is 
(on average) (1/3) log2(n), which implies a sixth less additions in Miller’s algorithm than 
using the standard method Therefore, combining the NAF of n  with all o f  the optimisations 
introduced in this chapter gives a cost o f 2141 +  13404M  +  7485 for computing the Tate 
pairing The theoretical results are summarised in Table 6 6
6.5 Experimental Results
In this section, experimental results are given for computing the Tate pairing using the 
techniques detailed in this chapter for the supersmgular genus 2 curve defined over F p 
Three levels o f security were defined for implementation, namely (160/1024), (192/2048) 
and (224/4096) It has been shown how to select a prime subgroup order n o f  the required
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Table 6 7 Security Parameters
160/1024 security level
n  =  2i5y +  217 + 1
p  =  63324531451181148200275171731203125718855624493339065310878459
331886717065893_________________________________________________________
192/2048 secunty level 
n  =  2191 +  2'J +  1
p =  89284651228083788426899503684145515482879124715345625109737480 
602016411174689533635990672440279080762322569446999588756146485641
92943960634648749730387013_____________________________________________
224/4096 security level 
n  =  2'22S +  213 +  1





number of bits, where n  is a Solinas prime with a Hamming weight o f  3 A method was also 
detailed to select a suitable large prime p such that p 2 +  1 =  0 m od n  The prime p  must 
be congruent to 5 m od 8 in order to use the finite field constructions given for F p2 and 
Fp4 detailed earlier Also, p  must be congruent to 2 ,3  m od 5, as these are the conditions 
associated with the curve itself Suitable values for p  for the three secunty levels are given 
in Table 6 7
Table 6 8 details the experimental results for the implementation o f the Tate pairing us­
ing the (160/1024) security level Table 6 9 gives the expenmental results for the (192/2048) 
security level, and Table 6 10 details the timings for the (224/4096) security level All of 
the timings are given m milliseconds There are four cases in each table, all o f which have 
a number of optimisations in common that have been derived in this chapter These include 
the efficient finite field construction for Wp4 , the explicit formulae for doubling a divisor 
as given in Table 6 3, and the formula given for evaluating the line function at the image 
divisor at each iteration o f M iller’s algorithm
The first three cases in each table use the new variant o f M iller’s algorithm that is given
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Tabic 6 8 Expérimenta] results - (160/1024) security level
Case Description Running time (ms)
1 Evaluating at degenerate divisor 16
2 Evaluating at general divisor 20 7
3 Evaluating using Mumford rep 20 45
4 Elliptic curve timing [105] 8 9
Table 6 9 Experimental results - (192/2048) security level
Case Description Running time (ms)
1 Evaluating at degenerate divisor 49
2 Evaluating at general divisor 62
3 Evaluating using Mumford rep 61
4 Elliptic curve timing [105] 20 5
Table 6 10 Experimental results - (224/4096) security level
Case Description Running time (ms)
1 Evaluating at degenerate divisor 183
2 Evaluating at general divisor 232
3 Evaluating using Mumford rep 229
4 Elliptic curve timing [105] 85
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in Algorithm 12 The first case in each table is the time taken to compute the Tate pairing 
when a degenerate divisor is used as the second input to M iller’s algorithm The second 
case in each table gives the time for when a general divisor is used as the second input 
to the algorithm The two finite points in the support o f the divisor are extracted, and the 
line function that is generated at each iteration of the algorithm is evaluated separately at 
both points The third case also computes a general pairing, except that the second input to 
M iller’s algorithm is in Mumford representation This case is always faster when the finite 
points in the image divisor are defined over a larger field
The fourth case in each table are timings that are given by Scott [105] using elliptic 
curves, and an equivalent level of security to the genus 2 timings presented here In Ta­
ble 6 8, the elliptic curve in question has an embedding degree of k =  2, and log2(p) «  
512 as a result In Table 6 9, the elliptic curve has an embedding degree of k =  4 and 
log2(p) ~  512 In Table 6 10, the elliptic curve has an embedding degree of k =  8 and 
log2(p) ~  512 It could be argued that comparing the (ordinary) elliptic curve case with 
k =  8 to the genus 2 case is ‘unfair’, as the theory on constructing genus 2 curves with a 
higher embedding degree over ¥ p is as yet undeveloped
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these tables Firstly, previous experimen­
tal results are due to Choie and Lee [17], who give timings to compute the Tate painng on 
this curve that range between 500 and 600 ms on a Pentium IV 2 GHz, for the (160/1024) 
security level Our timings far outperform this, as demonstrated in Table 6 8 Secondly, the 
results given in this section indicate that genus 2 pairings over large prime fields are valid 
candidates for practical implementation However, the elliptic curve timings are approxi­
mately twice as fast as the genus 2 timings for all three security levels This is roughly what 
one would expect, due to the more complicated group law in the genus 2 case
All o f the experiments were performed on our platform of a Pentium IV, which has a 
clock speed of 2 8 GHz, and which runs version 2 6 12 of the Linux kernel The code is 
written in C/C++ and is compiled using version 4 01 of the GCC/G++ compiler suite The 
efficient implementation of the finite field F p is taken from MIRACL 4 85 In particular,
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MIRACL supports special assembly language routines that can be used when working with 
prime moduli o f a fixed number of bits
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been shown that pairing calculation on supersingular genus 2 curves 
is efficient, and that these curves are a viable candidate for the practical implementation of 
pairing based cryptosystems as a result Efficient formulae have been derived for doubling 
a divisor and for extracting the functions that are required in M iller’s algorithm It has been 
shown how to choose an optimal subgroup order with a low Hamming weight, and how to 
implement the finite field arithmetic efficiently It has also been shown how the distortion 
map can be used to speed up the evaluation of the image divisor at the line function
A new variant o f Miller’s algorithm has been introduced for hyperelliptic curves with 
an even embedding degree This algorithm shows that it is never necessary to perform 
inversion when calculating the line functions in M iller’s algorithm, even if the image divisor 
is not o f a special form This algorithm is interesting in two ways First of all, it provides 
a nice historical bridge between the optimisations introduced by Galbraith et al [31], and 
those introduced by Barreto et al [5], as summarised in Table 6 5 Secondly, although this 
algorithm is not as fast as using denominator elimination in the general case, it can be faster 
when working with hyperelliptic curves of genus g >  1 and degenerate divisors
A theoretical analysis o f the cost o f computing the Tate pairing using our optimisations 
has been performed, and compared to previous results in the literature Finally, experimen­
tal results have been provided on the implementation of the Tate pairing In particular, our 
timings are the fastest reported in the literature to date by a considerable margin However, 
the timings show that pairing implementation on genus 2 curves over ¥ p is about twice as 
slow as pairing implementation on elliptic curves over ¥ p with an equivalent level o f secu­
rity If  this performance gap is to be bridged, it will be necessary to derive ordinary genus 2 






It was shown that the Tate pairing can be computed m an efficient manner using super- 
singular genus 2 curves over finite fields o f characteristic 2 The best choice of curve to 
use was investigated, and an octupling automorphism was obtained on the selected curves 
Rather than compute the functions that are required m Miller's algorithm from the Cantor 
composition and reduction of divisors, explicit formulae were provided that were derived 
using the octupling automorphism The idea of using degenerate divisors was explored It 
was shown how precomputation can be deployed to reduce the amount o f  computation to 
be performed in the algorithm itself The Frobemus endomorphism was also exploited to 
calculate some of the functions required m the algorithm
Furthermore, it was shown how it is possible to achieve a more efficient pairing calcula­
tion by utilising the 77 pairing construct In the genus 2 case, the 77 pairing requires a longer 
loop size in M iller’s algorithm than the standard Tate pairing However, the rj pairing has 
many advantages over the Tate pairing, such as the removal of additions from the loop and 
a final exponentiation that can be easily computed The genus 2 rj painng is also far simpler 
to implement than the version of the algorithm that used the Frobemus endomorphism to 
expedite the computation It was then shown how a specific instance of the 77 painng can
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be computed without the final exponentiation, assuming that the evaluation of the vertical 
line functions is included in the algorithm This was the first time that any method for 
computing the Tate pairing was shown to have this property
The truncated version of the // pairing, the q r  pairing, was then investigated This ap­
proach halves the number of loop iterations required in M iller’s algorithm compared to the 
7] pairing The disadvantages of the jj t  pairing are that an addition must be performed at 
the end of the loop, and that it has a more expensive final exponentiation than the rj pairing 
However, techniques were described to reduce the computational impact of both of these 
properties A comprehensive series of tests was then conducted, comparing the implemen­
tation of the genus 2 Tate, T] and rjr pairings using different security levels These results 
were compared to the efficiency of implementing the Tate pairing using supersingular el­
liptic curves of an equivalent level o f security The conclusion was that the genus 2 qp 
pairing yields the fastest pairing implementation over finite fields o f low characteristic that 
has been reported in the literature to date
The implementation of the Tate pairing using a supersingular genus 2 curve over a large 
prime field was then described A new variant o f M iller’s algorithm was derived that is 
more generic than the standard denominator elimination technique, and that can be useful 
m certain circumstances when using hyperelhptic curves of genus g > 1 Existing formulae 
for computing both the group law and the functions required for Miller’s algorithm were 
modified and improved It was also shown how the form o f the distortion map can be 
exploited to evaluate the intermediate functions in M iller’s algorithm more efficiently A 
theoretical analysis was performed against previous work, and a wide range of timings was 
reported using various standard levels of security These results were compared to existing 
results in the literature on pairing implementation using supersingular elliptic curves The 
conclusion was that pairing implementation on genus 2 curves m this context is slower than 
for elliptic curves, but still competitive
In summation, in this thesis it was demonstrated that pairing calculation using supersin­
gular genus 2 curves can be achieved efficiently This result implies that genus 2 curves are
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a valid alternative to using elliptic curves for implementing cryptographic protocols based 
on pairings This is a useful result, as it is good practice to have an alternative means to 
achieve anything m cryptography In a more practical sense, this result allows protocol 
designers to consider a wider range of curves for pairing implementation The actual se­
lection of curve parameters rests on a wide range of practical considerations, such as the 
computing platform or the language being used It is to be expected that elliptic curves will 
prove more useful for most circumstances This is due mainly to their simple description, 
which allows for an easier implementation by the non-speciahst However, we believe it is 
likely that genus 2 painngs will be deployed in certain niches, such as embedded hardware 
or low-powered devices
It is not necessary in mathematics to have any end goal in sight when considering an 
area in which to research Even if one does not accept the theoretical or practical rea­
sons given in the previous paragraph for considering genus 2 pairings, the study of genus 
2 curves cannot help but improve our knowledge about pairing implementation on elliptic 
curves An example from this thesis is that the inspiration for proving that there is no need 
for a final exponentiation for the r) pairing on supersingular elliptic curves came from ex­
perimentation with the genus 2 r] pairing Much work remains to be done on both the theory 
and implementation of pairings on hyperelhptic curves before one can be truly confident of 
the security o f  pairing based cryptography
7 2 Open Questions
There are a large number of open questions relating to (hyper)elliptic curve cryptography 
and the implementation of bilinear pairings However, in this section only questions that 
arise from the work in this thesis are examined Rubin and Silverberg [96] give an upper 
bound of k =  6 on the embedding degree of supersingular genus 2 curves over a large prime 
field F p Very recently, Galbraith et al [36] derived a suitable supersmgular genus 2 curve 
with this maximum embedding degree However, the curve in question is a real quadratic
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genus 2 curvc As pairing implementation has not as yet been attempted on such a curve, it 
is still an open question to derive a supersingular imaginary quadratic genus 2 curve with an 
embedding degree of k =  6 that is suitable for pairing implementation A curve with this 
maximum embedding degree would give additional advantages to genus 2 pairings over ¥ p 
Another open question is to find an ordinary genus 2 curve with a low embedding de­
gree It is important to do this for a number of reasons Firstly, to parallel the current re­
search that is being carried out on elliptic curves The literature on ordinary elliptic curves 
with a low embedding degree has expanded significantly in recent years This work has 
yielded a wide range of suitable curves over ¥ p However, there are as yet no known ordi­
nary elliptic curves over F 2™ with a low embedding degree (another open question in itself) 
Secondly, cryptographers have long had misgivings about using supersingular curves, due 
to a suspicion that the extra structure associated with such curves could be used in a de­
structive sense For example, supersingular curves are no longer used for cryptosystems 
based on the DLP in P ic ^ (F 5), due to the MOV/FR attack Ordinary curves with a low 
embedding degree are also vulnerable to these attacks However, it is possible that ordinary 
curves might be resistant to future attacks on supersingular curves in the context of pairings 
Thirdly, due to the work of Galbraith [32] and Rubin and Silverberg [96], it is known 
that there is a bound on the embedding degree o f all supersingular hyperelliptic curves that 
are interesting for cryptography This is particularly problematic over large prime fields, 
as only small embedding degrees can be obtained In contrast, ordinary elliptic curves 
are known to exist over F p with a large range of embedding degrees that are useful for 
implementation, such as k =  12 and k =  24 This is a significant advantage associated 
with ordinary curves, and it would be extremely useful to replicate this work in the genus 2 
context Another reason to consider ordinary curves is the paucity of suitable supersingular 
curves for pairing based cryptography over a given finite field It is desirable to be able to 
generate curves in a provably random fashion in order to generate confidence that the curve 
equation is not weak in some way
Fourthly, the recent work of Hess et al [48] in deriving the Ate pairing shows that
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pairing implementation on ordinary elliptic curves could be even more efficient than using 
supersmgular elliptic curves It is to be assumed that this result holds for ordinary genus
2 curves, however in the absence of any suitable curves it remains an open question The 
recent theory of the Ate pairing is the most powerful and comprehensive theoretical exam­
ination of the computation of the Tate pairing in rccent years However, there has been 
little extension or examination of the Ate pairing in the literature, and it is another open 
question as to whether the Ate pairing can be developed further Pairing implementation 
using both elliptic and genus 2 curves is fast approaching scalar multiplication in terms of 
efficiency It is possible that some modification of the Ate pairing might even enable pairing 
implementation to become faster than a general scalar multiplication
In chapter 5 o f this thesis, it was shown that the final exponentiation required to compute 
the 7] pairing can be avoided for certain curves, as long as the vertical line functions are 
included However, the mathematical proofs that are provided are unsatisfactory, as they 
do not address the more general question as to why this property holds A proof that all 77 
pairings are bilinear without the final exponentiation would be an interesting result A more 
specific and pressing question is to prove the genus 2 ?; case, as we have been unable to 
achieve this as yet An even more interesting question is whether this idea can be applied 
to the Ate pairing using ordinary elliptic curves over F p As the final exponentiation is 
generally expensive over F p, eliminating it using our technique might be more efficient 
than using denominator elimination
It may also be worth reconsidenng the value o f using hyperelliptic curves of higher 
genera for pairings In particular, little work has been done on using hyperelliptic curves 
o f  genus 3 Gaudry et al [40] recommend increasing the group size of hyperelliptic genus
3 curves by 12 5% to take their index-calculus attack into account However, this is not 
necessarily an impediment to using these curves for pairing based cryptography, if it can be 
shown that pairing calculation on hyperelliptic curves o f  genus 3 can be achieved in an effi­
cient manner In particular, the Ate pairing might yield an efficient pairing implementation 
on genus 3 hyperelliptic curves
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A.1 Absorbing powers of 8  for the genus 2 77 pairing
In Chapter 5, the genus 2 77 pairing is given as
m—1
v(P,Q)= n W W Q ) ) 8'"“ ",i=Q
where /8 jgljp =  a/3 In Chapter 4, it was shown how it is possible to precompute all o f 
the powers of x p  and yp  that are required m M iller’s algorithm The goal o f this section 
is to show how the exponentiation to 8m_1_î can be brought into the formulae for a  and 
P This optimisation avoids the need to explicitly octuple the accumulating variable /  each 
iteration of the loop Therefore, rather than compute a  and ¡3 each iteration, formulae are 
denved to compute a 23(m 1 and 1 l)
Calculating this efficiently requires the precomputation of certain powers of x q  and y Q , 
in addition to the precomputation of the powers of x p  and yp  mentioned above Two arrays 
o f  size m  are constructed, such that each index i in the arrays consists o f the value Xq and 
y*Q The first step in building the exponentiation into a  and (3 is to examine how w  and so 
behave under powering by Recall that w 8 — w  +  1 As m  is defined to be odd,
then m  — 1 — % =  i m od 2, and thus w 23(m 1 l) = w -f 71(2), where 71(2) is 1 when 1 is
174
odd and 0 otherwise Also note that as Sq + bo = w 5 ws , then s$ — so +  w 2, s[f =  + 1
and 5gJ = so + w 2 + I This can be generalised, so that when m  = 1 m od 4
50 = 6 0  +  7 1 (0 ^  + 7 3 (0 ,
and when rrt =  3 m od 4
g2J(OT l '> _  S() +  7l (t }w 2 +  +  ^
where 73(1) =  1 when 2 =  1,2 m od 4, and 0 otherwise Let 74(771, 2) denote the value 
73(2) when m =  1 m od 4, and 73(2) +  1 otherwise
As before, we write = x 2\  where % is considered modulo m Using the basis given 
m Chapter 4 for elements o f F 2i2ms the constant term of a 2d(m 1 %) is
y < 3 m - 2 - 3 . )  +  ( ^ - 2 - 3 0 ^  +  ( x (3 ,+ l )  +  * ( * ) )  ^ S m - 1 - 3 . )  +  +
+71 w  + 1)  + y p t ] + + 1
When m  — 1 — 1 (and hence 1) is odd, another term must be added to this This term is 
written as
71  ( 0  (■'•Qm ” 2_3l) +  l  +  7 l ( i )  +  -<-p!+ 1 ))  + 7 4 ( " 1 , 0
This can be simplified by writing 71 (0 (1  +  7 i (0 )  — 0’ cancelling various terms and sim­
plifying the cubing of The constant term of a 1S then
where 75(rn) =  1 if rn =  1 m od 4 and 0 otherwise The remaining terms are
(a^3" '- 1- 30 + z<®'"-2- 8‘)) w  +  + X(3,) + l) w 2 +
w4 4- so
The same process is now repeated for ¡3 The constant term of /323(m 1 '' is given as
^ - 3 - 3 . )  +  ^ ( * + 2 )  +  ^  ^ - 2 - 3 . )  +  ^ ( 3 !+ 2) +  ^ + 1 )  J  ^ m - J - 3 . )  +
?y|,3!+1) +  T ^ +1) ( l  +  7 1 «  +  r (r3 l+ 2 ))  +  7 3 ( 0  +  1, 
with the addition o f the term
71 (0 (xp‘+1) +  X q ' " ~ 2 ~ 3 ^  +  7i(i) +  l) + 7 4(m,t)
Simplifying this gives a constant term
( 3 m - 3 - 3 » )  , /  (3H -1 )  ( 3 m —2 —3 t ) \  ( 3 i + 2 )  /  ( 3 i + 2 )  ( 3 » + l ) \  ( J m - 3 - 3 . )
U q  ^  [ X p  ~ ^ X Q  J X P  y X P  - T X p  J  Q  -T-
Vp'+1) +  x ^ ‘+1) + 7 5 ( m )
The remaining terms are
( rg '+2> + r<3*+1>) w  + (t ^ " - 3- 3‘) +  r<p3'+2> +  l) ,W2 + 
^ g m - 2-3z) +  ^ m - 3 - 3 . ) ^  ^4  +  Sq
A.2 Absorbing powers of 8 for the genus 2 r jT  pairing
In Chapter 5, the octupling loop o f the genus 2 7^ pairing on the points P  and Q  is
( m - 3 ) / 2
where /8 [8,j P = a/3 The goal of this section is to modify the formulae for a  and ¡3 
given in Chapter 4 to avoid having to octuple the accumulating variable at each iteration of 
M iller’s algorithm This is done by absorbing the exponentiation to 2^m_3_2î)/2 into the 
formulae for a  and ¡3 As in the previous section, computing this efficiently requires the 
precomputation o f the values j,q and ¡Jq for all 0 <  i — 1 Firstly, it is necessary to 
examine how tu and î>q behave under powering by 23(m_3~2î)/2 As m  is odd, and hence 
(m -  3 — 2z)/2 =  i m od 2, then w 23{m 3 2%)!2 = w +  71(2) as before The values for
o 3 ( m  — 3 — 2 i ) / 2  - , , , „  n 3 ( m  —I —i)  ,Sq are also the same as the values given for Sq in the previous section
As before, we write xW =  x 2' , where i is considered modulo m  Using the basis given 
in Chapter 4 for elements o f F2i2m, the constant term of a 2’1’" J 2’l/2 is
( x ^ 3m - 7_6’) /2 ) ) 3 +  ^ x ((3m - 1+ 61) / 2) _|_ J_ « 3 m -3 + 6 i) /2 )^  x j ( 3 m - 6 i - 5 ) / 2 )  +
y ((3m - 7 - 6!)/2) +  ^ « 3 m - S + 8 , ) /2 )  +  j  +  ^  x « 3 m - 7 - 6 t )/2) +  ÿ « 3 m -3 + « ,) /2 )  +
73(0 + 1,
with the addition o f the term
7.(0 + 1 + 7l(0 + x«3m' 1+6,)/2)) + 74(m, 0
Adding these two terms together and simplifying gives
((3 m -7—60/2) /  ((3,11-1+60/2) ((3 » ,-3 + & )/2 )\ ((3m -5-6*)/2) ((3™ -3+6,)/2)
V q  -h  \ r p  +  T p  j  r Q  y p
( x « 3m “ 3+6>)/2) +  j  +  æ « 5m- , - 6 . ) / 2 ) ^  ^ - 7 - ^ , 2 )  +  ^
where 75(2) =  1 if  t = 1 m od 4 and 0 otherwise The remaining terms are
^ .( ( 3 m - 5 - 6 ,) /2 )  +  ^ - 7 - 6 0 / 2 ) ^  ^  +  +  ¿ ( Z m - 3 + 6 0 /2 ) +  ^ 2  +
( * « 3m- 1+6’ )/2> +  *«3m -3+ 6,)/2)j w 4 +  SQ
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The exponentiation on ¡3 is now examined The constant term of J 2ï)/2) is
y { p m - 9 - 6 i ) / 2 )  +  ^ ( ( 3 m + l + 6 0 / 2 )  ^ « 3 m - 7 - 6 z ) / 2 )  +  ÿ « 3 m - l + 6 i ) / 2 )  +
^ x ( (3 m + 1+ 6 i ) / 2 ) ^ ( ( 3 m - l + 6 i ) / 2 )  j  ^ ( ( 3 m - 9 - 6 i ) / 2 )
x « 3 m- l+ 6 , ) /2 )  ^ « 3 , , ,+ l+6,)/2)  +  7 j  ( î )  +  ^  +  7 s ( i )  +  ^
with the addition of the term
71 (t) (x « 3- 1+6'>/2) +  *«3m- 7- 6l)' 2> +  71«  +  l )  +  74(m ,.)
Performing this addition and simplifying yields the constant term
f ( 3 m - 9 - 6 i ) / 2 )  , /  ( ( 3 r n + l + 6 i ) / 2 )  ( ( 3 m - l + 6 i ) / 2 ) \  ( ( 3 m - 9 - 6 i ) / 2 )
V q  “f" y x p  ~ r  % p  J  x q  - r
( (3n , —1 + 6 0 / 2 )  ( ( 3 m + l + 6 T) / 2 )  /  ( ( 3 m - l + 6 0 / 2 )  . ( ( 3 m - 7 - C i ) / 2 ) \
y p  x p  y x p  ^ ~ x q  j  ^
X « 3m- l +6* )/2 )+ 7 5 W
The remaining terms are
( z « 3m +1+6i) /2) +  * « * » - 1 + 0 0 /* ) )  +  ^« S n H -l-W O /2 ) +  a.«Sm -9 -6 .) /2 )  +  ^ 2  +
^ « 3 „ 1- 7 - 6 0 /2 ) + ^ „ - 9 - 8 0 / 2 )  j |(>4 +  , 0
A 3 Unrolling the a/3 multiplication
In this section it is shown how to multiply two special elements of F 2i2m in an efficient 
manner, by exploiting the fact that both elements have a large number of zeros as coeffi­
cients Let a: =  a +  bw +  cw2 +  d.iu4 +  so and (3 — e Jw  -f- gw 2 +  hw A +  so, where 
a, ¡3 G F 2i2m are written in the basis that was constructed in chapter 4 The multiplication
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of a  and ¡3 can then be wntten as
<yp — (a +  bw +  cw 2 +  dtu4 +  6n)(c- +  f  w +  gw 2 +  hw 4 +  so)
=  ae +  a fw  +  a^iu2 +  ahw 4 a so +  be«; -b b fw 2 +  +
bhwb +  friuso +  ceit;2 +  c /u >3 +  q /u >4 +  ch(w 5 -f iu3 +  i/;2 +  1) +  
cw2so +  dew4 +  d /iy5 +  dg(w5 +  u >3 +  w2 +  1) +  d/i(iu +  1) +  
c/iu4so +  eso +  fwsQ  +  gw 2s o +  hw 4so +  (so +  iu5 +  w s )
Grouping all o f the relevant terms together gives
a/3 = (ae +  ch +  dg +  dh) +  (a j  +  be +  ¿//¿)u; +  (a</ +  6/  +  ce +  ch +  dg)w 2 +  
(bg + c f  + ch dg +  l)xy3 +  (ah  +  eg +  c/e)ui4 +
(b/i +  ch +  dj +  dg +  l)w 5 +  (a +  e +  l)so  +  (6 +  J ) wsq -F 
(c +  g)w 2s Q +  (rf +  ft)iu4so
This costs 16 multiplications in F 2m, which is a vast improvement on the 54 multiplica­
tions in F 2™ required for a general multiplication in F2i2m However, it is possible to save 
a further number of multiplications, by exploiting Karatsuba-likc optimisations First of all 
precompute the following values dh = d h ,dg  = d g ,ch  =  c h eg = c g ,a e  =  
a e, 6/  =  6 /  Then the multiplication is computed as
aj3 =  (ae +  ch +  d# +  d/i) +  ((a +  b )( f  +  e) +  ae +  b f  +  dh)w  +
((a +  c)(g  +  e) +  ae +  eg +  bf +  ch +  dg)w2 +
((b +  c)(g +  / )  +  b f  +  eg -f ch +  dg +  l )u ;3 +
((a +  d)(h  +  e) +  ae +  d/i +  cg)w 4 +
((6 +  d)(h  +  / )  +  bf  +  dh  +  ch -f ¿9 +  l)w 5 +
(a +  e +  l)so  +  (b +  /)w so  +  (c +  g)w 2so +  (d +  /i)iu4so
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Therefore, the total cost o f the af3 multiplication is only 11 multiplications in F 2™
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